On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register
value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the
last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a
speculatively written segment value.
That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS
entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled.
Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all
out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs
are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Somehow the swapgs mitigation entry code patch ended up with a JMPQ
instruction instead of JMP, where only the short jump is needed. Some
assembler versions apparently fail to optimize JMPQ into a two-byte JMP
when possible, instead always using a 7-byte JMP with relocation. For
some reason that makes the entry code explode with a #GP during boot.
The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the
Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are
enabled. Enable those features where applicable.
The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off".
There are different features which can affect the risk of attack:
- When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any
value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction. This means they can
write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can
be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI
handler:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg
// for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2
If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code
speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it
may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent
load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak.
Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when
coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to
switch back to the user GS. On AMD, this variant isn't possible
because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based
accesses.
NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case
doesn't exist quite yet.
- When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because
unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which
restricts GS values to user space addresses only. That means the
gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address
needs to be read from user space first. Something like:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
mov (%reg1), %reg2
// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2
// for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3
It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while
there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it
exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future). Without
tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable.
Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case:
- If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not
susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively
reading user space memory, even L1 cached values. This effectively
disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector.
- If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP
still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space
memory. But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the
user value from L1, if it has already been cached. This is probably
only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome.
Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function.
Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs
is serializing on AMD.
[ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested
by Dave Hansen ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Spectre v1 isn't only about array bounds checks. It can affect any
conditional checks. The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
handlers all have conditional swapgs checks. Those may be problematic in
the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with a user
GS.
For example:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
mov (%reg), %reg1
When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the swapgs, and
then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS value. So the user can
speculatively force a read of any kernel value. If a gadget exists which
uses the percpu value as an address in another load/store, then the
contents of the kernel value may become visible via an L1 side channel
attack.
A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space. The CPU can
speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the rest
of the speculative window.
The mitigation is similar to a traditional Spectre v1 mitigation, except:
a) index masking isn't possible; because the index (percpu offset)
isn't user-controlled; and
b) an lfence is needed in both the "from user" swapgs path and the
"from kernel" non-swapgs path (because of the two attacks described
above).
The user entry swapgs paths already have SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which has a
CR3 write when PTI is enabled. Since CR3 writes are serializing, the
lfences can be skipped in those cases.
On the other hand, the kernel entry swapgs paths don't depend on PTI.
To avoid unnecessary lfences for the user entry case, create two separate
features for alternative patching:
It's a waste for the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_* feature bits to occupy two
whole feature bits words. To better utilize feature words, re-define
word 11 to host scattered features and move the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_*
features into Linux defined word 11. More scattered features can be
added in word 11 in the future.
Rename leaf 11 in cpuid_leafs to CPUID_LNX_4 to reflect it's a
Linux-defined leaf.
Rename leaf 12 as CPUID_DUMMY which will be replaced by a meaningful
name in the next patch when CPUID.7.1:EAX occupies world 12.
Maximum number of RMID and cache occupancy scale are retrieved from
CPUID.0xf.1 after scattered CQM features are enumerated. Carve out the
code into a separate function.
KVM doesn't support resctrl now. So it's safe to move the
X86_FEATURE_CQM_* features to scattered features word 11 for KVM.
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: "Sean J Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86 <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560794416-217638-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
... into a separate function for better readability. Split out from a
patch from Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> to keep the mechanical,
sole code movement separate for easy review.
Although SAS3 & SAS3.5 IT HBA controllers support 64-bit DMA addressing, as
per hardware design, if DMA-able range contains all 64-bits
set (0xFFFFFFFF-FFFFFFFF) then it results in a firmware fault.
E.g. SGE's start address is 0xFFFFFFFF-FFFF000 and data length is 0x1000
bytes. when HBA tries to DMA the data at 0xFFFFFFFF-FFFFFFFF location then
HBA will fault the firmware.
Driver will set 63-bit DMA mask to ensure the above address will not be
used.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19.63 Signed-off-by: Suganath Prabu <suganath-prabu.subramani@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
GCC 5.5.0 sometimes cleverly hoists reads of the pvclock and/or hvclock
pages before the vclock mode checks. This creates a path through
vclock_gettime() in which no vclock is enabled at all (due to disabled
TSC on old CPUs, for example) but the pvclock or hvclock page
nevertheless read. This will segfault on bare metal.
This fixes commit 459e3a21535a ("gcc-9: properly declare the
{pv,hv}clock_page storage") in the sense that, before that commit, GCC
didn't seem to generate the offending code. There was nothing wrong
with that commit per se, and -stable maintainers should backport this to
all supported kernels regardless of whether the offending commit was
present, since the same crash could just as easily be triggered by the
phase of the moon.
On GCC 9.1.1, this doesn't seem to affect the generated code at all, so
I'm not too concerned about performance regressions from this fix.
After reworking U-boot args handling code and adding paranoid
arguments check we can eliminate CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT and
enable uboot support unconditionally.
For JTAG case we can assume that core registers will come up
reset value of 0 or in worst case we rely on user passing
'-on=clear_regs' to Metaware debugger.
GPU hang observed during the guest OCL conformance test which is caused
by THP GTT feature used durning the test.
It was observed the same GFN with different size (4K and 2M) requested
from the guest in GVT. So during the guest page dma map stage, it is
required to unmap first with orginal size and then remap again with
requested size.
The specification for the Toeplitz function doesn't require to set the key
explicitly to be symmetric. In case a symmetric functionality is required
a symmetric key can be simply used.
Wrongly forcing the algorithm to symmetric causes the wrong packet
distribution and a performance degradation.
Fix unreg_umr to move the MR to a kernel owned PD (i.e. the UMR PD) which
can't be accessed by userspace.
This ensures that nothing can continue to access the MR once it has been
placed in the kernels cache for reuse.
MRs in the cache continue to have their HW state, including DMA tables,
present. Even though the MR has been invalidated, changing the PD provides
an additional layer of protection against use of the MR.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190723065733.4899-5-leon@kernel.org Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10 Fixes: e126ba97dba9 ("mlx5: Add driver for Mellanox Connect-IB adapters") Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Artemy Kovalyov <artemyko@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fix unreg_umr to ignore the mkey state and do not fail if was freed. This
prevents a case that a user space application already changed the mkey
state to free and then the UMR operation will fail leaving the mkey in an
inappropriate state.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190723065733.4899-3-leon@kernel.org Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.19 Fixes: 968e78dd9644 ("IB/mlx5: Enhance UMR support to allow partial page table update") Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Artemy Kovalyov <artemyko@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The condition in xen_swiotlb_free_coherent() for deciding whether to
call xen_destroy_contiguous_region() is wrong: in case the region to
be freed is not contiguous calling xen_destroy_contiguous_region() is
the wrong thing to do: it would result in inconsistent mappings of
multiple PFNs to the same MFN. This will lead to various strange
crashes or data corruption.
Instead of calling xen_destroy_contiguous_region() in that case a
warning should be issued as that situation should never occur.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit abbbdf12497d ("replace kill_bdev() with __invalidate_device()")
once did this, but 29eaadc03649 ("nbd: stop using the bdev everywhere")
resurrected kill_bdev() and it has been there since then. So buffer_head
mappings still get killed on a server disconnection, and we can still
hit the BUG_ON on a filesystem on the top of the nbd device.
If CTR_EL0.{CWG,ERG} are 0b0000 then they must be interpreted to have
their architecturally maximum values, which defeats the use of
FTR_HIGHER_SAFE when sanitising CPU ID registers on heterogeneous
machines.
Introduce FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE so that these fields effectively
saturate at zero.
Fixes: 3c739b571084 ("arm64: Keep track of CPU feature registers") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4.x- Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit d968d2b801d8 ("ARM: 7497/1: hw_breakpoint: allow single-byte
watchpoints on all addresses") changed the validation requirements for
hardware watchpoints on arch/arm/. Update our compat layer to implement
the same relaxation.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Handling of the CPU_PM_ENTER_FAILED transition in the Arm PMU PM
notifier code incorrectly skips restoration of the counters. Fix the
logic so that CPU_PM_ENTER_FAILED follows the same path as CPU_PM_EXIT.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: da4e4f18afe0f372 ("drivers/perf: arm_pmu: implement CPU_PM notifier") Reported-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Acked-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
With debug info enabled (CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y) the resulting vmlinux may get
that huge that we need to increase the start addresss for the decompression
text section otherwise one will face a linker error.
Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org> Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
On my laptop most memcg kselftests were being skipped because it claimed
cgroup v2 hierarchy wasn't mounted, but this isn't correct. Instead, it
seems current systemd HEAD mounts it with the name "cgroup2" instead of
"cgroup":
After getting a storage server event that causes the DASD device driver
to update its unit address configuration during a device shutdown there is
the possibility of an endless loop in the device driver.
In the system log there will be ongoing DASD error messages with RC: -19.
The reason is that the loop starting the ruac request only terminates when
the retry counter is decreased to 0. But in the sleep_on function there are
early exit paths that do not decrease the retry counter.
Prevent an endless loop by handling those cases separately.
Remove the unnecessary do..while loop since the sleep_on function takes
care of retries by itself.
Fixes: 8e09f21574ea ("[S390] dasd: add hyper PAV support to DASD device driver, part 1") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.25+ Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Hoeppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Shakeel Butt reported premature oom on kernel with
"cgroup_disable=memory" since mem_cgroup_is_root() returns false even
though memcg is actually NULL. The drop_caches is also broken.
It is because commit aeed1d325d42 ("mm/vmscan.c: generalize
shrink_slab() calls in shrink_node()") removed the !memcg check before
!mem_cgroup_is_root(). And, surprisingly root memcg is allocated even
though memory cgroup is disabled by kernel boot parameter.
Add mem_cgroup_disabled() check to make reclaimer work as expected.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1563385526-20805-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: aeed1d325d42 ("mm/vmscan.c: generalize shrink_slab() calls in shrink_node()") Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com> Reported-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Jan Hadrava <had@kam.mff.cuni.cz> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.19+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Distribution installation images such as Debian include different sets
of modules which can be downloaded dynamically. Such images may notably
include the hda sound modules but not the i915 DRM module, even if the
latter was enabled at build time, as reported on
https://bugs.debian.org/931507
In such a case hdac_i915 would be linked in and try to load the i915
module, fail since it is not there, but still wait for a whole minute
before giving up binding with it.
This fixes such as case by only waiting for the binding if the module
was properly loaded (or module support is disabled, in which case i915
is already compiled-in anyway).
Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to
destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in
the error path.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Some devices are not supposed to support on-die ECC but experience
shows that internal ECC machinery can actually be enabled through the
"SET FEATURE (EFh)" command, even if a read of the "READ ID Parameter
Tables" returns that it is not.
Currently, the driver checks the "READ ID Parameter" field directly
after having enabled the feature. If the check fails it returns
immediately but leaves the ECC on. When using buggy chips like
MT29F2G08ABAGA and MT29F2G08ABBGA, all future read/program cycles will
go through the on-die ECC, confusing the host controller which is
supposed to be the one handling correction.
To address this in a common way we need to turn off the on-die ECC
directly after reading the "READ ID Parameter" and before checking the
"ECC status".
sl is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
Fix this by sanitizing sl before using it to index ibp->sl_to_sc.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
When a pin is active-low, logical trigger edge should be inverted to match
the same interrupt opportunity.
For example, a button pushed triggers falling edge in ACTIVE_HIGH case; in
ACTIVE_LOW case, the button pushed triggers rising edge. For user space the
IRQ requesting doesn't need to do any modification except to configuring
GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_ACTIVE_LOW.
For example, we want to catch the event when the button is pushed. The
button on the original board drives level to be low when it is pushed, and
drives level to be high when it is released.
while (1) {
read(fd, &dat, sizeof(dat));
if (dat.id == GPIOEVENT_EVENT_FALLING_EDGE)
printf("button pushed\n");
}
Run the same logic on another board which the polarity of the button is
inverted; it drives level to be high when pushed, and level to be low when
released. For this inversion we add flag GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_ACTIVE_LOW:
At the result, there are no any events caught when the button is pushed.
By the way, button releasing will emit a "falling" event. The timing of
"falling" catching is not expected.
In commit 46d179525a1f ("mmc: dw_mmc: Wait for data transfer after
response errors.") we fixed a tuning-induced hang that I saw when
stress testing tuning on certain SD cards. I won't re-hash that whole
commit, but the summary is that as a normal part of tuning you need to
deal with transfer errors and there were cases where these transfer
errors was putting my system into a bad state causing all future
transfers to fail. That commit fixed handling of the transfer errors
for me.
In downstream Chrome OS my fix landed and had the same behavior for
all SD/MMC commands. However, it looks like when the commit landed
upstream we limited it to only SD tuning commands. Presumably this
was to try to get around problems that Alim Akhtar reported on exynos
[1].
Unfortunately while stress testing reboots (and suspend/resume) on
some rk3288-based Chromebooks I found the same problem on the eMMC on
some of my Chromebooks (the ones with Hynix eMMC). Since the eMMC
tuning command is different (MMC_SEND_TUNING_BLOCK_HS200
vs. MMC_SEND_TUNING_BLOCK) we were basically getting back into the
same situation.
I'm hoping that whatever problems exynos was having in the past are
somehow magically fixed now and we can make the behavior the same for
all commands.
Fixes: 46d179525a1f ("mmc: dw_mmc: Wait for data transfer after response errors.") Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Alim Akhtar <alim.akhtar@gmail.com> Cc: Enric Balletbo i Serra <enric.balletbo@collabora.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When one transaction is finishing its commit, it is possible for another
transaction to start and enter its initial commit phase as well. If the
first ends up getting aborted, we have a small time window where the second
transaction commit does not notice that the previous transaction aborted
and ends up committing, writing a superblock that points to btrees that
reference extent buffers (nodes and leafs) that were not persisted to disk.
The consequence is that after mounting the filesystem again, we will be
unable to load some btree nodes/leafs, either because the content on disk
is either garbage (or just zeroes) or corresponds to the old content of a
previouly COWed or deleted node/leaf, resulting in the well known error
messages "parent transid verify failed on ...".
The following sequence diagram illustrates how this can happen.
CPU 1 CPU 2
<at transaction N>
btrfs_commit_transaction()
(...)
--> sets transaction state to
TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED
--> sets fs_info->running_transaction
to NULL
(...)
btrfs_start_transaction()
start_transaction()
wait_current_trans()
--> returns immediately
because
fs_info->running_transaction
is NULL
join_transaction()
--> creates transaction N + 1
--> sets
fs_info->running_transaction
to transaction N + 1
--> adds transaction N + 1 to
the fs_info->trans_list list
--> returns transaction handle
pointing to the new
transaction N + 1
(...)
btrfs_sync_file()
btrfs_start_transaction()
--> returns handle to
transaction N + 1
(...)
btrfs_write_and_wait_transaction()
--> writeback of some extent
buffer fails, returns an
error
btrfs_handle_fs_error()
--> sets BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR in
fs_info->fs_state
--> jumps to label "scrub_continue"
cleanup_transaction()
btrfs_abort_transaction(N)
--> sets BTRFS_FS_STATE_TRANS_ABORTED
flag in fs_info->fs_state
--> sets aborted field in the
transaction and transaction
handle structures, for
transaction N only
--> removes transaction from the
list fs_info->trans_list
btrfs_commit_transaction(N + 1)
--> transaction N + 1 was not
aborted, so it proceeds
(...)
--> sets the transaction's state
to TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START
--> does not find the previous
transaction (N) in the
fs_info->trans_list, so it
doesn't know that transaction
was aborted, and the commit
of transaction N + 1 proceeds
(...)
--> sets transaction N + 1 state
to TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED
btrfs_write_and_wait_transaction()
--> succeeds writing all extent
buffers created in the
transaction N + 1
write_all_supers()
--> succeeds
--> we now have a superblock on
disk that points to trees
that refer to at least one
extent buffer that was
never persisted
So fix this by updating the transaction commit path to check if the flag
BTRFS_FS_STATE_TRANS_ABORTED is set on fs_info->fs_state if after setting
the transaction to the TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START we do not find any previous
transaction in the fs_info->trans_list. If the flag is set, just fail the
transaction commit with -EROFS, as we do in other places. The exact error
code for the previous transaction abort was already logged and reported.
Fixes: 49b25e0540904b ("btrfs: enhance transaction abort infrastructure") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When doing an incremental send operation we can fail if we previously did
deduplication operations against a file that exists in both snapshots. In
that case we will fail the send operation with -EIO and print a message
to dmesg/syslog like the following:
BTRFS error (device sdc): Send: inconsistent snapshot, found updated \
extent for inode 257 without updated inode item, send root is 258, \
parent root is 257
This requires that we deduplicate to the same file in both snapshots for
the same amount of times on each snapshot. The issue happens because a
deduplication only updates the iversion of an inode and does not update
any other field of the inode, therefore if we deduplicate the file on
each snapshot for the same amount of time, the inode will have the same
iversion value (stored as the "sequence" field on the inode item) on both
snapshots, therefore it will be seen as unchanged between in the send
snapshot while there are new/updated/deleted extent items when comparing
to the parent snapshot. This makes the send operation return -EIO and
print an error message.
Example reproducer:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
# Create our first file. The first half of the file has several 64Kb
# extents while the second half as a single 512Kb extent.
$ xfs_io -f -s -c "pwrite -S 0xb8 -b 64K 0 512K" /mnt/foo
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xb8 512K 512K" /mnt/foo
# Create the base snapshot and the parent send stream from it.
$ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/mysnap1
$ btrfs send -f /tmp/1.snap /mnt/mysnap1
# Create our second file, that has exactly the same data as the first
# file.
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xb8 0 1M" /mnt/bar
# Create the second snapshot, used for the incremental send, before
# doing the file deduplication.
$ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/mysnap2
# Now before creating the incremental send stream:
#
# 1) Deduplicate into a subrange of file foo in snapshot mysnap1. This
# will drop several extent items and add a new one, also updating
# the inode's iversion (sequence field in inode item) by 1, but not
# any other field of the inode;
#
# 2) Deduplicate into a different subrange of file foo in snapshot
# mysnap2. This will replace an extent item with a new one, also
# updating the inode's iversion by 1 but not any other field of the
# inode.
#
# After these two deduplication operations, the inode items, for file
# foo, are identical in both snapshots, but we have different extent
# items for this inode in both snapshots. We want to check this doesn't
# cause send to fail with an error or produce an incorrect stream.
This issue started happening back in 2015 when deduplication was updated
to not update the inode's ctime and mtime and update only the iversion.
Back then we would hit a BUG_ON() in send, but later in 2016 send was
updated to return -EIO and print the error message instead of doing the
BUG_ON().
A test case for fstests follows soon.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203933 Fixes: 1c919a5e13702c ("btrfs: don't update mtime/ctime on deduped inodes") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Prior to this commit, starting nconfig, xconfig or gconfig, and saving
the .config file more than once caused data loss, where a .config file
that contained only comments would be written to disk starting from the
second save operation.
This bug manifests itself because the SYMBOL_WRITTEN flag is never
cleared after the first call to conf_write, and subsequent calls to
conf_write then skip all of the configuration symbols due to the
SYMBOL_WRITTEN flag being set.
This commit resolves this issue by clearing the SYMBOL_WRITTEN flag
from all symbols before conf_write returns.
In nouveau_conn_reset(), if connector->state is true,
__drm_atomic_helper_connector_destroy_state() will be called,
but the memory pointed by asyc isn't freed. Memory leak happens
in the following function __drm_atomic_helper_connector_reset(),
where newly allocated asyc->state will be assigned to connector->state.
So using nouveau_conn_atomic_destroy_state() instead of
__drm_atomic_helper_connector_destroy_state to free the "old" asyc.
The __raw_callee_save_*() functions have an ELF symbol size of zero,
which confuses objtool and other tools.
Fixes a bunch of warnings like the following:
arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.o: warning: objtool: __raw_callee_save_xen_pte_val() is missing an ELF size annotation
arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.o: warning: objtool: __raw_callee_save_xen_pgd_val() is missing an ELF size annotation
arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.o: warning: objtool: __raw_callee_save_xen_make_pte() is missing an ELF size annotation
arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.o: warning: objtool: __raw_callee_save_xen_make_pgd() is missing an ELF size annotation
After making a change to improve objtool's sibling call detection, it
started showing the following warning:
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.o: warning: objtool: .fixup+0x15: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame
The problem is the ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() macro. It does a
fake call by pushing a fake RIP and doing a jump. That tricks the
unwinder into printing the function which triggered the exception,
rather than the .fixup code.
Instead of the hack to make it look like the original function made the
call, just change the macro so that the original function actually does
make the call. This allows removal of the hack, and also makes objtool
happy.
I triggered a vmx instruction exception and verified that the stack
trace is still sane:
Commit 7457c0da024b ("x86/alternatives: Add int3_emulate_call()
selftest") is used to ensure there is a gap setup in int3 exception stack
which could be used for inserting call return address.
This gap is missed in XEN PV int3 exception entry path, then below panic
triggered:
For 64bit PV guests, Xen's ABI enters the kernel with using SYSRET, with
%rcx/%r11 on the stack. To convert back to "normal" looking exceptions,
the xen thunks do 'xen_*: pop %rcx; pop %r11; jmp *'.
E.g. Extracting 'xen_pv_trap xenint3' we have:
xen_xenint3:
pop %rcx;
pop %r11;
jmp xenint3
As xenint3 and int3 entry code are same except xenint3 doesn't generate
a gap, we can fix it by using int3 and drop useless xenint3.
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Spectrum systems use DSCP rewrite map to update DSCP field in egressing
packets to correspond to priority that the packet has. Whether rewriting
will take place is determined at the point when the packet ingresses the
switch: if the port is in Trust L3 mode, packet priority is determined from
the DSCP map at the port, and DSCP rewrite will happen. If the port is in
Trust L2 mode, 802.1p is used for packet prioritization, and no DSCP
rewrite will happen.
The driver determines the port trust mode based on whether any DSCP
prioritization rules are in effect at given port. If there are any, trust
level is L3, otherwise it's L2. When the last DSCP rule is removed, the
port is switched to trust L2. Under that scenario, if DSCP of a packet
should be rewritten, it should be rewritten to 0.
However, when switching to Trust L2, the driver neglects to also update the
DSCP rewrite map. The last DSCP rule thus remains in effect, and packets
egressing through this port, if they have the right priority, will have
their DSCP set according to this rule.
Fix by first configuring the rewrite map, and only then switching to trust
L2 and bailing out.
Fixes: b2b1dab6884e ("mlxsw: spectrum: Support ieee_setapp, ieee_delapp") Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@mellanox.com> Reported-by: Alex Veber <alexve@mellanox.com> Tested-by: Alex Veber <alexve@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
if (mq_open("/testing", 0x40, 3, &attr) == (mqd_t) -1)
perror("mq_open");
mqueue_get_inode() was correctly rejecting the giant mq_msgsize, and
preparing to return -EINVAL. During the cleanup, it calls
mqueue_evict_inode() which performed resource usage tracking math for
updating "user", before checking if there was a valid "user" at all
(which would indicate that the calculations would be sane). Instead,
delay this check to after seeing a valid "user".
The overflow was real, but the results went unused, so while the flaw is
harmless, it's noisy for kernel fuzzers, so just fix it by moving the
calculation under the non-NULL "user" where it actually gets used.
The dev_info.name[] array has space for RIO_MAX_DEVNAME_SZ + 1
characters. But the problem here is that we don't ensure that the user
put a NUL terminator on the end of the string. It could lead to an out
of bounds read.
Only users of upc_req in kernel side fs/coda/psdev.c and
fs/coda/upcall.c already include linux/coda_psdev.h.
Suggested by Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu> in
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20150531111913.GA23377@cs.cmu.edu/
Fixes these include/uapi/linux/coda_psdev.h compilation errors in userspace:
linux/coda_psdev.h:12:19: error: field `uc_chain' has incomplete type
struct list_head uc_chain;
^
linux/coda_psdev.h:13:2: error: unknown type name `caddr_t'
caddr_t uc_data;
^
linux/coda_psdev.h:14:2: error: unknown type name `u_short'
u_short uc_flags;
^
linux/coda_psdev.h:15:2: error: unknown type name `u_short'
u_short uc_inSize; /* Size is at most 5000 bytes */
^
linux/coda_psdev.h:16:2: error: unknown type name `u_short'
u_short uc_outSize;
^
linux/coda_psdev.h:17:2: error: unknown type name `u_short'
u_short uc_opcode; /* copied from data to save lookup */
^
linux/coda_psdev.h:19:2: error: unknown type name `wait_queue_head_t'
wait_queue_head_t uc_sleep; /* process' wait queue */
^
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9f99f5ce6a0563d5266e6cf7aa9585aac2cae971.1558117389.git.jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu Signed-off-by: Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Cc: Sam Protsenko <semen.protsenko@linaro.org> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Zhouyang Jia <jiazhouyang09@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The kernel is self-contained project and can be built with bare-metal
toolchain. But bare-metal toolchain doesn't define __linux__. Because
of this u_quad_t type is not defined when using bare-metal toolchain and
codafs build fails. This patch fixes it by defining u_quad_t type
unconditionally.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3cbb40b0a57b6f9923a9d67b53473c0b691a3eaa.1558117389.git.jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu Signed-off-by: Sam Protsenko <semen.protsenko@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Cc: Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli@iki.fi> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Zhouyang Jia <jiazhouyang09@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
If a memsetXX implementation is completely broken and fails in the first
iteration, when i, j, and k are all zero, the failure is masked as zero
is returned. Failing in the first iteration is perhaps the most likely
failure, so this makes the tests pretty much useless. Avoid the
situation by always setting a random unused bit in the result on
failure.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190506124634.6807-3-peda@axentia.se Fixes: 03270c13c5ff ("lib/string.c: add testcases for memset16/32/64") Signed-off-by: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This adds __GFP_NOWARN to the kmalloc()-portions of the overflow test to
avoid tainting the kernel. Additionally fixes up the math on wrap size
to be architecture and page size agnostic.
The description of cma_declare_contiguous() indicates that if the
'fixed' argument is true the reserved contiguous area must be exactly at
the address of the 'base' argument.
However, the function currently allows the 'base', 'size', and 'limit'
arguments to be silently adjusted to meet alignment constraints. This
commit enforces the documented behavior through explicit checks that
return an error if the region does not fit within a specified region.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561422051-16142-1-git-send-email-opendmb@gmail.com Fixes: 5ea3b1b2f8ad ("cma: add placement specifier for "cma=" kernel parameter") Signed-off-by: Doug Berger <opendmb@gmail.com> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Yue Hu <huyue2@yulong.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In file included from ./arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h:13,
from ./arch/x86/include/asm/mmzone_64.h:11,
from ./arch/x86/include/asm/mmzone.h:5,
from ./include/linux/mmzone.h:969,
from ./include/linux/gfp.h:6,
from ./include/linux/mm.h:10,
from arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c:34:
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c: In function 'check_timer':
./arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:37:11: warning: comparison of unsigned
expression >= 0 is always true [-Wtype-limits]
if ((v) <= apic_verbosity) \
^~
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c:2160:2: note: in expansion of macro
'apic_printk'
apic_printk(APIC_QUIET, KERN_INFO "..TIMER: vector=0x%02X "
^~~~~~~~~~~
./arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:37:11: warning: comparison of unsigned
expression >= 0 is always true [-Wtype-limits]
if ((v) <= apic_verbosity) \
^~
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c:2207:4: note: in expansion of macro
'apic_printk'
apic_printk(APIC_QUIET, KERN_ERR "..MP-BIOS bug: "
^~~~~~~~~~~
APIC_QUIET is 0, so silence them by making apic_verbosity type int.
While changing the number of interrupt channels, be2net stops adapter
operation (including netif_tx_disable()) but it doesn't signal that it
cannot transmit. This may lead dev_watchdog() to falsely trigger during
that time.
Add the missing call to netif_carrier_off(), following the pattern used in
many other drivers. netif_carrier_on() is already taken care of in
be_open().
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
clang gets confused by an uninitialized variable in what looks
to it like a never executed code path:
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c:618:13: error: variable 'polarity' is uninitialized when used here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized]
polarity = polarity ? ACPI_ACTIVE_LOW : ACPI_ACTIVE_HIGH;
^~~~~~~~
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c:606:32: note: initialize the variable 'polarity' to silence this warning
int rc, irq, trigger, polarity;
^
= 0
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c:617:12: error: variable 'trigger' is uninitialized when used here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized]
trigger = trigger ? ACPI_LEVEL_SENSITIVE : ACPI_EDGE_SENSITIVE;
^~~~~~~
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c:606:22: note: initialize the variable 'trigger' to silence this warning
int rc, irq, trigger, polarity;
^
= 0
This is unfortunately a design decision in clang and won't be fixed.
Changing the acpi_get_override_irq() macro to an inline function
reliably avoids the issue.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
clang finds a contruct suspicious that converts an unsigned
character to a signed integer and back, causing an overflow:
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:4605:39: error: implicit conversion from 'int' to 'u8' (aka 'unsigned char') changes value from -205 to 51 [-Werror,-Wconstant-conversion]
u8 wf = (pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK) ? ~w : 0;
~~ ^~
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:4607:38: error: implicit conversion from 'int' to 'u8' (aka 'unsigned char') changes value from -241 to 15 [-Werror,-Wconstant-conversion]
u8 uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? ~u : 0;
~~ ^~
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:4609:39: error: implicit conversion from 'int' to 'u8' (aka 'unsigned char') changes value from -171 to 85 [-Werror,-Wconstant-conversion]
u8 ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? ~x : 0;
~~ ^~
Add an explicit cast to tell clang that everything works as
intended here.
GCC v9 emits this warning:
CC drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_erp.o
drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_erp.c: In function 'zfcp_erp_action_enqueue':
drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_erp.c:217:26: warning: 'erp_action' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
217 | struct zfcp_erp_action *erp_action;
| ^~~~~~~~~~
This is a possible false positive case, as also documented in the GCC
documentations:
https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Warning-Options.html#index-Wmaybe-uninitialized
The actual code-sequence is like this:
Various callers can invoke the function below with the argument "want"
being one of:
ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_ADAPTER,
ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_PORT_FORCED,
ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_PORT, or
ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_LUN.
zfcp_erp_action_enqueue(want, ...)
...
need = zfcp_erp_required_act(want, ...)
need = want
...
maybe: need = ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_PORT
maybe: need = ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_ADAPTER
...
return need
...
zfcp_erp_setup_act(need, ...)
struct zfcp_erp_action *erp_action; // <== line 217
...
switch(need) {
case ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_LUN:
...
erp_action = &zfcp_sdev->erp_action;
WARN_ON_ONCE(erp_action->port != port); // <== access
...
break;
case ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_PORT:
case ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_PORT_FORCED:
...
erp_action = &port->erp_action;
WARN_ON_ONCE(erp_action->port != port); // <== access
...
break;
case ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_ADAPTER:
...
erp_action = &adapter->erp_action;
WARN_ON_ONCE(erp_action->port != NULL); // <== access
...
break;
}
...
WARN_ON_ONCE(erp_action->adapter != adapter); // <== access
When zfcp_erp_setup_act() is called, 'need' will never be anything else
than one of the 4 possible enumeration-names that are used in the
switch-case, and 'erp_action' is initialized for every one of them, before
it is used. Thus the warning is a false positive, as documented.
We introduce the extra if{} in the beginning to create an extra code-flow,
so the compiler can be convinced that the switch-case will never see any
other value.
BUG_ON()/BUG() is intentionally not used to not crash anything, should
this ever happen anyway - right now it's impossible, as argued above; and
it doesn't introduce a 'default:' switch-case to retain warnings should
'enum zfcp_erp_act_type' ever be extended and no explicit case be
introduced. See also v5.0 commit 399b6c8bc9f7 ("scsi: zfcp: drop old
default switch case which might paper over missing case").
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
When CONFIG_DMI is disabled, we only have a tentative declaration,
which causes a warning from clang:
drivers/acpi/blacklist.c:20:35: error: tentative array definition assumed to have one element [-Werror]
static const struct dmi_system_id acpi_rev_dmi_table[] __initconst;
As the variable is not actually used here, hide it entirely
in an #ifdef to shut up the warning.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The getxattr manpage states that we should return ERANGE if the
destination buffer size is too small to hold the value.
ceph_vxattrcb_layout does this internally, but we should be doing
this for all vxattrs.
Fix the only caller of getxattr_cb to check the returned size
against the buffer length and return -ERANGE if it doesn't fit.
Drop the same check in ceph_vxattrcb_layout and just rely on the
caller to handle it.
There is a race condition with how we send (or supress and don't send)
smb echos that will cause the client to incorrectly think the
server is unresponsive and thus needs to be reconnected.
Summary of the race condition:
1) Daisy chaining scheduling creates a gap.
2) If traffic comes unfortunate shortly after
the last echo, the planned echo is suppressed.
3) Due to the gap, the next echo transmission is delayed
until after the timeout, which is set hard to twice
the echo interval.
This is fixed by changing the timeouts from 2 to three times the echo interval.
Detailed description of the bug: https://lutz.donnerhacke.de/eng/Blog/Groundhog-Day-with-SMB-remount
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[BUG]
Lockdep will report the following circular locking dependency:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.2.0-rc2-custom #24 Tainted: G O
------------------------------------------------------
btrfs/8631 is trying to acquire lock: 000000002536438c (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2){+.+.}, at: btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x40/0x620 [btrfs]
but task is already holding lock: 000000003d52cc23 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}, at: create_pending_snapshot+0x8b6/0xe60 [btrfs]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[CAUSE]
Due to the delayed subvolume creation, we need to call
btrfs_qgroup_inherit() inside commit transaction code, with a lot of
other mutex hold.
This hell of lock chain can lead to above problem.
[FIX]
On the other hand, we don't really need to hold qgroup_ioctl_lock if
we're in the context of create_pending_snapshot().
As in that context, we're the only one being able to modify qgroup.
All other qgroup functions which needs qgroup_ioctl_lock are either
holding a transaction handle, or will start a new transaction:
Functions will start a new transaction():
* btrfs_quota_enable()
* btrfs_quota_disable()
Functions hold a transaction handler:
* btrfs_add_qgroup_relation()
* btrfs_del_qgroup_relation()
* btrfs_create_qgroup()
* btrfs_remove_qgroup()
* btrfs_limit_qgroup()
* btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call inside create_subvol()
So we have a higher level protection provided by transaction, thus we
don't need to always hold qgroup_ioctl_lock in btrfs_qgroup_inherit().
Only the btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call in create_subvol() needs to hold
qgroup_ioctl_lock, while the btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call in
create_pending_snapshot() is already protected by transaction.
So the fix is to detect the context by checking
trans->transaction->state.
If we're at TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING, then we're in commit transaction
context and no need to get the mutex.
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The list of profiles in btrfs_chunk_max_errors lists DUP as a profile
DUP able to tolerate 1 device missing. Though this profile is special
with 2 copies, it still needs the device, unlike the others.
Looking at the history of changes, thre's no clear reason why DUP is
there, functions were refactored and blocks of code merged to one
helper.
d20983b40e828 Btrfs: fix writing data into the seed filesystem
- factor code to a helper
de11cc12df173 Btrfs: don't pre-allocate btrfs bio
- unrelated change, DUP still in the list with max errors 1
a236aed14ccb0 Btrfs: Deal with failed writes in mirrored configurations
- introduced the max errors, leaves DUP and RAID1 in the same group
Fix a use-after-free bug during filesystem initialisation, where we
access the disc record (which is stored in a buffer) after we have
released the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Full-speed and low-speed USB devices do not work with Tegra210
platforms because of incorrect PLLU/PLLU_OUT1 clock settings.
When full-speed device is connected:
[ 14.059886] usb 1-3: new full-speed USB device number 2 using tegra-xusb
[ 14.196295] usb 1-3: device descriptor read/64, error -71
[ 14.436311] usb 1-3: device descriptor read/64, error -71
[ 14.675749] usb 1-3: new full-speed USB device number 3 using tegra-xusb
[ 14.812335] usb 1-3: device descriptor read/64, error -71
[ 15.052316] usb 1-3: device descriptor read/64, error -71
[ 15.164799] usb usb1-port3: attempt power cycle
When low-speed device is connected:
[ 37.610949] usb usb1-port3: Cannot enable. Maybe the USB cable is bad?
[ 38.557376] usb usb1-port3: Cannot enable. Maybe the USB cable is bad?
[ 38.564977] usb usb1-port3: attempt power cycle
This commit fixes the issue by:
1. initializing PLLU_OUT1 before initializing XUSB_FS_SRC clock
because PLLU_OUT1 is parent of XUSB_FS_SRC.
2. changing PLLU post-divider to /2 (DIVP=1) according to Technical
Reference Manual.
Fixes: e745f992cf4b ("clk: tegra: Rework pll_u") Signed-off-by: JC Kuo <jckuo@nvidia.com> Acked-By: Peter De Schrijver <pdeschrijver@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
While the .device_prep_slave_sg() callback rejects empty scatterlists,
it still accepts single-entry scatterlists with a zero-length segment.
These may happen if a driver calls dmaengine_prep_slave_single() with a
zero len parameter. The corresponding DMA request will never complete,
leading to messages like:
Although requesting a zero-length DMA request is a driver bug, rejecting
it early eases debugging. Note that the .device_prep_dma_memcpy()
callback already rejects requests to copy zero bytes.
The modification of EXIN register doesn't clean the bitfield before
the writing of a new value. After a few modifications the bitfield would
accumulate only '1's.
Since commit 85f1abe0019f ("kthread, sched/wait: Fix kthread_parkme()
completion issue"), kthreads that are bound to a CPU must be parked
before being stopped. At the moment the PSCI checker calls
kthread_stop() directly on the suspend kthread, which triggers the
following warning:
kthread_unpark() tries to bind the thread to its CPU and aborts with a
WARN() if the thread wasn't in TASK_PARKED state. Park the kthreads
before stopping them.
Microsoft HyperV disables the X86_FEATURE_SMCA bit on AMD systems, and
linux guests boot with repeated errors:
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_unregister_ecc_decoder (err -2)
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_register_ecc_decoder (err -2)
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_report_gart_errors (err -2)
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_unregister_ecc_decoder (err -2)
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_register_ecc_decoder (err -2)
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_report_gart_errors (err -2)
The warnings occur because the module code erroneously returns -EEXIST
for modules that have failed to load and are in the process of being
removed from the module list.
module amd64_edac_mod has a dependency on module edac_mce_amd. Using
modules.dep, systemd will load edac_mce_amd for every request of
amd64_edac_mod. When the edac_mce_amd module loads, the module has
state MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED and once the module load fails and the state
becomes MODULE_STATE_GOING. Another request for edac_mce_amd module
executes and add_unformed_module() will erroneously return -EEXIST even
though the previous instance of edac_mce_amd has MODULE_STATE_GOING.
Upon receiving -EEXIST, systemd attempts to load amd64_edac_mod, which
fails because of unknown symbols from edac_mce_amd.
add_unformed_module() must wait to return for any case other than
MODULE_STATE_LIVE to prevent a race between multiple loads of
dependent modules.
isp iommu requires wrapper variants of the clocks.
noc variants are always on and using the wrapper variants will activate
{A,H}CLK_ISP{0,1} due to the hierarchy.
Tested using the pending isp patch set (which is not upstream
yet). Without this patch, streaming from the isp stalls.
Also add the respective power domain and remove the "disabled" status.
Apparently driver was never tested with DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT flag being
unset since it completely disables interrupt handling instead of skipping
the callbacks invocations, hence putting channel into unusable state.
The flag is always set by all of kernel drivers that use APB DMA, so let's
error out in otherwise case for consistency. It won't be difficult to
support that case properly if ever will be needed.
Custom trampolines can only be enabled if there is only a single ops
attached to it. If there's only a single callback registered to a function,
and the ops has a trampoline registered for it, then we can call the
trampoline directly. This is very useful for improving the performance of
ftrace and livepatch.
If more than one callback is registered to a function, the general
trampoline is used, and the custom trampoline is not restored back to the
direct call even if all the other callbacks were unregistered and we are
back to one callback for the function.
To fix this, set FTRACE_FL_TRAMP flag if rec count is decremented
to one, and the ops that left has a trampoline.
This is similar to commit e6186820a745 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: Arch
counter doesn't tick in system suspend"). Specifically on the rk3288
it can be seen that the timer stops ticking in suspend if we end up
running through the "osc_disable" path in rk3288_slp_mode_set(). In
that path the 24 MHz clock will turn off and the timer stops.
To test this, I ran this on a Chrome OS filesystem:
before=$(date); \
suspend_stress_test -c1 --suspend_min=30 --suspend_max=31; \
echo ${before}; date
...and I found that unless I plug in a device that requests USB wakeup
to be active that the two calls to "date" would show that fewer than
30 seconds passed.
NOTE: deep suspend (where the 24 MHz clock gets disabled) isn't
supported yet on upstream Linux so this was tested on a downstream
kernel.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
When I try to boot rk3288-veyron-mickey I totally fail to make the
eMMC work. Specifically my logs (on Chrome OS 4.19):
mmc_host mmc1: card is non-removable.
mmc_host mmc1: Bus speed (slot 0) = 400000Hz (slot req 400000Hz, actual 400000HZ div = 0)
mmc_host mmc1: Bus speed (slot 0) = 50000000Hz (slot req 52000000Hz, actual 50000000HZ div = 0)
mmc1: switch to bus width 8 failed
mmc1: switch to bus width 4 failed
mmc1: new high speed MMC card at address 0001
mmcblk1: mmc1:0001 HAG2e 14.7 GiB
mmcblk1boot0: mmc1:0001 HAG2e partition 1 4.00 MiB
mmcblk1boot1: mmc1:0001 HAG2e partition 2 4.00 MiB
mmcblk1rpmb: mmc1:0001 HAG2e partition 3 4.00 MiB, chardev (243:0)
mmc_host mmc1: Bus speed (slot 0) = 400000Hz (slot req 400000Hz, actual 400000HZ div = 0)
mmc_host mmc1: Bus speed (slot 0) = 50000000Hz (slot req 52000000Hz, actual 50000000HZ div = 0)
mmc1: switch to bus width 8 failed
mmc1: switch to bus width 4 failed
mmc1: tried to HW reset card, got error -110
mmcblk1: error -110 requesting status
mmcblk1: recovery failed!
print_req_error: I/O error, dev mmcblk1, sector 0
...
When I remove the '/delete-property/mmc-hs200-1_8v' then everything is
hunky dory.
That line comes from the original submission of the mickey dts
upstream, so presumably at the time the HS200 was failing and just
enumerating things as a high speed device was fine. ...or maybe it's
just that some mickey devices work when enumerating at "high speed",
just not mine?
In any case, hs200 seems good now. Let's turn it on.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
As some point hs200 was failing on rk3288-veyron-minnie. See commit 984926781122 ("ARM: dts: rockchip: temporarily remove emmc hs200 speed
from rk3288 minnie"). Although I didn't track down exactly when it
started working, it seems to work OK now, so let's turn it back on.
To test this, I booted from SD card and then used this script to
stress the enumeration process after fixing a memory leak [1]:
cd /sys/bus/platform/drivers/dwmmc_rockchip
for i in $(seq 1 3000); do
echo "========================" $i
echo ff0f0000.dwmmc > unbind
sleep .5
echo ff0f0000.dwmmc > bind
while true; do
if [ -e /dev/mmcblk2 ]; then
break;
fi
sleep .1
done
done
DMA got broken a while back in two different ways:
1) a change in the behaviour of disable_irq() to wait for the interrupt
to finish executing causes us to deadlock at the end of DMA.
2) a change to avoid modifying the scatterlist left the first transfer
uninitialised.
DMA is only used with expansion cards, so has gone unnoticed.
Fixes: fa4e99899932 ("[ARM] dma: RiscPC: don't modify DMA SG entries") Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
iptunnel_xmit() works as a common function, also used by a udp tunnel
which doesn't have to have a tunnel device, like how TIPC works with
udp media.
In these cases, we should allow not to count pkts on dev's tstats, so
that udp tunnel can work with no tunnel device safely.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Since scsi_device_quiesce() skips SCSI devices that have another state than
RUNNING, OFFLINE or TRANSPORT_OFFLINE, scsi_device_resume() should not
complain about SCSI devices that have been skipped. Hence this patch. This
patch avoids that the following warning appears during resume:
The RQF_PREEMPT flag is used for three purposes:
- In the SCSI core, for making sure that power management requests
are executed even if a device is in the "quiesced" state.
- For domain validation by SCSI drivers that use the parallel port.
- In the IDE driver, for IDE preempt requests.
Rename "preempt-only" into "pm-only" because the primary purpose of
this mode is power management. Since the power management core may
but does not have to resume a runtime suspended device before
performing system-wide suspend and since a later patch will set
"pm-only" mode as long as a block device is runtime suspended, make
it possible to set "pm-only" mode from more than one context. Since
with this change scsi_device_quiesce() is no longer idempotent, make
that function return early if it is called for a quiesced queue.
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Cc: Jianchao Wang <jianchao.w.wang@oracle.com> Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The PPS assert/clear offset corrections are set by the PPS_SETPARAMS
ioctl in the pps_ktime structs, which also contain flags. The flags are
not initialized by applications (using the timepps.h header) and they
are not used by the kernel for anything except returning them back in
the PPS_GETPARAMS ioctl.
Set the flags to zero to make it clear they are unused and avoid leaking
uninitialized data of the PPS_SETPARAMS caller to other applications
that have a read access to the PPS device.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190702092251.24303-1-mlichvar@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Rodolfo Giometti <giometti@enneenne.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This makes the setproctitle() special case very explicit indeed, and
handles it with a separate helper function entirely. In the process, it
re-instates the original semantics of simply stopping at the first NUL
character when the original last NUL character is no longer there.
[ The original semantics can still be seen in mm/util.c: get_cmdline()
that is limited to a fixed-size buffer ]
This makes the logic about when we use the string lengths etc much more
obvious, and makes it easier to see what we do and what the two very
different cases are.
Note that even when we allow walking past the end of the argument array
(because the setproctitle() might have overwritten and overflowed the
original argv[] strings), we only allow it when it overflows into the
environment region if it is immediately adjacent.
[ Fixed for missing 'count' checks noted by Alexey Izbyshev ]
Start off with a clean slate that only reads exactly from arg_start to
arg_end, without any oddities. This simplifies the code and in the
process removes the case that caused us to potentially leak an
uninitialized byte from the temporary kernel buffer.
Note that in order to start from scratch with an understandable base,
this simplifies things _too_ much, and removes all the legacy logic to
handle setproctitle() having changed the argument strings.
We'll add back those special cases very differently in the next commit.
When going through execve(), zero out the NUMA fault statistics instead of
freeing them.
During execve, the task is reachable through procfs and the scheduler. A
concurrent /proc/*/sched reader can read data from a freed ->numa_faults
allocation (confirmed by KASAN) and write it back to userspace.
I believe that it would also be possible for a use-after-free read to occur
through a race between a NUMA fault and execve(): task_numa_fault() can
lead to task_numa_compare(), which invokes task_weight() on the currently
running task of a different CPU.
Another way to fix this would be to make ->numa_faults RCU-managed or add
extra locking, but it seems easier to wipe the NUMA fault statistics on
execve.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Fixes: 82727018b0d3 ("sched/numa: Call task_numa_free() from do_execve()") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190716152047.14424-1-jannh@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This patch will check the weight and exit the loop if we exceeds the
weight. This is useful for preventing scsi kthread from hogging cpu
which is guest triggerable.
This addresses CVE-2019-3900.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Fixes: 057cbf49a1f0 ("tcm_vhost: Initial merge for vhost level target fabric driver") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
[jwang: backport to 4.19] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This patch will check the weight and exit the loop if we exceeds the
weight. This is useful for preventing vsock kthread from hogging cpu
which is guest triggerable. The weight can help to avoid starving the
request from on direction while another direction is being processed.
The value of weight is picked from vhost-net.
This addresses CVE-2019-3900.
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Fixes: 433fc58e6bf2 ("VSOCK: Introduce vhost_vsock.ko") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When the rx buffer is too small for a packet, we will discard the vq
descriptor and retry it for the next packet:
while ((sock_len = vhost_net_rx_peek_head_len(net, sock->sk,
&busyloop_intr))) {
...
/* On overrun, truncate and discard */
if (unlikely(headcount > UIO_MAXIOV)) {
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, READ, vq->iov, 1, 1);
err = sock->ops->recvmsg(sock, &msg,
1, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC);
pr_debug("Discarded rx packet: len %zd\n", sock_len);
continue;
}
...
}
This makes it possible to trigger a infinite while..continue loop
through the co-opreation of two VMs like:
1) Malicious VM1 allocate 1 byte rx buffer and try to slow down the
vhost process as much as possible e.g using indirect descriptors or
other.
2) Malicious VM2 generate packets to VM1 as fast as possible
Fixing this by checking against weight at the end of RX and TX
loop. This also eliminate other similar cases when:
- userspace is consuming the packets in the meanwhile
- theoretical TOCTOU attack if guest moving avail index back and forth
to hit the continue after vhost find guest just add new buffers
This addresses CVE-2019-3900.
Fixes: d8316f3991d20 ("vhost: fix total length when packets are too short") Fixes: 3a4d5c94e9593 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
[jwang: backport to 4.19] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
We used to have vhost_exceeds_weight() for vhost-net to:
- prevent vhost kthread from hogging the cpu
- balance the time spent between TX and RX
This function could be useful for vsock and scsi as well. So move it
to vhost.c. Device must specify a weight which counts the number of
requests, or it can also specific a byte_weight which counts the
number of bytes that has been processed.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
[jwang: backport to 4.19, fix conflict in net.c] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Certain ttys operations (pty_unix98_ops) lack tiocmget() and tiocmset()
functions which are called by the certain HCI UART protocols (hci_ath,
hci_bcm, hci_intel, hci_mrvl, hci_qca) via hci_uart_set_flow_control()
or directly. This leads to an execution at NULL and can be triggered by
an unprivileged user. Fix this by adding a helper function and a check
for the missing tty operations in the protocols code.
This fixes CVE-2019-10207. The Fixes: lines list commits where calls to
tiocm[gs]et() or hci_uart_set_flow_control() were added to the HCI UART
protocols.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1b42faa2848963564a5b1b7f8c837ea7b55ffa50 Reported-by: syzbot+79337b501d6aa974d0f6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.36+ Fixes: b3190df62861 ("Bluetooth: Support for Atheros AR300x serial chip") Fixes: 118612fb9165 ("Bluetooth: hci_bcm: Add suspend/resume PM functions") Fixes: ff2895592f0f ("Bluetooth: hci_intel: Add Intel baudrate configuration support") Fixes: 162f812f23ba ("Bluetooth: hci_uart: Add Marvell support") Fixes: fa9ad876b8e0 ("Bluetooth: hci_qca: Add support for Qualcomm Bluetooth chip wcn3990") Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Yu-Chen, Cho <acho@suse.com> Tested-by: Yu-Chen, Cho <acho@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Intel VT-d driver was reworked to use common deferred flushing
implementation. Previously there was one global per-cpu flush queue,
afterwards - one per domain.
Before deferring a flush, the queue should be allocated and initialized.
Currently only domains with IOMMU_DOMAIN_DMA type initialize their flush
queue. It's probably worth to init it for static or unmanaged domains
too, but it may be arguable - I'm leaving it to iommu folks.
Prevent queuing an iova flush if the domain doesn't have a queue.
The defensive check seems to be worth to keep even if queue would be
initialized for all kinds of domains. And is easy backportable.
On 4.19.43 stable kernel it has a user-visible effect: previously for
devices in si domain there were crashes, on sata devices: