OUT endpoint requests may somtimes have this flag set when
preparing to be submitted to HW indicating that there is an
additional TRB chained to the request for alignment purposes.
If that request is removed before the controller can execute the
transfer (e.g. ep_dequeue/ep_disable), the request will not go
through the dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_completed_request() handler
and will not have its needs_extra_trb flag cleared when
dwc3_gadget_giveback() is called. This same request could be
later requeued for a new transfer that does not require an
extra TRB and if it is successfully completed, the cleanup
and TRB reclamation will incorrectly process the additional TRB
which belongs to the next request, and incorrectly advances the
TRB dequeue pointer, thereby messing up calculation of the next
requeust's actual/remaining count when it completes.
The right thing to do here is to ensure that the flag is cleared
before it is given back to the function driver. A good place
to do that is in dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request().
Fixes: c6267a51639b ("usb: dwc3: gadget: align transfers to wMaxPacketSize") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jack Pham <jackp@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
[jackp: backport to <= 4.20: replaced 'needs_extra_trb' with 'unaligned'
and 'zero' members in patch and reworded commit text] Signed-off-by: Jack Pham <jackp@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The underlying assumption that one sparse section belongs into a single
numa node doesn't hold really. Robert Shteynfeld has reported a boot
failure. The boot log was not captured but his memory layout is as
follows:
This means that node0 starts in the middle of a memory section which is
also in node1. memmap_init_zone tries to initialize padding of a
section even when it is outside of the given pfn range because there are
code paths (e.g. memory hotplug) which assume that the full worth of
memory section is always initialized.
In this particular case, though, such a range is already intialized and
most likely already managed by the page allocator. Scribbling over
those pages corrupts the internal state and likely blows up when any of
those pages gets used.
Reported-by: Robert Shteynfeld <robert.shteynfeld@gmail.com> Fixes: 2830bf6f05fb ("mm, memory_hotplug: initialize struct pages for the full memory section") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Under heavy load if we don't have any pre-allocated rsps left, we
dynamically allocate a rsp, but we are not actually allocating memory
for nvme_completion (rsp->req.rsp). In such a case, accessing pointer
fields (req->rsp->status) in nvmet_req_init() will result in crash.
To fix this, allocate the memory for nvme_completion by calling
nvmet_rdma_alloc_rsp()
Fixes: 8407879c("nvmet-rdma:fix possible bogus dereference under heavy load") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Max Gurtovoy <maxg@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Raju Rangoju <rajur@chelsio.com> Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When calling smp_call_ipl_cpu() from the IPL CPU, we will try to read
from pcpu_devices->lowcore. However, due to prefixing, that will result
in reading from absolute address 0 on that CPU. We have to go via the
actual lowcore instead.
This means that right now, we will read lc->nodat_stack == 0 and
therfore work on a very wrong stack.
This BUG essentially broke rebooting under QEMU TCG (which will report
a low address protection exception). And checking under KVM, it is
also broken under KVM. With 1 VCPU it can be easily triggered.
During review I noticed that inner meta map setup for map in
map is buggy in that it does not propagate all needed data
from the reference map which the verifier is later accessing.
In particular one such case is index masking to prevent out of
bounds access under speculative execution due to missing the
map's unpriv_array/index_mask field propagation. Fix this such
that the verifier is generating the correct code for inlined
lookups in case of unpriviledged use.
Before patch (test_verifier's 'map in map access' dump):
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
In check_map_access() we probe actual bounds through __check_map_access()
with offset of reg->smin_value + off for lower bound and offset of
reg->umax_value + off for the upper bound. However, even though the
reg->smin_value could have a negative value, the final result of the
sum with off could be positive when pointer arithmetic with known and
unknown scalars is combined. In this case we reject the program with
an error such as "R<x> min value is negative, either use unsigned index
or do a if (index >=0) check." even though the access itself would be
fine. Therefore extend the check to probe whether the actual resulting
reg->smin_value + off is less than zero.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
For unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds, meaning their smin_value is
negative and their smax_value is positive, we need to reject arithmetic
with pointer to map value. For unprivileged the goal is to mask every
map pointer arithmetic and this cannot reliably be done when it is
unknown at verification time whether the scalar value is negative or
positive. Given this is a corner case, the likelihood of breaking should
be very small.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unprivileged users in that
arithmetic itself must not go out of bounds as opposed to the actual
access later on. Therefore after each adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with
a stack pointer as a destination we simulate a check_stack_access()
of 1 byte on the destination and once that fails the program is
rejected for unprivileged program loads. This is analog to map
value pointer arithmetic and needed for masking later on.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged users in that
arithmetic itself must not go out of bounds as opposed to the actual
access later on. Therefore after each adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with a
map value pointer as a destination it will simulate a check_map_access()
of 1 byte on the destination and once that fails the program is rejected
for unprivileged program loads. We use this later on for masking any
pointer arithmetic with the remainder of the map value space. The
likelihood of breaking any existing real-world unprivileged eBPF
program is very small for this corner case.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Right now we are using BPF ax register in JIT for constant blinding as
well as in interpreter as temporary variable. Verifier will not be able
to use it simply because its use will get overridden from the former in
bpf_jit_blind_insn(). However, it can be made to work in that blinding
will be skipped if there is prior use in either source or destination
register on the instruction. Taking constraints of ax into account, the
verifier is then open to use it in rewrites under some constraints. Note,
ax register already has mappings in every eBPF JIT.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This change moves the on-stack 64 bit tmp variable in ___bpf_prog_run()
into the hidden ax register. The latter is currently only used in JITs
for constant blinding as a temporary scratch register, meaning the BPF
interpreter will never see the use of ax. Therefore it is safe to use
it for the cases where tmp has been used earlier. This is needed to later
on allow restricted hidden use of ax in both interpreter and JITs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Move prev_insn_idx and insn_idx from the do_check() function into
the verifier environment, so they can be read inside the various
helper functions for handling the instructions. It's easier to put
this into the environment rather than changing all call-sites only
to pass it along. insn_idx is useful in particular since this later
on allows to hold state in env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
malicious bpf program may try to force the verifier to remember
a lot of distinct verifier states.
Put a limit to number of per-insn 'struct bpf_verifier_state'.
Note that hitting the limit doesn't reject the program.
It potentially makes the verifier do more steps to analyze the program.
It means that malicious programs will hit BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS sooner
instead of spending cpu time walking long link list.
The limit of BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES==64 affects cilium progs
with slight increase in number of "steps" it takes to successfully verify
the programs:
before after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1940 1940
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3089 3089
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1065 1065
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 28052 | 28162
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 35487 | 35541
bpf_netdev.o 10864 10864
bpf_overlay.o 6643 6643
bpf_lcx_jit.o 38437 38437
But it also makes malicious program to be rejected in 0.4 seconds vs 6.5
Hence apply this limit to unprivileged programs only.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
pathological bpf programs may try to force verifier to explode in
the number of branch states:
20: (d5) if r1 s<= 0x24000028 goto pc+0
21: (b5) if r0 <= 0xe1fa20 goto pc+2
22: (d5) if r1 s<= 0x7e goto pc+0
23: (b5) if r0 <= 0xe880e000 goto pc+0
24: (c5) if r0 s< 0x2100ecf4 goto pc+0
25: (d5) if r1 s<= 0xe880e000 goto pc+1
26: (c5) if r0 s< 0xf4041810 goto pc+0
27: (d5) if r1 s<= 0x1e007e goto pc+0
28: (b5) if r0 <= 0xe86be000 goto pc+0
29: (07) r0 += 16614
30: (c5) if r0 s< 0x6d0020da goto pc+0
31: (35) if r0 >= 0x2100ecf4 goto pc+0
Teach verifier to recognize always taken and always not taken branches.
This analysis is already done for == and != comparison.
Expand it to all other branches.
It also helps real bpf programs to be verified faster:
before after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 2003 1940
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3173 3089
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1080 1065
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 29584 28052
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 36916 35487
bpf_netdev.o 11188 10864
bpf_overlay.o 6679 6643
bpf_lcx_jit.o 39555 38437
Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
When kernel messages are printed to the console, they appear blank on
the unicode screen. This is because vt_console_print() is lacking a call
to vc_uniscr_putc(). However the later function assumes vc->vc_x is
always up to date when called, which is not the case here as
vt_console_print() uses it to mark the beginning of the display update.
This patch reworks (and simplifies) vt_console_print() so that vc->vc_x
is always valid and keeps the start of display update in a local variable
instead, which finally allows for adding the missing vc_uniscr_putc()
call.
Commit cbffaf7aa09e ("can: flexcan: Always use last mailbox for TX")
introduced a loop letting i run up to (including) ARRAY_SIZE(regs->mb)
and in the body accessed regs->mb[i] which is an out-of-bounds array
access that then resulted in an access to an reserved register area.
Later this was changed by commit 0517961ccdf1 ("can: flexcan: Add
provision for variable payload size") to iterate a bit differently but
still runs one iteration too much resulting to call
flexcan_get_mb(priv, priv->mb_count)
which results in a WARN_ON and then a NULL pointer exception. This
only affects devices compatible with "fsl,p1010-flexcan",
"fsl,imx53-flexcan", "fsl,imx35-flexcan", "fsl,imx25-flexcan",
"fsl,imx28-flexcan", so newer i.MX SoCs are not affected.
Fixes: cbffaf7aa09e ("can: flexcan: Always use last mailbox for TX") Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # >= 4.20 Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kyungtae Kim detected a potential integer overflow in bcm_[rx|tx]_setup()
when the conversion into ktime multiplies the given value with NSEC_PER_USEC
(1000).
Add a check for the given tv_usec, so that the value stays below one second.
Additionally limit the tv_sec value to a reasonable value for CAN related
use-cases of 400 days and ensure all values to be positive.
Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com> Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # >= 2.6.26 Tested-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com> Acked-by: Andre Naujoks <nautsch2@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This patch revert commit 7da11ba5c506
("can: dev: __can_get_echo_skb(): print error message, if trying to echo non existing skb")
After introduction of this change we encountered following new error
message on various i.MX plattforms (flexcan):
| flexcan 53fc8000.can can0: __can_get_echo_skb: BUG! Trying to echo non
| existing skb: can_priv::echo_skb[0]
The introduction of the message was a mistake because
priv->echo_skb[idx] = NULL is a perfectly valid in following case: If
CAN_RAW_LOOPBACK is disabled (setsockopt) in applications, the pkt_type
of the tx skb's given to can_put_echo_skb is set to PACKET_LOOPBACK. In
this case can_put_echo_skb will not set priv->echo_skb[idx]. It is
therefore kept NULL.
As additional argument for revert: The order of check and usage of idx
was changed. idx is used to access an array element before checking it's
boundaries.
Signed-off-by: Manfred Schlaegl <manfred.schlaegl@ginzinger.com> Fixes: 7da11ba5c506 ("can: dev: __can_get_echo_skb(): print error message, if trying to echo non existing skb") Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The way we allocate events works fine in most cases, except
when multiple PCI devices share an ITS-visible DevID, and that
one of them is trying to use MultiMSI allocation.
In that case, our allocation is not guaranteed to be zero-based
anymore, and we have to make sure we allocate it on a boundary
that is compatible with the PCI Multi-MSI constraints.
Fix this by allocating the full region upfront instead of iterating
over the number of MSIs. MSI-X are always allocated one by one,
so this shouldn't change anything on that front.
The recent addition of SPDX license identifiers to the files in
drivers/net/ethernet/sun created a licensing conflict.
The cassini driver files contain a proper license notice:
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the
* License, or (at your option) any later version.
but the SPDX change added:
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
So the file got tagged GPL v2 only while in fact it is licensed under GPL
v2 or later.
It's nice that people care about the SPDX tags, but they need to be more
careful about it. Not everything under (the) sun belongs to ...
Fix up the SPDX identifier and remove the boiler plate text as it is
redundant.
Fixes: c861ef83d771 ("sun: Add SPDX license tags to Sun network drivers") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Shannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@oracle.com> Cc: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Shannon Nelson <shannon.lee.nelson@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The recent commit which prevented a division by 0 issue in the alarm timer
code broke posix CPU timers as an unwanted side effect.
The reason is that the common rearm code checks for timer->it_interval
being 0 now. What went unnoticed is that the posix cpu timer setup does not
initialize timer->it_interval as it stores the interval in CPU timer
specific storage. The reason for the separate storage is historical as the
posix CPU timers always had a 64bit nanoseconds representation internally
while timer->it_interval is type ktime_t which used to be a modified
timespec representation on 32bit machines.
Instead of reverting the offending commit and fixing the alarmtimer issue
in the alarmtimer code, store the interval in timer->it_interval at CPU
timer setup time so the common code check works. This also repairs the
existing inconistency of the posix CPU timer code which kept a single shot
timer armed despite of the interval being 0.
The separate storage can be removed in mainline, but that needs to be a
separate commit as the current one has to be backported to stable kernels.
Fixes: 0e334db6bb4b ("posix-timers: Fix division by zero bug") Reported-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190111133500.840117406@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
While in the native case entry into the kernel happens on the trampoline
stack, PV Xen kernels get entered with the current thread stack right
away. Hence source and destination stacks are identical in that case,
and special care is needed.
Other than in sync_regs() the copying done on the INT80 path isn't
NMI / #MC safe, as either of these events occurring in the middle of the
stack copying would clobber data on the (source) stack.
There is similar code in interrupt_entry() and nmi(), but there is no fixup
required because those code paths are unreachable in XEN PV guests.
[ tglx: Sanitized subject, changelog, Fixes tag and stable mail address. Sigh ]
Fixes: 7f2590a110b8 ("x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries") Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5C3E1128020000780020DFAD@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There was a bug where the per-mm pkey state was not being preserved across
fork() in the child. fork() is performed in the pkey selftests, but all of
the pkey activity is performed in the parent. The child does not perform
any actions sensitive to pkey state.
To make the test more sensitive to these kinds of bugs, add a fork() where
the parent exits, and execution continues in the child.
To achieve this let the key exhaustion test not terminate at the first
allocation failure and fork after 2*NR_PKEYS loops and continue in the
child.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: jroedel@suse.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190102215657.585704B7@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Memory protection key behavior should be the same in a child as it was
in the parent before a fork. But, there is a bug that resets the
state in the child at fork instead of preserving it.
The creation of new mm's is a bit convoluted. At fork(), the code
does:
1. memcpy() the parent mm to initialize child
2. mm_init() to initalize some select stuff stuff
3. dup_mmap() to create true copies that memcpy() did not do right
For pkeys two bits of state need to be preserved across a fork:
'execute_only_pkey' and 'pkey_allocation_map'.
Those are preserved by the memcpy(), but mm_init() invokes
init_new_context() which overwrites 'execute_only_pkey' and
'pkey_allocation_map' with "new" values.
The author of the code erroneously believed that init_new_context is *only*
called at execve()-time. But, alas, init_new_context() is used at execve()
and fork().
The result is that, after a fork(), the child's pkey state ends up looking
like it does after an execve(), which is totally wrong. pkeys that are
already allocated can be allocated again, for instance.
To fix this, add code called by dup_mmap() to copy the pkey state from
parent to child explicitly. Also add a comment above init_new_context() to
make it more clear to the next poor sod what this code is used for.
Fixes: e8c24d3a23a ("x86/pkeys: Allocation/free syscalls") Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: jroedel@suse.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190102215655.7A69518C@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The spec only requires the posted interrupt descriptor address to be
64-bytes aligned (i.e. bits[0:5] == 0). Using page_address_valid also
forces the address to be page aligned.
Only validate that the address does not cross the maximum physical address
without enforcing a page alignment.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6de84e581c0 ("nVMX x86: check posted-interrupt descriptor addresss on vmentry of L2") Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhuhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
From: Mark Mielke <mark.mielke@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This changes the allocation of cached_vmcs12 to use kzalloc instead of
kmalloc. This removes the information leak found by Syzkaller (see
Reported-by) in this case and prevents similar leaks from happening
based on cached_vmcs12.
It also changes vmx_get_nested_state to copy out the full 4k VMCS12_SIZE
in copy_to_user rather than only the size of the struct.
Tested: rebuilt against head, booted, and ran the syszkaller repro
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=174efca3400000 without
observing any problems.
Reported-by: syzbot+ded1696f6b50b615b630@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 8fcc4b5923af5de58b80b53a069453b135693304 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tom Roeder <tmroeder@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
KVM hypercalls return a negative value error code in case of a fatal
error, e.g. when the hypercall isn't supported or was made with invalid
parameters. WARN_ONCE on fatal errors when sending PV IPIs as any such
error all but guarantees an SMP system will hang due to a missing IPI.
Fixes: aaffcfd1e82d ("KVM: X86: Implement PV IPIs in linux guest") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The recognition of the KVM_HC_SEND_IPI hypercall was unintentionally
wrapped in "#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64", causing 32-bit KVM hosts to reject
any and all PV IPI requests despite advertising the feature. This
results in all KVM paravirtualized guests hanging during SMP boot due
to IPIs never being delivered.
Fixes: 4180bf1b655a ("KVM: X86: Implement "send IPI" hypercall") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The single-step debugging of KVM guests on x86 is broken: if we run
gdb 'stepi' command at the breakpoint when the guest interrupts are
enabled, RIP always jumps to native_apic_mem_write(). Then other
nasty effects follow.
Long investigation showed that on Jun 7, 2017 the
commit c8401dda2f0a00cd25c0 ("KVM: x86: fix singlestepping over syscall")
introduced the kvm_run.debug corruption: kvm_vcpu_do_singlestep() can
be called without X86_EFLAGS_TF set.
Let's fix it. Please consider that for -stable.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c8401dda2f0a00cd25c0 ("KVM: x86: fix singlestepping over syscall") Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The dm-crypt cipher specification in a mapping table is defined as:
cipher[:keycount]-chainmode-ivmode[:ivopts]
or (new crypt API format):
capi:cipher_api_spec-ivmode[:ivopts]
For ESSIV, the parameter includes hash specification, for example:
aes-cbc-essiv:sha256
The implementation expected that additional IV option to never include
another dash '-' character.
But, with SHA3, there are names like sha3-256; so the mapping table
parser fails:
Commit 00a0ea33b495 ("dm thin: do not queue freed thin mapping for next
stage processing") changed process_prepared_discard_passdown_pt1() to
increment all the blocks being discarded until after the passdown had
completed to avoid them being prematurely reused.
IO issued to a thin device that breaks sharing with a snapshot, followed
by a discard issued to snapshot(s) that previously shared the block(s),
results in passdown_double_checking_shared_status() being called to
iterate through the blocks double checking their reference count is zero
and issuing the passdown if so. So a side effect of commit 00a0ea33b495
is passdown_double_checking_shared_status() was broken.
Fix this by checking if the block reference count is greater than 1.
Also, rename dm_pool_block_is_used() to dm_pool_block_is_shared().
Fixes: 00a0ea33b495 ("dm thin: do not queue freed thin mapping for next stage processing") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Reported-by: ryan.p.norwood@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
memcpy_fromio() doesn't provide any control over access size. For example,
on arm64, it is implemented using readb and readq. This may trigger a
synchronous external abort:
Assuming aligned 32-bit registers, let's use readl, after making sure
that 'offset' and 'len' are indeed multiples of 4.
Fixes: ba80917d9932d ("scsi: ufs: ufshcd_dump_regs to use memcpy_fromio") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Gonzalez <marc.w.gonzalez@free.fr> Acked-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Hugo <jhugo@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Tested-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The _DSM function number validation only happens to succeed when the
generic Linux command number translation corresponds with a
DSM-family-specific function number. This breaks NVDIMM-N
implementations that correctly implement _LSR, _LSW, and _LSI, but do
not happen to publish support for DSM function numbers 4, 5, and 6.
Recall that the support for _LS{I,R,W} family of methods results in the
DIMM being marked as supporting those command numbers at
acpi_nfit_register_dimms() time. The DSM function mask is only used for
ND_CMD_CALL support of non-NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL devices.
In preparation for using function number 0 as an error value, prevent it
from being considered a valid function value by acpi_nfit_ctl().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: stuart hayes <stuart.w.hayes@gmail.com> Fixes: e02fb7264d8a ("nfit: add Microsoft NVDIMM DSM command set...") Reported-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
An integer overflow may arise in uinput_validate_absinfo() if "max - min"
can't be represented by an "int". We should check for overflow before
trying to use the result.
Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The usec part of the timeval is defined as
__kernel_suseconds_t tv_usec; /* microseconds */
Arnd noticed that sparc64 is the only architecture that defines
__kernel_suseconds_t as int rather than long.
This breaks the current y2038 fix for kernel as we only access and define
the timeval struct for non-kernel use cases. But, this was hidden by an
another typo in the use of __KERNEL__ qualifier.
Fix the typo, and provide an override for sparc64.
Fixes: 152194fe9c3f ("Input: extend usable life of event timestamps to 2106 on 32 bit systems") Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add support for the SteelSeries Stratus Duo, a wireless Xbox 360
controller. The Stratus Duo ships with a USB dongle to enable wireless
connectivity, but it can also function as a wired controller by connecting
it directly to a PC via USB, hence the need for two USD PIDs. 0x1430 is the
dongle, and 0x1431 is the controller.
Otherwise we gradually leak credits leading to potential
hung session.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When executing add_credits() we currently call cifs_reconnect()
if the number of credits is zero and there are no requests in
flight. In this case we may call cifs_reconnect() recursively
twice and cause memory corruption given the following sequence
of functions:
Fix this by avoiding to call cifs_reconnect() in add_credits()
and checking for zero credits in the demultiplex thread.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
We do need to account for credits received in error responses
to read requests on encrypted sessions.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Currently we mark MID as malformed if we get an error from server
in a read response. This leads to not properly processing credits
in the readv callback. Fix this by marking such a response as
normal received response and process it appropriately.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When doing MTU i/o we need to leave some credits for
possible reopen requests and other operations happening
in parallel. Currently we leave 1 credit which is not
enough even for reopen only: we need at least 2 credits
if durable handle reconnect fails. Also there may be
other operations at the same time including compounding
ones which require 3 credits at a time each. Fix this
by leaving 8 credits which is big enough to cover most
scenarios.
Was able to reproduce this when server was configured
to give out fewer credits than usual.
The proper fix would be to reconnect a file handle first
and then obtain credits for an MTU request but this leads
to bigger code changes and should happen in other patches.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When CONFIG_VGACON_SOFT_SCROLLBACK is selected, the VGA display memory
index and vc_visible_origin don't change when scrollback is activated.
The actual screen content is saved away and the scrollbackdata is copied
over it. However the vt code, and /dev/vcs devices in particular, still
expect vc_origin to always point at the actual screen content not the
displayed scrollback content.
So adjust vc_origin to point at the saved screen content when scrollback
is active and set it back to vc_visible_origin when restoring the screen.
This fixes /dev/vcsa<n> that return scrollback content when they
shouldn't (onli /dev/vcsa without a number should), and also fixes
/dev/vcsu that should return scrollback content when scrollback is
active but currently doesn't.
An unnecessary call to vga_set_mem_top() is also removed.
fc96df16a1ce is good and can already fix the "return stack garbage" issue,
but let's also improve hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo(), which would silently
return stack garbage, if people forget to check channel->state or
ring_info->ring_buffer, when using the function in the future.
Having an error check in the function would eliminate the potential risk.
Add a Fixes tag to indicate the patch depdendency.
Fixes: fc96df16a1ce ("Drivers: hv: vmbus: Return -EINVAL for the sys files for unopened channels") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Hyper-V memory hotplug protocol has 2M granularity and in Linux x86 we use
128M. To deal with it we implement partial section onlining by registering
custom page onlining callback (hv_online_page()). Later, when more memory
arrives we try to online the 'tail' (see hv_bring_pgs_online()).
It was found that in some cases this 'tail' onlining causes issues:
Turns out that we now have deferred struct page initialization for memory
hotplug so e.g. memory_block_action() in drivers/base/memory.c does
pages_correctly_probed() check and in that check it avoids inspecting
struct pages and checks sections instead. But in Hyper-V balloon driver we
do PageReserved(pfn_to_page()) check and this is now wrong.
Fix __might_sleep warning[1] in tty/n_hdlc.c read due to copy_to_user
call while current is TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE. This is a false positive
since the code path does not depend on current state remaining
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE. The loop breaks out and sets TASK_RUNNING after
calling copy_to_user.
This patch supresses the warning by setting TASK_RUNNING before calling
copy_to_user.
We were experiencing a crash similar to the one reported as part of
commit:a5ba1d95e46e ("uart: fix race between uart_put_char() and
uart_shutdown()") in our testbed as well. We continue to observe the same
crash after integrating the commit a5ba1d95e46e ("uart: fix race between
uart_put_char() and uart_shutdown()")
On reviewing the change, the port lock should be taken prior to checking for
if (!circ->buf) in fn. __uart_put_char and other fns. that update the buffer
uart_state->xmit.
Traceback:
[11/27/2018 06:24:32.4870] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
at virtual address 0000003b
Some tty line disciplines do not have a receive buf callback, so
properly check for that before calling it. If they do not have this
callback, just eat the character quietly, as we can't fail this call.
Because the irq was requested through device managed resources API
(devm_request_threaded_irq()) it was freed after meson_mmc_remove()
completion, thus after mmc_free_host() has reclaimed meson_host memory.
As this irq is IRQF_SHARED, while using CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ, its handler
get called by free_irq(). So meson_mmc_irq() was called after the
meson_host memory reclamation and was using invalid memory.
We ended up with the following scenario:
device_release_driver()
meson_mmc_remove()
mmc_free_host() /* Freeing host memory */
...
devres_release_all()
devm_irq_release()
__free_irq()
meson_mmc_irq() /* Uses freed memory */
To avoid this, the irq is released in meson_mmc_remove() and in
mseon_mmc_probe() error path before mmc_free_host() gets called.
Fix this by sanitizing ipcnum before using it to index pDrvData->IPCs.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
smp_rescan_cpus() is called without the device_hotplug_lock, which can lead
to a dedlock when a new CPU is found and immediately set online by a udev
rule.
This was observed on an older kernel version, where the cpu_hotplug_begin()
loop was still present, and it resulted in hanging chcpu and systemd-udev
processes. This specific deadlock will not show on current kernels. However,
there may be other possible deadlocks, and since smp_rescan_cpus() can still
trigger a CPU hotplug operation, the device_hotplug_lock should be held.
For reference, this was the deadlock with the old cpu_hotplug_begin() loop:
chcpu (rescan) systemd-udevd
echo 1 > /sys/../rescan
-> smp_rescan_cpus()
-> (*) get_online_cpus()
(increases refcount)
-> smp_add_present_cpu()
(new CPU found)
-> register_cpu()
-> device_add()
-> udev "add" event triggered -----------> udev rule sets CPU online
-> echo 1 > /sys/.../online
-> lock_device_hotplug_sysfs()
(this is missing in rescan path)
-> device_online()
-> (**) device_lock(new CPU dev)
-> cpu_up()
-> cpu_hotplug_begin()
(loops until refcount == 0)
-> deadlock with (*)
-> bus_probe_device()
-> device_attach()
-> device_lock(new CPU dev)
-> deadlock with (**)
Fix this by taking the device_hotplug_lock in the CPU rescan path.
Right now the early machine detection code check stsi 3.2.2 for "KVM"
and set MACHINE_IS_VM if this is different. As the console detection
uses diagnose 8 if MACHINE_IS_VM returns true this will crash Linux
early for any non z/VM system that sets a different value than KVM.
So instead of assuming z/VM, do not set any of MACHINE_IS_LPAR,
MACHINE_IS_VM, or MACHINE_IS_KVM.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The ASCE of an mm_struct can be modified after a task has been created,
e.g. via crst_table_downgrade for a compat process. The active_mm logic
to avoid the switch_mm call if the next task is a kernel thread can
lead to a situation where switch_mm is called where 'prev == next' is
true but 'prev->context.asce == next->context.asce' is not.
This can lead to a situation where a CPU uses the outdated ASCE to run
a task. The result can be a crash, endless loops and really subtle
problem due to TLBs being created with an invalid ASCE.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v3.15+ Fixes: 53e857f30867 ("s390/mm,tlb: race of lazy TLB flush vs. recreation") Reported-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
So far we've mapped branches to "ijmp" which also counts conditional
branches NOT taken. This makes us different from other architectures
such as ARM which seem to be counting only taken branches.
So use "ijmptak" hardware condition which only counts (all jump
instructions that are taken)
'ijmptak' event is available on both ARCompact and ARCv2 ISA based
cores.
In setup_arch_memory we reserve the memory area wherein the kernel
is located. Current implementation may reserve more memory than
it actually required in case of CONFIG_LINUX_LINK_BASE is not
equal to CONFIG_LINUX_RAM_BASE. This happens because we calculate
start of the reserved region relatively to the CONFIG_LINUX_RAM_BASE
and end of the region relatively to the CONFIG_LINUX_RAM_BASE.
For example in case of HSDK board we wasted 256MiB of physical memory:
------------------->8------------------------------
Memory: 770416K/1048576K available (5496K kernel code,
240K rwdata, 1064K rodata, 2200K init, 275K bss,
278160K reserved, 0K cma-reserved)
------------------->8------------------------------
Fix that.
Fixes: 9ed68785f7f2b ("ARC: mm: Decouple RAM base address from kernel link addr") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #4.14+ Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev <Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ARCv2 optimized memset uses PREFETCHW instruction for prefetching the
next cache line but doesn't ensure that the line is not past the end of
the buffer. PRETECHW changes the line ownership and marks it dirty,
which can cause issues in SMP config when next line was already owned by
other core. Fix the issue by avoiding the PREFETCHW
Some more details:
The current code has 3 logical loops (ignroing the unaligned part)
(a) Big loop for doing aligned 64 bytes per iteration with PREALLOC
(b) Loop for 32 x 2 bytes with PREFETCHW
(c) any left over bytes
loop (a) was already eliding the last 64 bytes, so PREALLOC was
safe. The fix was removing PREFETCW from (b).
Another potential issue (applicable to configs with 32 or 128 byte L1
cache line) is that PREALLOC assumes 64 byte cache line and may not do
the right thing specially for 32b. While it would be easy to adapt,
there are no known configs with those lie sizes, so for now, just
compile out PREALLOC in such cases.
The fixed clocks in the DTS file have a hyphen, but the clock driver has
the fixed clocks using underbar. Thus the clock driver cannot detect the
other fixed clocks correctly. Change the fixed clock names to a hyphen.
During the bootup of the kernel, the DAPM bias level is in the OFF
state. As soon as the DAPM framework kicks in it pushes the codec
into STANDBY state.
The probe function doesn't prepare the clock, and STANDBY state
does a clk_disable_unprepare() without checking the previous state.
This leads to an OOPS.
Not transitioning from an OFF state to the STANDBY state fixes the
problem.
Signed-off-by: b-ak <anur.bhargav@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
snap realm and corresponding inode have pointers to each other.
The two pointer should get clear at the same time. Otherwise,
snap realm's pointer may reference freed inode.
The patch "usb: simplify usbport trigger" together with "leds: triggers:
add device attribute support" caused an regression for the usbport
trigger. it will no longer enumerate any active usb hub ports under the
"ports" directory in the sysfs class directory, if the usb host drivers
are fully initialized before the usbport trigger was loaded.
The reason is that the usbport driver tries to register the sysfs
entries during the activate() callback. And this will fail with -2 /
ENOENT because the patch "leds: triggers: add device attribute support"
made it so that the sysfs "ports" group was only being added after the
activate() callback succeeded.
This version of the patch reverts parts of the "usb: simplify usbport
trigger" patch and restores usbport trigger's functionality.
We forgot to update ip6erspan version related info when changing link,
which will cause setting new hwid failed.
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Fixes: 94d7d8f292870 ("ip6_gre: add erspan v2 support") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Different frame variants known as "ERSPAN Types" can be
distinguished based on the GRE "Protocol Type" field value: Type I
and II's value is 0x88BE while Type III's is 0x22EB [ETYPES].
So set it properly in erspan_xmit() according to erspan_ver. While at
it, also remove the unused parameter 'proto' in erspan_fb_xmit().
Fixes: 94d7d8f29287 ("ip6_gre: add erspan v2 support") Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In changelink ops, the ip6gre_net pointer is retrieved from
dev_net(dev), which is wrong in case of x-netns. Thus, the tunnel is not
unlinked from its current list and is relinked into another net
namespace. This corrupts the tunnel lists and can later trigger a kernel
oops.
Fix this by retrieving the netns from device private area.
Fixes: c8632fc30bb0 ("net: ip6_gre: Split up ip6gre_changelink()") Cc: Petr Machata <petrm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Failure __ip_append_data triggers udp_flush_pending_frames, but these
tests happen later. The skb must be freed directly.
Fixes: bec1f6f697362 ("udp: generate gso with UDP_SEGMENT") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Recent changes (especially 05cd271fd61a ("cls_flower: Support multiple
masks per priority")) in the fl_flow_mask structure grow it and its
current size e.g. on x86_64 with defconfig is 760 bytes and more than
1024 bytes with some debug options enabled. Prior the mentioned commit
its size was 176 bytes (using defconfig on x86_64).
With regard to this fact it's reasonable to allocate this structure
dynamically in fl_change() to reduce its stack size.
v2:
- use kzalloc() instead of kcalloc()
Fixes: 05cd271fd61a ("cls_flower: Support multiple masks per priority") Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Cc: Paul Blakey <paulb@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Ido Schimmel [Fri, 18 Jan 2019 15:57:55 +0000 (15:57 +0000)]
mlxsw: pci: Ring CQ's doorbell before RDQ's
When a packet should be trapped to the CPU the device consumes a WQE
(work queue element) from an RDQ (receive descriptor queue) and copies
the packet to the address specified in the WQE. The device then tries to
post a CQE (completion queue element) that contains various metadata
(e.g., ingress port) about the packet to a CQ (completion queue).
In case the device managed to consume a WQE, but did not manage to post
the corresponding CQE, it will get stuck. This unlikely situation can be
triggered due to the scheme the driver is currently using to process
CQEs.
The driver will consume up to 512 CQEs at a time and after processing
each corresponding WQE it will ring the RDQ's doorbell, letting the
device know that a new WQE was posted for it to consume. Only after
processing all the CQEs (up to 512), the driver will ring the CQ's
doorbell, letting the device know that new ones can be posted.
Fix this by having the driver ring the CQ's doorbell for every processed
CQE, but before ringing the RDQ's doorbell. This guarantees that
whenever we post a new WQE, there is a corresponding CQE available. Copy
the currently processed CQE to prevent the device from overwriting it
with a new CQE after ringing the doorbell.
Note that the driver still arms the CQ only after processing all the
pending CQEs, so that interrupts for this CQ will only be delivered
after the driver finished its processing.
Before commit 8404f6f2e8ed ("mlxsw: pci: Allow to use CQEs of version 1
and version 2") the issue was virtually impossible to trigger since the
number of CQEs was twice the number of WQEs and the number of CQEs
processed at a time was equal to the number of available WQEs.
Fixes: 8404f6f2e8ed ("mlxsw: pci: Allow to use CQEs of version 1 and version 2") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Reported-by: Semion Lisyansky <semionl@mellanox.com> Tested-by: Semion Lisyansky <semionl@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When using a tc flower action of egress mirred redirect, the driver adds
an implicit FID setting action. This implicit action sets a dummy FID to
the packet and is used as part of a design for trapping unmatched flows
in OVS. While this implicit FID setting action is supposed to be a NOP
when a redirect action is added, in Spectrum-2 the FID record is
consulted as the dummy FID index is an 802.1D FID index and the packet
is dropped instead of being redirected.
Set the dummy FID index value to be within 802.1Q range. This satisfies
both Spectrum-1 which ignores the FID and Spectrum-2 which identifies it
as an 802.1Q FID and will then follow the redirect action.
Fixes: c3ab435466d5 ("mlxsw: spectrum: Extend to support Spectrum-2 ASIC") Signed-off-by: Nir Dotan <nird@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
1. In response to events in the netdev and inetaddr notification chains
2. When a network namespace is being dismantled
In both cases only routes associated with a dead nexthop group are
flushed. However, a nexthop group will only be marked as dead in case it
is populated with actual nexthops using a nexthop device. This is not
the case when the route in question is an error route (e.g.,
'blackhole', 'unreachable').
Therefore, when a network namespace is being dismantled such routes are
not flushed and leaked [1].
To reproduce:
# ip netns add blue
# ip -n blue route add unreachable 192.0.2.0/24
# ip netns del blue
Fix this by not skipping error routes that are not marked with
RTNH_F_DEAD when flushing the routing tables.
To prevent the flushing of such routes in case #1, add a parameter to
fib_table_flush() that indicates if the table is flushed as part of
namespace dismantle or not.
Note that this problem does not exist in IPv6 since error routes are
associated with the loopback device.
Spectrum-2 PHY layer introduces a calibration period which is a part of the
Spectrum-2 firmware boot process. Hence increase the SW timeout waiting for
the firmware to come out of boot. This does not increase system boot time
in cases where the firmware PHY calibration process is done quickly.
Fixes: c3ab435466d5 ("mlxsw: spectrum: Extend to support Spectrum-2 ASIC") Signed-off-by: Nir Dotan <nird@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Vhost dirty page logging API is designed to sync through GPA. But we
try to log GIOVA when device IOTLB is enabled. This is wrong and may
lead to missing data after migration.
To solve this issue, when logging with device IOTLB enabled, we will:
1) reuse the device IOTLB translation result of GIOVA->HVA mapping to
get HVA, for writable descriptor, get HVA through iovec. For used
ring update, translate its GIOVA to HVA
2) traverse the GPA->HVA mapping to get the possible GPA and log
through GPA. Pay attention this reverse mapping is not guaranteed
to be unique, so we should log each possible GPA in this case.
This fix the failure of scp to guest during migration. In -next, we
will probably support passing GIOVA->GPA instead of GIOVA->HVA.
Fixes: 6b1e6cc7855b ("vhost: new device IOTLB API") Reported-by: Jintack Lim <jintack@cs.columbia.edu> Cc: Jintack Lim <jintack@cs.columbia.edu> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
For nested and variable attributes, the expected length of an attribute
is not known and marked by a negative number. This results in an OOB
read when the expected length is later used to check if the attribute is
all zeros. Fix this by using the actual length of the attribute rather
than the expected length.
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com> Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@ovn.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Martin reported a set of filters don't work after changing
from reclassify to continue. Looking into the code, it
looks like skb protocol is not always fetched for each
iteration of the filters. But, as demonstrated by Martin,
TC actions could modify skb->protocol, for example act_vlan,
this means we have to refetch skb protocol in each iteration,
rather than using the one we fetch in the beginning of the loop.
This bug is _not_ introduced by commit 3b3ae880266d
("net: sched: consolidate tc_classify{,_compat}"), technically,
if act_vlan is the only action that modifies skb protocol, then
it is commit c7e2b9689ef8 ("sched: introduce vlan action") which
introduced this bug.
Reported-by: Martin Olsson <martin.olsson+netdev@sentorsecurity.com> Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
when the tunnel_key action is replaced, the kernel forgets to release the
dst metadata: ensure they are released by tunnel_key_init(), the same way
it's done in tunnel_key_release().
Fixes: d0f6dd8a914f4 ("net/sched: Introduce act_tunnel_key") Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The current code in __mdiobus_register() doesn't properly handle
failures returned by the devm_gpiod_get_optional() call: it returns
immediately, without unregistering the device that was added by the
call to device_register() earlier in the function.
This leaves a stale device, which then causes a NULL pointer
dereference in the code that handles deferred probing:
The actual error that we had from devm_gpiod_get_optional() was
-EPROBE_DEFER, due to the GPIO being provided by a driver that is
probed later than the Ethernet controller driver.
To fix this, we simply add the missing device_del() invocation in the
error path.
Fixes: 69226896ad636 ("mdio_bus: Issue GPIO RESET to PHYs") Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>