With this change, there will be a wakeup entry at /sys/../power/wakeup,
and the user could use this entry to choose whether enable xhci wakeup
features (wake up system from suspend) or not.
Another syzbot report [1] with no reproducer hints
at a bug in ip6_gre tunnel (dev:ip6gretap0)
Since ipv6 mcast code makes sure to read dev->mtu once
and applies a sanity check on it (see commit b9b312a7a451
"ipv6: mcast: better catch silly mtu values"), a remaining
possibility is that a layer is able to set dev->mtu to
an underflowed value (high order bit set).
This could happen indeed in ip6gre_tnl_link_config_route(),
ip6_tnl_link_config() and ipip6_tunnel_bind_dev()
Make sure to sanitize mtu value in a local variable before
it is written once on dev->mtu, as lockless readers could
catch wrong temporary value.
Use a temporary variable to take full advantage of READ_ONCE() behavior.
Without this, the report (and even the test) might be out of sync with
the initial test.
Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y5x7GXeluFmZ8E0E@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Fixes: 9fc9e278a5c0 ("panic: Introduce warn_limit") Fixes: d4ccd54d28d3 ("exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops") Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Running "make htmldocs" shows that "/sys/kernel/oops_count" was
duplicated. This should have been "warn_count":
Warning: /sys/kernel/oops_count is defined 2 times:
./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count:0
./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count:0
Fix the typo.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/202212110529.A3Qav8aR-lkp@intel.com Fixes: 8b05aa263361 ("panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs") Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Several run-time checkers (KASAN, UBSAN, KFENCE, KCSAN, sched) roll
their own warnings, and each check "panic_on_warn". Consolidate this
into a single function so that future instrumentation can be added in
a single location.
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com> Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org> Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com> Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com> Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-4-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an
attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look
completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if
each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and
this causes a counter to eventually overflow.
The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded
refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit
platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms
that much nowadays.)
So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.
The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like
how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically
important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or
a text console that oopses will be printed to.
In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork()
child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run
when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that
oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per
run.
(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing
happens under &die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor
of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock
contention.)
It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter
with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical
environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on
normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.
12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much
longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical
desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and
violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders
of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI
pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.
In linux-next, IA64_MCA_RECOVERY uses the (new) function
make_task_dead(), which is not exported for use by modules. Instead of
exporting it for one user, convert IA64_MCA_RECOVERY to be a bool
Kconfig symbol.
In a config file from "kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>" for a
different problem, this linker error was exposed when
CONFIG_IA64_MCA_RECOVERY=m.
arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c: In function 'die':
arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c:109:2: error: implicit declaration of function
'make_dead_task' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
109 | make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/h8300/mm/fault.c: In function 'do_page_fault':
arch/h8300/mm/fault.c:54:2: error: implicit declaration of function
'make_dead_task' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
54 | make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The function's name is make_task_dead(), change it so there is no more
build error.
Additionally, include linux/sched/task.h in arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
to avoid the same error because do_exit()'s declaration is in kernel.h
but make_task_dead()'s is in task.h, which is not included in traps.c.
Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.") Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211227184851.2297759-3-nathan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c:217:2: error: implicit declaration of
function 'make_dead_task' [-Werror,-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
make_dead_task(err);
^
The function's name is make_task_dead(), change it so there is no more
build error.
Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.") Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211227184851.2297759-2-nathan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Recently the kbuild robot reported two new errors:
>> lib/kunit/kunit-example-test.o: warning: objtool: .text.unlikely: unexpected end of section
>> arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.o: warning: objtool: oops_end() falls through to next function show_opcodes()
I don't know why they did not occur in my test setup but after digging
it I realized I had accidentally dropped a comma in
tools/objtool/check.c when I renamed rewind_stack_do_exit to
rewind_stack_and_make_dead.
Add that comma back to fix objtool errors.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/202112140949.Uq5sFKR1-lkp@intel.com Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There are two big uses of do_exit. The first is it's design use to be
the guts of the exit(2) system call. The second use is to terminate
a task after something catastrophic has happened like a NULL pointer
in kernel code.
Add a function make_task_dead that is initialy exactly the same as
do_exit to cover the cases where do_exit is called to handle
catastrophic failure. In time this can probably be reduced to just a
light wrapper around do_task_dead. For now keep it exactly the same so
that there will be no behavioral differences introducing this new
concept.
Replace all of the uses of do_exit that use it for catastraphic
task cleanup with make_task_dead to make it clear what the code
is doing.
As part of this rename rewind_stack_do_exit
rewind_stack_and_make_dead.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In order to avoid copy-pasting "panic_on_warn = 0" all over the places,
it is better to move it inside panic() and then remove it from the other
places.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1644324666-15947-4-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Xuefeng Li <lixuefeng@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Patch series "sysctl: first set of kernel/sysctl cleanups", v2.
Finally had time to respin the series of the work we had started last
year on cleaning up the kernel/sysct.c kitchen sink. People keeps
stuffing their sysctls in that file and this creates a maintenance
burden. So this effort is aimed at placing sysctls where they actually
belong.
I'm going to split patches up into series as there is quite a bit of
work.
This first set adds register_sysctl_init() for uses of registerting a
sysctl on the init path, adds const where missing to a few places,
generalizes common values so to be more easy to share, and starts the
move of a few kernel/sysctl.c out where they belong.
The majority of rework on v2 in this first patch set is 0-day fixes.
Eric Biederman's feedback is later addressed in subsequent patch sets.
I'll only post the first two patch sets for now. We can address the
rest once the first two patch sets get completely reviewed / Acked.
This patch (of 9):
The kernel/sysctl.c is a kitchen sink where everyone leaves their dirty
dishes, this makes it very difficult to maintain.
To help with this maintenance let's start by moving sysctls to places
where they actually belong. The proc sysctl maintainers do not want to
know what sysctl knobs you wish to add for your own piece of code, we
just care about the core logic.
Today though folks heavily rely on tables on kernel/sysctl.c so they can
easily just extend this table with their needed sysctls. In order to
help users move their sysctls out we need to provide a helper which can
be used during code initialization.
We special-case the initialization use of register_sysctl() since it
*is* safe to fail, given all that sysctls do is provide a dynamic
interface to query or modify at runtime an existing variable. So the
use case of register_sysctl() on init should *not* stop if the sysctls
don't end up getting registered. It would be counter productive to stop
boot if a simple sysctl registration failed.
Provide a helper for init then, and document the recommended init levels
to use for callers of this routine. We will later use this in
subsequent patches to start slimming down kernel/sysctl.c tables and
moving sysctl registration to the code which actually needs these
sysctls.
[mcgrof@kernel.org: major commit log and documentation rephrasing also moved to fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c ]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123202347.818157-1-mcgrof@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123202347.818157-2-mcgrof@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org> Cc: Qing Wang <wangqing@vivo.com> Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org> Cc: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr> Cc: Lukas Middendorf <kernel@tuxforce.de> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Phillip Potter <phil@philpotter.co.uk> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de> Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If the function sdma_load_context() fails, the sdma_desc will be
freed, but the allocated desc->bd is forgot to be freed.
We already met the sdma_load_context() failure case and the log as
below:
[ 450.699064] imx-sdma 30bd0000.dma-controller: Timeout waiting for CH0 ready
...
In this case, the desc->bd will not be freed without this change.
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-ppd.dtb: i2c-switch@70: $nodename:0: 'i2c-switch@70' does not match '^(i2c-?)?mux'
From schema: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/i2c-mux-pca954x.yaml
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-ppd.dtb: i2c-switch@70: Unevaluated properties are not allowed ('#address-cells', '#size-cells', 'i2c@0', 'i2c@1', 'i2c@2', 'i2c@3', 'i2c@4', 'i2c@5', 'i2c@6', 'i2c@7' were unexpected)
From schema: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/i2c-mux-pca954x.yaml
Fix this by renaming the PCA9547 node to "i2c-mux", to match the I2C bus
multiplexer/switch DT bindings and the Generic Names Recommendation in
the Devicetree Specification.
ignore_sysret() contains an unsuffixed SYSRET instruction. gas correctly
interprets this as SYSRETL, but leaving it up to gas to guess when there
is no register operand that implies a size is bad practice, and upstream
gas is likely to warn about this in the future. Use SYSRETL explicitly.
This does not change the assembled output.
intel_dp_check_mst_status() uses a 14-byte array to read the DPRX Event
Status Indicator data, but then passes that buffer at offset 10 off as
an argument to drm_dp_channel_eq_ok().
End result: there are only 4 bytes remaining of the buffer, yet
drm_dp_channel_eq_ok() wants a 6-byte buffer. gcc-11 correctly warns
about this case:
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c: In function ‘intel_dp_check_mst_status’:
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c:3491:22: warning: ‘drm_dp_channel_eq_ok’ reading 6 bytes from a region of size 4 [-Wstringop-overread]
3491 | !drm_dp_channel_eq_ok(&esi[10], intel_dp->lane_count)) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c:3491:22: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘const u8 *’ {aka ‘const unsigned char *’}
In file included from drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c:38:
include/drm/drm_dp_helper.h:1466:6: note: in a call to function ‘drm_dp_channel_eq_ok’
1466 | bool drm_dp_channel_eq_ok(const u8 link_status[DP_LINK_STATUS_SIZE],
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
6:14 elapsed
This commit just extends the original array by 2 zero-initialized bytes,
avoiding the warning.
There may be some underlying bug in here that caused this confusion, but
this is at least no worse than the existing situation that could use
random data off the stack.
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Baoquan reported that after triggering a crash the subsequent crash-kernel
fails to boot about half of the time. It triggers a NULL pointer
dereference in the periodic tick code.
This happens because the legacy timer interrupt (IRQ0) is resent in
software which happens in soft interrupt (tasklet) context. In this context
get_irq_regs() returns NULL which leads to the NULL pointer dereference.
The reason for the resend is a spurious APIC interrupt on the IRQ0 vector
which is captured and leads to a resend when the legacy timer interrupt is
enabled. This is wrong because the legacy PIC interrupts are level
triggered and therefore should never be resent in software, but nothing
ever sets the IRQ_LEVEL flag on those interrupts, so the core code does not
know about their trigger type.
Ensure that IRQ_LEVEL is set when the legacy PCI interrupts are set up.
Fixes: a4633adcdbc1 ("[PATCH] genirq: add genirq sw IRQ-retrigger") Reported-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87mt6rjrra.ffs@tglx Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3
driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding
reset tasks:
Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and
tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of
their code blocks. If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between
the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and
tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur.
Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior
to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another
deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER
tg3_io_error_detected() has executed:
Since this driver enables the interrupt by RIC2_QFE1, this driver
should clear the interrupt flag if it happens. Otherwise, the interrupt
causes to hang the system.
Note that this also fix a minor coding style (a comment indentation)
around the fixed code.
Fixes: c156633f1353 ("Renesas Ethernet AVB driver proper") Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com> Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Currently, if you bind the socket to something like:
servaddr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
servaddr.sin6_port = htons(0);
servaddr.sin6_scope_id = 0;
inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &servaddr.sin6_addr);
And then request a connect to:
connaddr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
connaddr.sin6_port = htons(20000);
connaddr.sin6_scope_id = if_nametoindex("lo");
inet_pton(AF_INET6, "fe88::1", &connaddr.sin6_addr);
What the stack does is:
- bind the socket
- create a new asoc
- to handle the connect
- copy the addresses that can be used for the given scope
- try to connect
But the copy returns 0 addresses, and the effect is that it ends up
trying to connect as if the socket wasn't bound, which is not the
desired behavior. This unexpected behavior also allows KASLR leaks
through SCTP diag interface.
The fix here then is, if when trying to copy the addresses that can
be used for the scope used in connect() it returns 0 addresses, bail
out. This is what TCP does with a similar reproducer.
syzbot reported a use-after-free in do_accept(), precisely nr_accept()
as sk_prot_alloc() allocated the memory and sock_put() frees it. [0]
The issue could happen if the heartbeat timer is fired and
nr_heartbeat_expiry() calls nr_destroy_socket(), where a socket
has SOCK_DESTROY or a listening socket has SOCK_DEAD.
In this case, the first condition cannot be true. SOCK_DESTROY is
flagged in nr_release() only when the file descriptor is close()d,
but accept() is being called for the listening socket, so the second
condition must be true.
Usually, the AF_NETROM listener neither starts timers nor sets
SOCK_DEAD. However, the condition is met if connect() fails before
listen(). connect() starts the t1 timer and heartbeat timer, and
t1timer calls nr_disconnect() when timeout happens. Then, SOCK_DEAD
is set, and if we call listen(), the heartbeat timer calls
nr_destroy_socket().
This path seems expected, and nr_destroy_socket() is called to clean
up resources. Initially, there was sock_hold() before nr_destroy_socket()
so that the socket would not be freed, but the commit 517a16b1a88b
("netrom: Decrease sock refcount when sock timers expire") accidentally
removed it.
To fix use-after-free, let's add sock_hold().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_accept+0x483/0x510 net/socket.c:1848
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807978d398 by task syz-executor.3/5315
RFC 9260, Sec 8.5.1 states that for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE, the chunk
MUST be accepted if the vtag of the packet matches its own tag and the
T bit is not set OR if it is set to its peer's vtag and the T bit is set
in chunk flags. Otherwise the packet MUST be silently dropped.
Update vtag verification for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE based on the above
description.
syzbot reminds us netlink_getname() runs locklessly [1]
This first patch annotates the race against nlk->portid.
Following patches take care of the remaining races.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_getname / netlink_insert
write to 0xffff88814176d310 of 4 bytes by task 2315 on cpu 1:
netlink_insert+0xf1/0x9a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:583
netlink_autobind+0xae/0x180 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:856
netlink_sendmsg+0x444/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1895
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x38f/0x500 net/socket.c:2476
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2530 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x19a/0x230 net/socket.c:2559
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2568 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2566 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2566
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
read to 0xffff88814176d310 of 4 bytes by task 2316 on cpu 0:
netlink_getname+0xcd/0x1a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1144
__sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2026
__do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2041 [inline]
__se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2038 [inline]
__x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:2038
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0xc9a49780
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 2316 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00030-ge8f60cd7db24-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The type of hash::nelems has been changed from size_t to atom_t
which in fact is int, so not need to check if BITS_PER_LONG, that
is bit number of size_t, is bigger than 32
and rht_grow_above_max() will be called to check if hashtable is
too big, ensure it can not bigger than 1<<31
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yu <zhangyu31@baidu.com> Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: c1bb9484e3b0 ("netlink: annotate data races around nlk->portid") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Skip interference with an ongoing transaction, do not perform garbage
collection on inactive elements. Reset annotated previous end interval
if the expired element is marked as busy (control plane removed the
element right before expiration).
If net_assign_generic() fails, the current error path in ops_init() tries
to clear the gen pointer slot. Anyway, in such error path, the gen pointer
itself has not been modified yet, and the existing and accessed one is
smaller than the accessed index, causing an out-of-bounds error:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ops_init+0x2de/0x320
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888109124978 by task modprobe/1018
zero_page is a void* pointer but memblock_alloc() returns phys_addr_t type
so this generates a warning while using clang and with -Wint-error enabled
that becomes and error. So let's cast the return of memblock_alloc() to
(void *).
In smbd_destroy(), clear the server->smbd_conn pointer after freeing the
smbd_connection struct that it points to so that reconnection doesn't get
confused.
Fixes: 8ef130f9ec27 ("CIFS: SMBD: Implement function to destroy a SMB Direct connection") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> Acked-by: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com> Cc: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
On transport recoonect, upper layer CIFS code destroys the current
transport and then recoonect. This code path is not used by SMBD, in that
SMBD destroys its transport on RDMA disconnect notification independent of
CIFS upper layer behavior.
This approach adds some costs to SMBD layer to handle transport shutdown
and restart, and to deal with several racing conditions on reconnecting
transport.
Re-work this code path by introducing a new smbd_destroy. This function is
called form upper layer to ask SMBD to destroy the transport. SMBD will no
longer need to destroy the transport by itself while worrying about data
transfer is in progress. The upper layer guarantees the transport is
locked.
change log:
v2: fix build errors when CONFIG_CIFS_SMB_DIRECT is not configured
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Stable-dep-of: b7ab9161cf5d ("cifs: Fix oops due to uncleared server->smbd_conn in reconnect") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Function 'create_hist_field' is called recursively at
trace_events_hist.c:1954 and can return NULL-value that's why we have
to check it to avoid null pointer dereference.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230111120409.4111-1-n.petrova@fintech.ru Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 30350d65ac56 ("tracing: Add variable support to hist triggers") Signed-off-by: Natalia Petrova <n.petrova@fintech.ru> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Currently trace_printk() can be used as soon as early_trace_init() is
called from start_kernel(). But if a crash happens, and
"ftrace_dump_on_oops" is set on the kernel command line, all you get will
be:
[ 0.456075] <idle>-0 0dN.2. 347519us : Unknown type 6
[ 0.456075] <idle>-0 0dN.2. 353141us : Unknown type 6
[ 0.456075] <idle>-0 0dN.2. 358684us : Unknown type 6
This is because the trace_printk() event (type 6) hasn't been registered
yet. That gets done via an early_initcall(), which may be early, but not
early enough.
Instead of registering the trace_printk() event (and other ftrace events,
which are not trace events) via an early_initcall(), have them registered at
the same time that trace_printk() can be used. This way, if there is a
crash before early_initcall(), then the trace_printk()s will actually be
useful.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230104161412.019f6c55@gandalf.local.home Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Fixes: e725c731e3bb1 ("tracing: Split tracing initialization into two for early initialization") Reported-by: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org> Tested-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
During a system boot, it can happen that the kernel receives a burst of
requests to insert the same module but loading it eventually fails
during its init call. For instance, udev can make a request to insert
a frequency module for each individual CPU when another frequency module
is already loaded which causes the init function of the new module to
return an error.
Since commit 6e6de3dee51a ("kernel/module.c: Only return -EEXIST for
modules that have finished loading"), the kernel waits for modules in
MODULE_STATE_GOING state to finish unloading before making another
attempt to load the same module.
This creates unnecessary work in the described scenario and delays the
boot. In the worst case, it can prevent udev from loading drivers for
other devices and might cause timeouts of services waiting on them and
subsequently a failed boot.
This patch attempts a different solution for the problem 6e6de3dee51a
was trying to solve. Rather than waiting for the unloading to complete,
it returns a different error code (-EBUSY) for modules in the GOING
state. This should avoid the error situation that was described in 6e6de3dee51a (user space attempting to load a dependent module because
the -EEXIST error code would suggest to user space that the first module
had been loaded successfully), while avoiding the delay situation too.
This has been tested on linux-next since December 2022 and passes
all kmod selftests except test 0009 with module compression enabled
but it has been confirmed that this issue has existed and has gone
unnoticed since prior to this commit and can also be reproduced without
module compression with a simple usleep(5000000) on tools/modprobe.c [0].
These failures are caused by hitting the kernel mod_concurrent_max and can
happen either due to a self inflicted kernel module auto-loead DoS somehow
or on a system with large CPU count and each CPU count incorrectly triggering
many module auto-loads. Both of those issues need to be fixed in-kernel.
Fixes: 6e6de3dee51a ("kernel/module.c: Only return -EEXIST for modules that have finished loading") Co-developed-by: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
[mcgrof: enhance commit log with testing and kmod test result interpretation ] Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The 'h' is a pointer to struct ctlr_info, so it's just 4 or 8 bytes, while
the structure itself is much bigger.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: edd163687ea5 ("hpsa: add driver for HP Smart Array controllers.") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118031255.GE15213@altlinux.org Signed-off-by: Alexey V. Vissarionov <gremlin@altlinux.org> Acked-by: Don Brace <don.brace@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Since the commit c3d98ea08291 ("VFS: Don't use save/replace_mount_options
if not using generic_show_options") eliminates replace_mount_options
in reiserfs_remount, but does not handle the allocated new_opts,
it will cause memory leak in the reiserfs_remount.
Because new_opts is useless in reiserfs_mount, so we fix this bug by
removing the useless new_opts in reiserfs_remount.
Fixes: c3d98ea08291 ("VFS: Don't use save/replace_mount_options if not using generic_show_options") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211027143445.4156459-1-mudongliangabcd@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu <mudongliangabcd@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
It is possible to return a pointer to a local variable when looking up
the architecture name for the running system and no normalization is
done on that value, i.e. we may end up returning the uts.machine local
variable.
While this doesn't happen on most arches, as normalization takes place,
lets fix this by making that a static variable and optimize it a bit by
not always running uname(), only the first time.
Don't use a WARN_ON when printing a potentially user triggered
condition. Also don't print the partno when the block device name
already includes it, and use the %pg specifier to simplify printing
the block device name.
client sends a SYN, but $Host is unreachable/silent.
Client eventually gives up and the conntrack entry will time out.
However, if the client is restarted with same addr/port pair, it
may prevent the conntrack entry from timing out.
This is noticeable when the existing conntrack entry has no NAT
transformation or an outdated one and port reuse happens either
on client or due to a NAT middlebox.
This change prevents refresh of the timeout for SYN retransmits,
so entry is going away after nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_syn_sent
seconds (default: 60).
Entry will be re-created on next connection attempt, but then
nat rules will be evaluated again.
I got the following WARNING message while removing driver(ds2482):
------------[ cut here ]------------
do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<000000002d50bfb6>] w1_process+0x9e/0x1d0 [wire]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 262 at kernel/sched/core.c:9817 __might_sleep+0x98/0xa0
CPU: 0 PID: 262 Comm: w1_bus_master1 Tainted: G N 6.1.0-rc3+ #307
RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x98/0xa0
Call Trace:
exit_signals+0x6c/0x550
do_exit+0x2b4/0x17e0
kthread_exit+0x52/0x60
kthread+0x16d/0x1e0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
The state of task is set to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE in loop in w1_process(),
set it to TASK_RUNNING when it breaks out of the loop to avoid the
warning.
I got a deadloop report while doing device(ds2482) add/remove test:
[ 162.241881] w1_master_driver w1_bus_master1: Waiting for w1_bus_master1 to become free: refcnt=1.
[ 163.272251] w1_master_driver w1_bus_master1: Waiting for w1_bus_master1 to become free: refcnt=1.
[ 164.296157] w1_master_driver w1_bus_master1: Waiting for w1_bus_master1 to become free: refcnt=1.
...
__w1_remove_master_device() can't return, because the dev->refcnt is not zero.
w1_add_master_device() |
w1_alloc_dev() |
atomic_set(&dev->refcnt, 2) |
kthread_run() |
|__w1_remove_master_device()
| kthread_stop()
// KTHREAD_SHOULD_STOP is set, |
// threadfn(w1_process) won't be |
// called. |
kthread() |
| // refcnt will never be 0, it's deadloop.
| while (atomic_read(&dev->refcnt)) {...}
After calling w1_add_master_device(), w1_process() is not really
invoked, before w1_process() starting, if kthread_stop() is called
in __w1_remove_master_device(), w1_process() will never be called,
the refcnt can not be decreased, then it causes deadloop in remove
function because of non-zero refcnt.
We need to make sure w1_process() is really started, so move the
set refcnt into w1_process() to fix this problem.
While one cpu is working on looking up the right socket from ehash
table, another cpu is done deleting the request socket and is about
to add (or is adding) the big socket from the table. It means that
we could miss both of them, even though it has little chance.
Let me draw a call trace map of the server side.
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
tcp_v4_rcv() syn_recv_sock()
inet_ehash_insert()
-> sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(osk)
__inet_lookup_established()
-> __sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(sk, list)
Notice that the CPU 0 is receiving the data after the final ack
during 3-way shakehands and CPU 1 is still handling the final ack.
Why could this be a real problem?
This case is happening only when the final ack and the first data
receiving by different CPUs. Then the server receiving data with
ACK flag tries to search one proper established socket from ehash
table, but apparently it fails as my map shows above. After that,
the server fetches a listener socket and then sends a RST because
it finds a ACK flag in the skb (data), which obeys RST definition
in RFC 793.
Besides, Eric pointed out there's one more race condition where it
handles tw socket hashdance. Only by adding to the tail of the list
before deleting the old one can we avoid the race if the reader has
already begun the bucket traversal and it would possibly miss the head.
Many thanks to Eric for great help from beginning to end.
Add missing cleanup in devm_platform_ioremap_resource().
When probe fails remove dma channel resources and disable clocks in
accordance with the order of resources allocated .
Signed-off-by: Swati Agarwal <swati.agarwal@xilinx.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220817061125.4720-2-swati.agarwal@xilinx.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 596b53ccc36a ("dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
AXI-DMA IP supports configurable (c_sg_length_width) buffer length
register width, hence read buffer length (xlnx,sg-length-width) DT
property and ensure that driver doesn't program buffer length
exceeding the supported limit. For VDMA and CDMA there is no change.
Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@xilinx.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Merello <andrea.merello@gmail.com> [rebase, reword] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 596b53ccc36a ("dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This patch removes a bit of duplicated code by introducing a new
function that implements calculations for DMA copy size, and
prepares for changes to the copy size calculation that will
happen in following patches.
Suggested-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Merello <andrea.merello@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@xilinx.com> Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 596b53ccc36a ("dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
betopff_init() only checks the total sum of the report counts for each
report field to be at least 4, but hid_betopff_play() expects 4 report
fields.
A device advertising an output report with one field and 4 report counts
would pass the check but crash the kernel with a NULL pointer dereference
in hid_betopff_play().
PTP TX timestamp handling was observed to be broken with this driver
when using the raw Layer 2 PTP encapsulation. ptp4l was not receiving
the expected TX timestamp after transmitting a packet, causing it to
enter a failure state.
The problem appears to be due to the way that the driver pads packets
which are smaller than the Ethernet minimum of 60 bytes. If headroom
space was available in the SKB, this caused the driver to move the data
back to utilize it. However, this appears to cause other data references
in the SKB to become inconsistent. In particular, this caused the
ptp_one_step_sync function to later (in the TX completion path) falsely
detect the packet as a one-step SYNC packet, even when it was not, which
caused the TX timestamp to not be processed when it should be.
Using the headroom for this purpose seems like an unnecessary complexity
as this is not a hot path in the driver, and in most cases it appears
that there is sufficient tailroom to not require using the headroom
anyway. Remove this usage of headroom to prevent this inconsistency from
occurring and causing other problems.
Fixes: 653e92a9175e ("net: macb: add support for padding and fcs computation") Signed-off-by: Robert Hancock <robert.hancock@calian.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Tested-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com> # on SAMA7G5 Reviewed-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The first time dma_chan_get() is called for a channel the channel
client_count is incorrectly incremented twice for public channels,
first in balance_ref_count(), and again prior to returning. This
results in an incorrect client count which will lead to the
channel resources not being freed when they should be. A simple
test of repeated module load and unload of async_tx on a Dell
Power Edge R7425 also shows this resulting in a kref underflow
warning.
cat /sys/class/dma/dma0chan*/in_use would get the wrong result.
2
2
2
Fixes: d2f4f99db3e9 ("dmaengine: Rework dma_chan_get") Signed-off-by: Koba Ko <koba.ko@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Jie Hai <haijie1@huawei.com> Test-by: Jie Hai <haijie1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Tested-by: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221201030050.978595-1-koba.ko@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Eliminate anonymous module_init() and module_exit(), which can lead to
confusion or ambiguity when reading System.map, crashes/oops/bugs,
or an initcall_debug log.
Give each of these init and exit functions unique driver-specific
names to eliminate the anonymous names.
As per the documentation, function usb_ep_free_request guarantees
the request will not be queued or no longer be re-queued (or
otherwise used). However, with the current implementation it
doesn't make sure that the request in ep0 isn't reused.
Fix this by dequeuing the ep0req on functionfs_unbind before
freeing the request to align with the definition.
While performing fast composition switch, there is a possibility that the
process of ffs_ep0_write/ffs_ep0_read get into a race condition
due to ep0req being freed up from functionfs_unbind.
Consider the scenario that the ffs_ep0_write calls the ffs_ep0_queue_wait
by taking a lock &ffs->ev.waitq.lock. However, the functionfs_unbind isn't
bounded so it can go ahead and mark the ep0req to NULL, and since there
is no NULL check in ffs_ep0_queue_wait we will end up in use-after-free.
Fix this by making a serialized execution between the two functions using
a mutex_lock(ffs->mutex).
Add a check for empty report_list in hid_validate_values().
The missing check causes a type confusion when issuing a list_entry()
on an empty report_list.
The problem is caused by the assumption that the device must
have valid report_list. While this will be true for all normal HID
devices, a suitably malicious device can violate the assumption.
Fixes: 1b15d2e5b807 ("HID: core: fix validation of report id 0") Signed-off-by: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The caller may pass any value as addr, what may result in an out-of-bounds
access to array mdio_map. One existing case is stmmac_init_phy() that
may pass -1 as addr. Therefore validate addr before using it.
Fixes: 7f854420fbfe ("phy: Add API for {un}registering an mdio device to a bus.") Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cdf664ea-3312-e915-73f8-021678d08887@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Packet len computed as difference of length word extracted from
skb data and four may result in a negative value. In such case
processing of the buffer should be interrupted rather than
setting sr_skb->len to an unexpectedly large value (due to cast
from signed to unsigned integer) and passing sr_skb to
usbnet_skb_return.
Since resplen and respoffs are signed integers sufficiently
large values of unsigned int len and offset members of RNDIS
response will result in negative values of prior variables.
This may be utilized to bypass implemented security checks
to either extract memory contents by manipulating offset or
overflow the data buffer via memcpy by manipulating both
offset and len.
Additionally assure that sum of resplen and respoffs does not
overflow so buffer boundaries are kept.
Fixes: 80f8c5b434f9 ("rndis_wlan: copy only useful data from rndis_command respond") Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230111175031.7049-1-szymon.heidrich@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Fix a use-after-free that occurs in kfree_skb() called from
local_cleanup(). This could happen when killing nfc daemon (e.g. neard)
after detaching an nfc device.
When detaching an nfc device, local_cleanup() called from
nfc_llcp_unregister_device() frees local->rx_pending and decreases
local->ref by kref_put() in nfc_llcp_local_put().
In the terminating process, nfc daemon releases all sockets and it leads
to decreasing local->ref. After the last release of local->ref,
local_cleanup() called from local_release() frees local->rx_pending
again, which leads to the bug.
Setting local->rx_pending to NULL in local_cleanup() could prevent
use-after-free when local_cleanup() is called twice.
Fixes: 3536da06db0b ("NFC: llcp: Clean local timers and works when removing a device") Signed-off-by: Jisoo Jang <jisoo.jang@yonsei.ac.kr> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230111131914.3338838-1-jisoo.jang@yonsei.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.
However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.
To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.
The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:
[...]
// r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
// r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
// r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
//
r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
*(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
// lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
//
// Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor
// for no r9-r10 dependency.
//
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr
// 2039f26f3aca: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID,
// store may be subject to SSB
//
// fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr
//
r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8)
// r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr
//
// leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel:
r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak
if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredict
// architecturally dead code if input r6 is 0,
// only executes speculatively iff ptr bit is 1
r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) # encode bit in cache (0: slow, 1: fast)
SLOW:
[...]
After running this, the program can time the access to *(r7 + 0) to
determine whether the chosen pointer bit was 0 or 1. Repeat this 64
times to recover the whole address on amd64.
In summary, sanitization can only be skipped if one scalar is
overwritten with another scalar. Scalar-confusion due to speculative
store bypass can not lead to invalid accesses because the pointer
bounds deducted during verification are enforced using branchless
logic. See 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on
pointer arithmetic") for details.
Do not make the mitigation depend on !env->allow_{uninit_stack,ptr_leaks}
because speculative leaks are likely unexpected if these were enabled.
For example, leaking the address to a protected log file may be acceptable
while disabling the mitigation might unintentionally leak the address
into the cached-state of a map that is accessible to unprivileged
processes.
AN restart triggered during KR training not only aborts the KR training
process but also move the HW to unstable state. Driver has to wait upto
500ms or until the KR training is completed before restarting AN cycle.
Fixes: 7c12aa08779c ("amd-xgbe: Move the PHY support into amd-xgbe") Co-developed-by: Sudheesh Mavila <sudheesh.mavila@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sudheesh Mavila <sudheesh.mavila@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Raju Rangoju <Raju.Rangoju@amd.com> Acked-by: Shyam Sundar S K <Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
There is difference in the TX Flow Control registers (TFCR) between the
revisions of the hardware. The older revisions of hardware used to have
single register per queue. Whereas, the newer revision of hardware (from
ver 30H onwards) have one register per priority.
Update the driver to use the TFCR based on the reported version of the
hardware.
When aops->write_begin() does not initialize fsdata, KMSAN may report
an error passing the latter to aops->write_end().
Fix this by unconditionally initializing fsdata.
Fixes: f2b6a16eb8f5 ("fs: affs convert to new aops") Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Fix three error exit issues in expected receive setup.
Re-arrange error exits to increase readability.
Issues and fixes:
1. Possible missed page unpin if tidlist copyout fails and
not all pinned pages where made part of a TID.
Fix: Unpin the unused pages.
2. Return success with unset return values tidcnt and length
when no pages were pinned.
Fix: Return -ENOSPC if no pages were pinned.
3. Return success with unset return values tidcnt and length when
no rcvarray entries available.
Fix: Return -ENOSPC if no rcvarray entries are available.
Fixes: 7e7a436ecb6e ("staging/hfi1: Add TID entry program function body") Fixes: 97736f36dbeb ("IB/hfi1: Validate page aligned for a given virtual addres") Fixes: f404ca4c7ea8 ("IB/hfi1: Refactor hfi_user_exp_rcv_setup() IOCTL") Signed-off-by: Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/167328548150.1472310.1492305874804187634.stgit@awfm-02.cornelisnetworks.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To avoid a race, reserve the number of user expected
TIDs before setup.
Fixes: 7e7a436ecb6e ("staging/hfi1: Add TID entry program function body") Signed-off-by: Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/167328547636.1472310.7419712824785353905.stgit@awfm-02.cornelisnetworks.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
A zero length user buffer makes no sense and the code
does not handle it correctly. Instead, reject a
zero length as invalid.
Fixes: 97736f36dbeb ("IB/hfi1: Validate page aligned for a given virtual addres") Signed-off-by: Dean Luick <dean.luick@cornelisnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/167328547120.1472310.6362802432127399257.stgit@awfm-02.cornelisnetworks.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6dl-gw560x.dtb: serial@2020000: rts-gpios: False schema does not allow [[20, 1, 0]]
From schema: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/fsl-imx-uart.yaml
The imx6qdl-gw560x board does not expose the UART RTS and CTS
as native UART pins, so 'uart-has-rtscts' should not be used.
Using 'uart-has-rtscts' with 'rts-gpios' is an invalid combination
detected by serial.yaml.
Fix the problem by removing the incorrect 'uart-has-rtscts' property.
Therefore, replace the TYPE_ALIGN macro with the _Alignof builtin to
avoid undefined behavior. (_Alignof itself is C11 and the kernel is
built with -gnu11).
ISO C11 _Alignof is subtly different from the GNU C extension
__alignof__. Latter is the preferred alignment and _Alignof the
minimal alignment. For long long on x86 these are 8 and 4
respectively.
The macro TYPE_ALIGN's behavior matches _Alignof rather than
__alignof__.
Eric writes:
I recommend not backporting this patch or the other three
patches apparently intended to support it to 4.19 stable. All
these patches are related to ext4's bigalloc feature, which was
experimental as of 4.19 (expressly noted by contemporary
versions of e2fsprogs) and also suffered from a number of bugs.
A significant number of additional patches that were applied to
5.X kernels over time would have to be backported to 4.19 for
the patch below to function correctly. It's really not worth
doing that given bigalloc's experimental status as of 4.19 and
the very rare combination of the bigalloc and inline features.
Eric writes:
I recommend not backporting this patch or the other three
patches apparently intended to support it to 4.19 stable. All
these patches are related to ext4's bigalloc feature, which was
experimental as of 4.19 (expressly noted by contemporary
versions of e2fsprogs) and also suffered from a number of bugs.
A significant number of additional patches that were applied to
5.X kernels over time would have to be backported to 4.19 for
the patch below to function correctly. It's really not worth
doing that given bigalloc's experimental status as of 4.19 and
the very rare combination of the bigalloc and inline features.
Eric writes:
I recommend not backporting this patch or the other three
patches apparently intended to support it to 4.19 stable. All
these patches are related to ext4's bigalloc feature, which was
experimental as of 4.19 (expressly noted by contemporary
versions of e2fsprogs) and also suffered from a number of bugs.
A significant number of additional patches that were applied to
5.X kernels over time would have to be backported to 4.19 for
the patch below to function correctly. It's really not worth
doing that given bigalloc's experimental status as of 4.19 and
the very rare combination of the bigalloc and inline features.
Eric writes:
I recommend not backporting this patch or the other three
patches apparently intended to support it to 4.19 stable. All
these patches are related to ext4's bigalloc feature, which was
experimental as of 4.19 (expressly noted by contemporary
versions of e2fsprogs) and also suffered from a number of bugs.
A significant number of additional patches that were applied to
5.X kernels over time would have to be backported to 4.19 for
the patch below to function correctly. It's really not worth
doing that given bigalloc's experimental status as of 4.19 and
the very rare combination of the bigalloc and inline features.
We can get EFI variables without fetching the attribute, so we must
allow for that in gsmi.
commit 859748255b43 ("efi: pstore: Omit efivars caching EFI varstore
access layer") added a new get_variable call with attr=NULL, which
triggers panic in gsmi.
Commit ba47f97a18f2 ("serial: core: remove baud_rates when serial console
setup") changed uart_set_options to select the correct baudrate
configuration based on the absolute error between requested baudrate and
available standard baudrate settings.
Prior to that commit the baudrate was selected based on which predefined
standard baudrate did not exceed the requested baudrate.
This change of selection logic was never reflected in the atmel serial
driver. Thus the comment left in the atmel serial driver is no longer
accurate.
Additionally the manual rounding up described in that comment and applied
via (quot - 1) requests an incorrect baudrate. Since uart_set_options uses
tty_termios_encode_baud_rate to determine the appropriate baudrate flags
this can cause baudrate selection to fail entirely because
tty_termios_encode_baud_rate will only select a baudrate if relative error
between requested and selected baudrate does not exceed +/-2%.
Fix that by requesting actual, exact baudrate used by the serial.
Fixes: ba47f97a18f2 ("serial: core: remove baud_rates when serial console setup") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tobias Schramm <t.schramm@manjaro.org> Acked-by: Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230109072940.202936-1-t.schramm@manjaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
A local variable sg is used to store scatterlist pointer in
pch_dma_tx_complete(). The for loop doing Tx byte accounting before
dma_unmap_sg() alters sg in its increment statement. Therefore, the
pointer passed into dma_unmap_sg() won't match to the one given to
dma_map_sg().
To fix the problem, use priv->sg_tx_p directly in dma_unmap_sg()
instead of the local variable.
The commit e00b488e813f ("usb-storage: Add Hiksemi USB3-FW to IGNORE_UAS")
blacklists UAS for all of RTL9210 enclosures.
The RTL9210 controller was advertised with UAS since its release back in
2019 and was shipped with a lot of enclosure products with different
firmware combinations.
Blacklist UAS only for HIKSEMI MD202.
This should hopefully be replaced with more robust method than just
comparing strings. But with limited information [1] provided thus far
(dmesg when the device is plugged in, which includes manufacturer and
product, but no lsusb -v to compare against), this is the best we can do
for now.
Which I believe disassembles to (I don't know ARM assembly, but it looks sane enough to me...):
// halfword (16-bit) store presumably to event->wLength (at offset 6 of struct usb_cdc_notification)
0B 0D 00 79 strh w11, [x8, #6]
// word (32-bit) store presumably to req->Length (at offset 8 of struct usb_request)
6C 0A 00 B9 str w12, [x19, #8]
// x10 (NULL) was read here from offset 0 of valid pointer x9
// IMHO we're reading 'cdev->gadget' and getting NULL
// gadget is indeed at offset 0 of struct usb_composite_dev
2A 01 40 F9 ldr x10, [x9]
// loading req->buf pointer, which is at offset 0 of struct usb_request
69 02 40 F9 ldr x9, [x19]
// x10 is null, crash, appears to be attempt to read cdev->gadget->max_speed
4B 5D 40 B9 ldr w11, [x10, #0x5c]
which seems to line up with ncm_do_notify() case NCM_NOTIFY_SPEED code fragment:
/* SPEED_CHANGE data is up/down speeds in bits/sec */
data = req->buf + sizeof *event;
data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget));
My analysis of registers and NULL ptr deref crash offset
(Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000005c)
heavily suggests that the crash is due to 'cdev->gadget' being NULL when executing:
data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget));
which calls:
ncm_bitrate(NULL)
which then calls:
gadget_is_superspeed(NULL)
which reads
((struct usb_gadget *)NULL)->max_speed
and hits a panic.
AFAICT, if I'm counting right, the offset of max_speed is indeed 0x5C.
(remember there's a GKI KABI reservation of 16 bytes in struct work_struct)
It's not at all clear to me how this is all supposed to work...
but returning 0 seems much better than panic-ing...
Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Cc: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230117131839.1138208-1-maze@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Currently the color matching descriptor is only sent across the wire
a single time, following the descriptors for each format and frame.
According to the UVC 1.5 Specification 3.9.2.6 ("Color Matching
Descriptors"):
"Only one instance is allowed for a given format and if present,
the Color Matching descriptor shall be placed following the Video
and Still Image Frame descriptors for that format".
Add another reference to the color matching descriptor after the
yuyv frames so that it's correctly transmitted for that format
too.
Commit c1e5c2f0cb8a ("usb: typec: altmodes/displayport: correct pin
assignment for UFP receptacles") fixed the pin assignment calculation
to take into account whether the peripheral was a plug or a receptacle.
But the "pin_assignments" sysfs logic was not updated. Address this by
using the macros introduced in the aforementioned commit in the sysfs
logic too.
Commit ca07e1c1e4a6 ("drivers:usb:fsl:Make fsl ehci drv an independent
driver module") changed DRV_NAME which was used for MODULE_ALIAS as well.
Starting from this the module alias didn't match the platform device
name created in fsl-mph-dr-of.c
Change DRV_NAME to match the driver name for host mode in fsl-mph-dr-of.
This is needed for module autoloading on ls1021a.
On async reads, page data is allocated before sending. When the
response is received but it has no data to fill (e.g.
STATUS_END_OF_FILE), __calc_signature() will still include the pages in
its computation, leading to an invalid signature check.
This patch fixes this by not setting the async read smb_rqst page data
(zeroed by default) if its got_bytes is 0.
This can be reproduced/verified with xfstests generic/465.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If the controller is suspended by runtime PM, the clock is already
disabled, so do not try to disable it again during removal. Use
pm_runtime_disable() to flush any pending runtime PM transitions.
(Actually, this is fixing the "Read the Current Status" command sent to
the device's outgoing mailbox, but it is only currently used for the PWM
instructions.)
The PCI-1760 is operated mostly by sending commands to a set of Outgoing
Mailbox registers, waiting for the command to complete, and reading the
result from the Incoming Mailbox registers. One of these commands is
the "Read the Current Status" command. The number of this command is
0x07 (see the User's Manual for the PCI-1760 at
<https://advdownload.advantech.com/productfile/Downloadfile2/1-11P6653/PCI-1760.pdf>.
The `PCI1760_CMD_GET_STATUS` macro defined in the driver should expand
to this command number 0x07, but unfortunately it currently expands to
0x03. (Command number 0x03 is not defined in the User's Manual.)
Correct the definition of the `PCI1760_CMD_GET_STATUS` macro to fix it.
This is used by all the PWM subdevice related instructions handled by
`pci1760_pwm_insn_config()` which are probably all broken. The effect
of sending the undefined command number 0x03 is not known.
Fixes: 14b93bb6bbf0 ("staging: comedi: adv_pci_dio: separate out PCI-1760 support") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230103143754.17564-1-abbotti@mev.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The Texas Instruments TUSB8041 has an autosuspend problem at high
temperature.
If there is not USB traffic, after a couple of ms, the device enters in
autosuspend mode. In this condition the external clock stops working, to
save energy. When the USB activity turns on, ther hub exits the
autosuspend state, the clock starts running again and all works fine.
At ambient temperature all works correctly, but at high temperature,
when the USB activity turns on, the external clock doesn't restart and
the hub disappears from the USB bus.
Disabling the autosuspend mode for this hub solves the issue.