The j1939_session_deactivate() is decrementing the session ref-count and
potentially can free() the session. This would cause use-after-free
situation.
However, the code calling j1939_session_deactivate() does always hold
another reference to the session, so that it would not be free()ed in
this code path.
This patch adds a comment to make this clear and a WARN_ON, to ensure
that future changes will not violate this requirement. Further this
patch avoids dereferencing the session pointer as a precaution to avoid
use-after-free if the session is actually free()ed.
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210714111602.24021-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Reported-by: Xiaochen Zou <xzou017@ucr.edu> Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This makes 'perf top' abort in some cases, and the right fix will
involve surgery that is too much to do at this stage, so revert for now
and fix it in the next merge window.
With commit c9f3401313a5 ("powerpc: Always enable queued spinlocks for
64s, disable for others") CONFIG_PPC_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS is always
enabled on ppc64le, external modules that use spinlock APIs are
failing.
ERROR: modpost: GPL-incompatible module XXX.ko uses GPL-only symbol 'shared_processor'
Before the above commit, modules were able to build without any
issues. Also this problem is not seen on other architectures. This
problem can be workaround if CONFIG_UNINLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK is enabled in
the config. However CONFIG_UNINLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK is not enabled by
default and only enabled in certain conditions like
CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCKS is set in the kernel config.
Given that spin locks are one of the basic facilities for module code,
this effectively makes it impossible to build/load almost any non GPL
modules on ppc64le.
This was first reported at https://github.com/openzfs/zfs/issues/11172
Currently shared_processor is exported as GPL only symbol.
Fix this for parity with other architectures by exposing
shared_processor to non-GPL modules too.
As pointed out by Matthew Wilcox, this needs to use
page_file_offset() to calculate the offset instead.
Pages coming from the swap cache have page->index set
to their index within the swapcache, not within the backing
file. For a sufficiently large swapcache, we could have
overlapping values of page->index within the same backing file.
Suggested by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.7+ Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask") we
narrowed the offset mask for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to
mitigate a corner case where in the speculative domain it is possible to
advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-
bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space.
The verifier's state pruning for scalars leaves one corner case open
where in the first verification path R_x holds an unknown scalar with an
aux->alu_limit of e.g. 7, and in a second verification path that same
register R_x, here denoted as R_x', holds an unknown scalar which has
tighter bounds and would thus satisfy range_within(R_x, R_x') as well as
tnum_in(R_x, R_x') for state pruning, yielding an aux->alu_limit of 3:
Given the second path fits the register constraints for pruning, the final
generated mask from aux->alu_limit will remain at 7. While technically
not wrong for the non-speculative domain, it would however be possible
to craft similar cases where the mask would be too wide as in 7fedb63a8307.
One way to fix it is to detect the presence of unknown scalar map pointer
arithmetic and force a deeper search on unknown scalars to ensure that
we do not run into a masking mismatch.
func_states_equal makes a very short lived allocation for idmap,
probably because it's too large to fit on the stack. However the
function is called quite often, leading to a lot of alloc / free
churn. Replace the temporary allocation with dedicated scratch
space in struct bpf_verifier_env.
Follow-up to fe9a5ca7e370 ("bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative
path verification"). The sanitize_insn_aux_data() helper does not serve a
particular purpose in today's code. The original intention for the helper
was that if function-by-function verification fails, a given program would
be cleared from temporary insn_aux_data[], and then its verification would
be re-attempted in the context of the main program a second time.
However, a failure in do_check_subprogs() will skip do_check_main() and
propagate the error to the user instead, thus such situation can never occur.
Given its interaction is not compatible to the Spectre v1 mitigation (due to
comparing aux->seen with env->pass_cnt), just remove sanitize_insn_aux_data()
to avoid future bugs in this area.
Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of
techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and
stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5:
A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many
microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are
known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on
any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does
not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data
cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is
detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed.
af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate
this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast"
(low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store
of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then
speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero
value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at
that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then
redirected to the "zero page".
The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is
done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with
relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking
on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus,
there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10
and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e3088 /assumed/ a low latency
operation.
However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient
since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store
and is thus bypassed as well:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below
32: (bf) r9 = r10
// JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg:
// r9 -> r15 (callee saved)
// r10 -> rbp
// train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9
// and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table.
33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576)
34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580)
36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584)
38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588)
40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
[...]
543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp
// to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain
// in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is
// disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context:
//
// ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54 push r12
// ffffffff8117ee22: 55 push rbp
// ffffffff8117ee23: 53 push rbx
// ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff test rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc
// ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00 jne ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken
// [...]
// ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff mov r12,0xffffffffffffffea
// ffffffff8117eee7: 5b pop rbx
// ffffffff8117eee8: 5d pop rbp
// ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0 mov rax,r12
// ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c pop r12
// ffffffff8117eeee: c3 ret
545: (18) r1 = map[id:4]
547: (bf) r2 = r7
548: (b7) r3 = 0
549: (b7) r4 = 4
550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288
// instruction 551 inserted by verifier \
551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
// storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16 | since value of r10 is "slow".
552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 /
// following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency
// misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes.
553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16)
// in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative
// domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below.
554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the
verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of
the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency
instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast
to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware
registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally,
fp-16 can still be r2.
Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads
from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/
the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register
such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this
option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under
speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on
r10 would look as follows:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
[...]
// longer store forward prediction training sequence than before.
2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588)
2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0
2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592)
2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0
2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store
// forward prediction training.
2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0
2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0
2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0
2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0
2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0
2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0
2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0
2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0
2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0
2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0
2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0
2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0
2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0
2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0
2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0
2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0
2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0
2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0
2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0
2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0
2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0
2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the
// sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier.
2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 | since store unit is still busy.
// load from stack intended to bypass stores.
2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
[...]
Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such
as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution
units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the
sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior
stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack
may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share
execution resources.
This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e3088 ("bpf:
Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection
of stack reuse from af86ca4e3088 where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been
written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does
not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for
several reasons outlined as follows:
1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is
therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store
bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the
oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which
does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast"
read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and
therefore also must be subject to mitigation.
2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr)
condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could
also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative
store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to
a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near
these pointer types.
While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also
stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]:
[...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory
of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently
and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We
explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more
pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used
by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to
type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for
stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of
the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of
completeness. [...]
From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather
limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills
to the BPF stack:
[...]
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
[...]
2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value
// of 943576462 before store ...
2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462
2112: (af) r11 ^= r7
2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11
2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462
2116: (af) r2 ^= r11
// ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg.
2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage
infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective
and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have
to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a
tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers
would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the
fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the
latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations
options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes:
[...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might
complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...]
The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution
and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but
it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally
visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which
is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to
rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says:
[...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is
allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and
physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store
buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the
store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding
subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel
CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...]
One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e3088
where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming
from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX
or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data
value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills.
The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be
leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST |
BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a
speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged
programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon
register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not
used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot
occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate
the latter cost.
In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction
/either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to
/no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected
by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already.
This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation
as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled,
it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional
instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow
as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4
since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and
ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs.
The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does
annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers.
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The hi3110_cmd() is supposed to return zero on success and negative
error codes on failure, but it was accidentally declared as a u8 when
it needs to be an int type.
Fixes: 57e83fb9b746 ("can: hi311x: Add Holt HI-311x CAN driver") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729141246.GA1267@kili Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(),
pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be
called in release automatically.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(),
pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be
called in release automatically.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The result of __dev_get_by_index() is not checked for NULL and then gets
dereferenced immediately.
Also, __dev_get_by_index() must be called while holding either RTNL lock
or @dev_base_lock, which isn't satisfied by mlx5e_hairpin_get_mdev() or
its callers. This makes the underlying hlist_for_each_entry() loop not
safe, and can have adverse effects in itself.
Fix by using dev_get_by_index() and handling nullptr return value when
ifindex device is not found. Update mlx5e_hairpin_get_mdev() callers to
check for possible PTR_ERR() result.
Fix a bug when flow table is created in priority that already
has other flow tables as shown in the below diagram.
If the new flow table (FT-B) has the lowest level in the priority,
we need to connect the flow tables from the previous priority (p0)
to this new table. In addition when this flow table is destroyed
(FT-B), we need to connect the flow tables from the previous
priority (p0) to the next level flow table (FT-C) in the same
priority of the destroyed table (if exists).
Some bootloaders set the widebus enable bit in the INTF_CONFIG register,
but configuration of widebus isn't yet supported ensure that the
register has a known value, with widebus disabled.
Fixes: c943b4948b58 ("drm/msm/dp: add displayPort driver support") Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722024434.3313167-1-bjorn.andersson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Syzbot reported skb_over_panic() in llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). The
problem was in wrong LCC header manipulations.
Syzbot's reproducer tries to send XID packet. llc_ui_sendmsg() is
doing following steps:
1. skb allocation with size = len + header size
len is passed from userpace and header size
is 3 since addr->sllc_xid is set.
2. skb_reserve() for header_len = 3
3. filling all other space with memcpy_from_msg()
Ok, at this moment we have fully loaded skb, only headers needs to be
filled.
Then code comes to llc_sap_action_send_xid_c(). This function pushes 3
bytes for LLC PDU header and initializes it. Then comes
llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). It initalizes next 3 bytes *AFTER* LLC PDU
header and call skb_push(skb, 3). This looks wrong for 2 reasons:
1. Bytes rigth after LLC header are user data, so this function
was overwriting payload.
2. skb_push(skb, 3) call can cause skb_over_panic() since
all free space was filled in llc_ui_sendmsg(). (This can
happen is user passed 686 len: 686 + 14 (eth header) + 3 (LLC
header) = 703. SKB_DATA_ALIGN(703) = 704)
So, in this patch I added 2 new private constansts: LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID
and LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID. LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID is used to correctly reserve
header size to handle LLC + XID case. LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID is used by
llc_pdu_header_init() function to push 6 bytes instead of 3. And finally
I removed skb_push() call from llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd().
This changes should not affect other parts of LLC, since after
all steps we just transmit buffer.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5e5a981ad7cc54c4b2b4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK MSR is part of interrupt based asynchronous page fault
interface and not the original (deprecated) KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF. This is
stated in Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst.
Fixes: 66570e966dd9 ("kvm: x86: only provide PV features if enabled in guest's CPUID") Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210722123018.260035-1-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In the existing code while changing the number of TX/RX
queues using ethtool the PF/VF interface resources are
freed and reallocated (otx2_stop and otx2_open is called)
if the device is in running state. If any resource allocation
fails in otx2_open, driver free already allocated resources
and return. But again, when the number of queues changes
as the device state still running oxt2_stop is called.
In which we try to free already freed resources leading
to driver crash.
This patch fixes the issue by setting the INTF_DOWN flag on
error and free the resources in otx2_stop only if the flag is
not set.
Fixes: 50fe6c02e5ad ("octeontx2-pf: Register and handle link notifications") Signed-off-by: Geetha sowjanya <gakula@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Sunil Kovvuri Goutham <Sunil.Goutham@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
One skb's skb_shinfo frags are not writable, and they can be shared with
other skbs' like by pskb_copy(). To write the frags may cause other skb's
data crash.
So before doing en/decryption, skb_cow_data() should always be called for
a cloned or nonlinear skb if req dst is using the same sg as req src.
While at it, the likely branch can be removed, as it will be covered
by skb_cow_data().
Note that esp_input() has the same issue, and I will fix it in another
patch. tipc_aead_encrypt() doesn't have this issue, as it only processes
linear data in the unlikely branch.
Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication") Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Be sure to count the csum_none cases when csum offload is
enabled.
Fixes: 0f3154e6bcb3 ("ionic: Add Tx and Rx handling") Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
We need to count the correct Tx and/or Rx packets for dynamic
interrupt moderation, depending on which we're processing on
the queue interrupt.
Fixes: 04a834592bf5 ("ionic: dynamic interrupt moderation") Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Move the interrupt coalesce value update out of the napi
thread and into the dim_work thread and set it only when it
has actually changed.
Fixes: 04a834592bf5 ("ionic: dynamic interrupt moderation") Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Syzbot reported memory leak in qrtr. The problem was in unputted
struct sock. qrtr_local_enqueue() function calls qrtr_port_lookup()
which takes sock reference if port was found. Then there is the following
check:
Since we should drop the reference before returning from this function and
ipc can be non-NULL inside this if, we should add qrtr_port_put() inside
this if.
The similar corner case is in qrtr_endpoint_post() as Manivannan
reported. In case of sock_queue_rcv_skb() failure we need to put
port reference to avoid leaking struct sock pointer.
Fixes: e04df98adf7d ("net: qrtr: Remove receive worker") Fixes: bdabad3e363d ("net: Add Qualcomm IPC router") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+35a511c72ea7356cdcf3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In cases where the header straight after the tunnel header was
another ethernet header (TEB), instead of the network header,
the ECN decapsulation code would treat the ethernet header as if
it was an IP header, resulting in mishandling and possible
wrong drops or corruption of the IP header.
In this case, ECT(1) is sent, so IP_ECN_decapsulate tries to copy it to the
inner IPv4 header, and correct its checksum.
The offset of the ECT bits in an IPv4 header corresponds to the
lower 2 bits of the second octet of the destination MAC address
in the ethernet header.
The IPv4 checksum corresponds to end of the source address.
In order to reproduce:
$ ip netns add A
$ ip netns add B
$ ip -n A link add _v0 type veth peer name _v1 netns B
$ ip -n A link set _v0 up
$ ip -n A addr add dev _v0 10.254.3.1/24
$ ip -n A route add default dev _v0 scope global
$ ip -n B link set _v1 up
$ ip -n B addr add dev _v1 10.254.1.6/24
$ ip -n B route add default dev _v1 scope global
$ ip -n B link add gre1 type gretap local 10.254.1.6 remote 10.254.3.1 key 0x49000000
$ ip -n B link set gre1 up
# Now send an IPv4/GRE/Eth/IPv4 frame where the outer header has ECT(1),
# and the inner header has no ECT bits set:
$ cat send_pkt.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from scapy.all import *
send(pkt)
$ sudo ip netns exec B tcpdump -neqlllvi gre1 icmp & ; sleep 1
$ sudo ip netns exec A python3 send_pkt.py
In the original packet, the source/destinatio MAC addresses are
dst=18:be:92:a0:ee:26 src=18:b0:92:a0:6c:26
In the received packet, they are
dst=18:bd:92:a0:ee:26 src=18:b0:92:a0:6c:27
Thanks to Lahav Schlesinger <lschlesinger@drivenets.com> and Isaac Garzon <isaac@speed.io>
for helping me pinpoint the origin.
Fixes: b723748750ec ("tunnel: Propagate ECT(1) when decapsulating as recommended by RFC6040") Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Gilad Naaman <gnaaman@drivenets.com> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The release_sock() is blocking function, it would change the state
after sleeping. In order to evaluate the stated condition outside
the socket lock context, switch to use wait_woken() instead.
Fixes: 6398e23cdb1d8 ("tipc: standardize accept routine") Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hoang Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
For implicit-connect, when it's either SYN- or SYN+, an ACK should
be sent back to the client immediately. It's not appropriate for
the client to enter established state only after receiving data
from the server.
On client side, after the SYN is sent out, tipc_wait_for_connect()
should be called to wait for the ACK if timeout is set.
This patch also restricts __tipc_sendstream() to call __sendmsg()
only when it's in TIPC_OPEN state, so that the client can program
in a single loop doing both connecting and data sending like:
for (...)
sendmsg(dest, buf);
This makes the implicit-connect more implicit.
Fixes: b97bf3fd8f6a ("[TIPC] Initial merge") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In SW DCB mode the packets sent receive incorrect UP tags. They are
constructed correctly and put into tx_ring, but UP is later remapped by
HW on the basis of TCTUPR register contents according to Tx queue
selected, and BW used is consistent with the new UP values. This is
caused by Tx queue selection in kernel not taking into account DCB
configuration. This patch fixes the issue by implementing the
ndo_select_queue NDO callback.
Previously the trace:
"Starting FW LLDP agent failed: error: I40E_ERR_ADMIN_QUEUE_ERROR, I40E_AQ_RC_EAGAIN"
was produced when user tried to start Firmware LLDP agent,
just after it was stopped with sequence:
ethtool --set-priv-flags <dev> disable-fw-lldp on
ethtool --set-priv-flags <dev> disable-fw-lldp off
(without any delay between the commands)
At that point the firmware is still processing stop command, the behavior
is expected.
Fixes: c1041d070437 ("i40e: Missing response checks in driver when starting/stopping FW LLDP") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com> Tested-by: Imam Hassan Reza Biswas <imam.hassan.reza.biswas@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Correct the message flow between driver and firmware when disabling
queues.
Previously in case of PF reset (due to required reinit after reconfig),
the error like: "VSI seid 397 Tx ring 60 disable timeout" could show up
occasionally. The error was not a real issue of hardware or firmware,
it was caused by wrong sequence of messages invoked by the driver.
Fixes: 41c445ff0f48 ("i40e: main driver core") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com> Tested-by: Tony Brelinski <tonyx.brelinski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Notify the driver about the 4-address mode change and also send a nulldata
packet to the AP to notify it about the change
Fixes: 1ff4e8f2dec8 ("mac80211: notify the driver when a sta uses 4-address mode") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210702050111.47546-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
We got the following UBSAN report on one of our testing machines:
================================================================================
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2389:24
index 6 is out of range for type 'char *[6]'
CPU: 43 PID: 930921 Comm: systemd-coredum Tainted: G O 5.10.48-cloudflare-kasan-2021.7.0 #1
Hardware name: <snip>
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x7d/0xa3
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x43/0x48
? seq_printf+0x17d/0x250
bpf_link_show_fdinfo+0x329/0x380
? bpf_map_value_size+0xe0/0xe0
? put_files_struct+0x20/0x2d0
? __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0
seq_show+0x3f7/0x540
seq_read_iter+0x3f8/0x1040
seq_read+0x329/0x500
? seq_read_iter+0x1040/0x1040
? __fsnotify_parent+0x80/0x820
? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x380/0x380
vfs_read+0x123/0x460
ksys_read+0xed/0x1c0
? __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1f0/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
<snip>
================================================================================
================================================================================
UBSAN: object-size-mismatch in kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2384:2
From the report, we can infer that some array access in bpf_link_show_fdinfo at index 6
is out of bounds. The obvious candidate is bpf_link_type_strs[BPF_LINK_TYPE_XDP] with
BPF_LINK_TYPE_XDP == 6. It turns out that BPF_LINK_TYPE_XDP is missing from bpf_types.h
and therefore doesn't have an entry in bpf_link_type_strs:
Statistical counters are not incrementing in some adapter versions with
newer FW. This is due to the stats context length mismatch between FW and
driver. Since the L2 driver updates the length correctly, use the stats
length from L2 driver while allocating the DMA'able memory and creating
the stats context.
When we exceed the limit of BSS entries, this function will free the
new entry, however, at this time, it is the last door to access the
inputed ies, so these ies will be unreferenced objects and cause memory
leak.
Therefore we should free its ies before deallocating the new entry, beside
of dropping it from hidden_list.
There is a use after free memory corruption during module exit:
- nfcsim_exit()
- nfcsim_device_free(dev0)
- nfc_digital_unregister_device()
This iterates over command queue and frees all commands,
- dev->up = false
- nfcsim_link_shutdown()
- nfcsim_link_recv_wake()
This wakes the sleeping thread nfcsim_link_recv_skb().
- nfcsim_link_recv_skb()
Wake from wait_event_interruptible_timeout(),
call directly the deb->cb callback even though (dev->up == false),
- digital_send_cmd_complete()
Dereference of "struct digital_cmd" cmd which was freed earlier by
nfc_digital_unregister_device().
This causes memory corruption shortly after (with unrelated stack
trace):
nfc nfc0: NFC: nfcsim_recv_wq: Device is down
llcp: nfc_llcp_recv: err -19
nfc nfc1: NFC: nfcsim_recv_wq: Device is down
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffed
Call Trace:
fsnotify+0x54b/0x5c0
__fsnotify_parent+0x1fe/0x300
? vfs_write+0x27c/0x390
vfs_write+0x27c/0x390
ksys_write+0x63/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
This flow of calling digital_send_cmd_complete() callback on driver exit
is specific to nfcsim which implements reading and sending work queues.
Since the NFC digital device was unregistered, the callback should not
be called.
Fixes: 204bddcb508f ("NFC: nfcsim: Make use of the Digital layer") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
iocg_wake_fn() open-codes wait_queue_entry removal and wakeup because it
wants the wq_entry to be always removed whether it ended up waking the
task or not. finish_wait() tests whether wq_entry needs removal without
grabbing the wait_queue lock and expects the waker to use
list_del_init_careful() after all waking operations are complete, which
iocg_wake_fn() didn't do. The operation order was wrong and the regular
list_del_init() was used.
The result is that if a waiter wakes up racing the waker, it can free pop
the wq_entry off stack before the waker is still looking at it, which can
lead to a backtrace like the following.
It is not true (as stated in the reverted commit changelog) that we never
unmap the BAR on failure; it actually does happen properly on
amdgpu_driver_load_kms() -> amdgpu_driver_unload_kms() ->
amdgpu_device_fini() error path.
What's worse, this commit actually completely breaks resource freeing on
probe failure (like e.g. failure to load microcode), as
amdgpu_driver_unload_kms() notices adev->rmmio being NULL and bails too
early, leaving all the resources that'd normally be freed in
amdgpu_acpi_fini() and amdgpu_device_fini() still hanging around, leading
to all sorts of oopses when someone tries to, for example, access the
sysfs and procfs resources which are still around while the driver is
gone.
Fixes: 4192f7b57689 ("drm/amdgpu: unmap register bar on device init failure") Reported-by: Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In case when psp_init_asd_microcode() fails to load ASD microcode file,
psp_v12_0_init_microcode() tries to print the firmware filename that
failed to load before bailing out.
This is wrong because:
- the firmware filename it would want it print is an incorrect one as
psp_init_asd_microcode() and psp_v12_0_init_microcode() are loading
different filenames
- it tries to print fw_name, but that's not yet been initialized by that
time, so it prints random stack contents, e.g.
amdgpu 0000:04:00.0: Direct firmware load for amdgpu/renoir_asd.bin failed with error -2
amdgpu 0000:04:00.0: amdgpu: fail to initialize asd microcode
amdgpu 0000:04:00.0: amdgpu: psp v12.0: Failed to load firmware "\xfeTO\x8e\xff\xff"
Fix that by bailing out immediately, instead of priting the bogus error
message.
[Why]
We don't check DENTIST_DISPCLK_CHG_DONE to ensure dentist
display clockis updated to target value. In some scenarios with large
display clock margin, it will deliver unfinished display clock and cause
issues like display black screen.
[How]
Checking DENTIST_DISPCLK_CHG_DONE to ensure display clock
has been update to target value before driver do other clock related
actions.
Commit 7930742d6, reverting 26fd962, missed out on reverting an incorrect
change to a return value. The niu_pci_vpd_scan_props(..) == 1 case appears
to be a normal path - treating it as an error and return -EINVAL was
breaking VPD_SCAN and causing the driver to fail to load.
Fix, so my Neptune card works again.
Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu> Cc: Shannon Nelson <shannon.lee.nelson@gmail.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 7930742d ('Revert "niu: fix missing checks of niu_pci_eeprom_read"') Signed-off-by: Paul Jakma <paul@jakma.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 670e90924bfe ("HID: wacom: support named keys on older devices")
added support for sending named events from the soft buttons on the
24HDT and 27QHDT. In the process, however, it inadvertantly disabled the
touchscreen of the 24HDT and 27QHDT by default. The
`wacom_set_shared_values` function would normally enable touch by default
but because it checks the state of the non-shared `has_mute_touch_switch`
flag and `wacom_setup_touch_input_capabilities` sets the state of the
/shared/ version, touch ends up being disabled by default.
This patch sets the non-shared flag, letting `wacom_set_shared_values`
take care of copying the value over to the shared version and setting
the default touch state to "on".
Fixes: 670e90924bfe ("HID: wacom: support named keys on older devices") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Jason Gerecke <jason.gerecke@wacom.com> Reviewed-by: Ping Cheng <ping.cheng@wacom.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The memory reserved by console/PALcode or non-volatile memory is not added
to memblock.memory.
Since commit fa3354e4ea39 (mm: free_area_init: use maximal zone PFNs rather
than zone sizes) the initialization of the memory map relies on the
accuracy of memblock.memory to properly calculate zone sizes. The holes in
memblock.memory caused by absent regions reserved by the firmware cause
incorrect initialization of struct pages which leads to BUG() during the
initial page freeing:
Fix this by registering the reserved ranges in memblock.memory.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210726192311.uffqnanxw3ac5wwi@ivybridge Fixes: fa3354e4ea39 ("mm: free_area_init: use maximal zone PFNs rather than zone sizes") Reported-by: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs() MAX_RX_URBS coherent buffers are allocated
and there is nothing, that frees them:
1) In callback function the urb is resubmitted and that's all
2) In disconnect function urbs are simply killed, but URB_FREE_BUFFER
is not set (see esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs) and this flag cannot be used
with coherent buffers.
So, all allocated buffers should be freed with usb_free_coherent()
explicitly.
Side note: This code looks like a copy-paste of other can drivers. The
same patch was applied to mcba_usb driver and it works nice with real
hardware. There is no change in functionality, only clean-up code for
coherent buffers.
In ems_usb_start() MAX_RX_URBS coherent buffers are allocated and
there is nothing, that frees them:
1) In callback function the urb is resubmitted and that's all
2) In disconnect function urbs are simply killed, but URB_FREE_BUFFER
is not set (see ems_usb_start) and this flag cannot be used with
coherent buffers.
So, all allocated buffers should be freed with usb_free_coherent()
explicitly.
Side note: This code looks like a copy-paste of other can drivers. The
same patch was applied to mcba_usb driver and it works nice with real
hardware. There is no change in functionality, only clean-up code for
coherent buffers.
In usb_8dev_start() MAX_RX_URBS coherent buffers are allocated and
there is nothing, that frees them:
1) In callback function the urb is resubmitted and that's all
2) In disconnect function urbs are simply killed, but URB_FREE_BUFFER
is not set (see usb_8dev_start) and this flag cannot be used with
coherent buffers.
So, all allocated buffers should be freed with usb_free_coherent()
explicitly.
Side note: This code looks like a copy-paste of other can drivers. The
same patch was applied to mcba_usb driver and it works nice with real
hardware. There is no change in functionality, only clean-up code for
coherent buffers.
Fixes: 0024d8ad1639 ("can: usb_8dev: Add support for USB2CAN interface from 8 devices") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d39b458cd425a1cf7f512f340224e6e9563b07bd.1627404470.git.paskripkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Yasushi reported, that his Microchip CAN Analyzer stopped working
since commit 91c02557174b ("can: mcba_usb: fix memory leak in
mcba_usb"). The problem was in missing urb->transfer_dma
initialization.
In my previous patch to this driver I refactored mcba_usb_start() code
to avoid leaking usb coherent buffers. To archive it, I passed local
stack variable to usb_alloc_coherent() and then saved it to private
array to correctly free all coherent buffers on ->close() call. But I
forgot to initialize urb->transfer_dma with variable passed to
usb_alloc_coherent().
All of this was causing device to not work, since dma addr 0 is not
valid and following log can be found on bug report page, which points
exactly to problem described above.
| DMAR: [DMA Write] Request device [00:14.0] PASID ffffffff fault addr 0 [fault reason 05] PTE Write access is not set
This patch fixes an incorrect way of reading error counters in messages
received for this purpose from the PCAN-USB interface. These messages
inform about the increase or decrease of the error counters, whose values
are placed in bytes 1 and 2 of the message data (not 0 and 1).
Fixes: ea8b33bde76c ("can: pcan_usb: add support of rxerr/txerr counters") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210625130931.27438-4-s.grosjean@peak-system.com Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Stephane Grosjean <s.grosjean@peak-system.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
After unlist_netdevice(), dev_get_by_index() return NULL in
raw_setsockopt(). Function raw_enable_filters() will add sock
and can_filter to net->can.rx_alldev_list. Then the sock is closed.
Followed by, we sock_sendmsg() to a new vcan device use the same
can_filter. Protocol stack match the old receiver whose sock has
been released on net->can.rx_alldev_list in can_rcv_filter().
Function raw_rcv() uses the freed sock. UAF BUG is triggered.
We can find that the key issue is that net_device has not been
protected in raw_setsockopt(). Use rtnl_lock to protect net_device
in raw_setsockopt().
Fixes: c18ce101f2e4 ("[CAN]: Add raw protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722070819.1048263-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
For punch holes in EOF blocks, fallocate used buffer write to zero the
EOF blocks in last cluster. But since ->writepage will ignore EOF
pages, those zeros will not be flushed.
This "looks" ok as commit 6bba4471f0cc ("ocfs2: fix data corruption by
fallocate") will zero the EOF blocks when extend the file size, but it
isn't. The problem happened on those EOF pages, before writeback, those
pages had DIRTY flag set and all buffer_head in them also had DIRTY flag
set, when writeback run by write_cache_pages(), DIRTY flag on the page
was cleared, but DIRTY flag on the buffer_head not.
When next write happened to those EOF pages, since buffer_head already
had DIRTY flag set, it would not mark page DIRTY again. That made
writeback ignore them forever. That will cause data corruption. Even
directio write can't work because it will fail when trying to drop pages
caches before direct io, as it found the buffer_head for those pages
still had DIRTY flag set, then it will fall back to buffer io mode.
To make a summary of the issue, as writeback ingores EOF pages, once any
EOF page is generated, any write to it will only go to the page cache,
it will never be flushed to disk even file size extends and that page is
not EOF page any more. The fix is to avoid zero EOF blocks with buffer
write.
The following code snippet from qemu-img could trigger the corruption.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210722054923.24389-2-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If append-dio feature is enabled, direct-io write and fallocate could
run in parallel to extend file size, fallocate used "orig_isize" to
record i_size before taking "ip_alloc_sem", when
ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster() zeroout EOF blocks, i_size maybe already
extended by ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), that will cause valid data zeroed
out.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210722054923.24389-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Fixes: 6bba4471f0cc ("ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The arguments to the KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG ioctl include a pointer,
therefore it needs a compat ioctl implementation. Otherwise,
32-bit userspace fails to invoke it on 64-bit kernels; for x86
it might work fine by chance if the padding is zero, but not
on big-endian architectures.
Reported-by: Thomas Sattler Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2a31b9db1535 ("kvm: introduce manual dirty log reprotect") Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID is the maximum vcpu-id of a guest, and not the number
of vcpu-ids. Fix array indexed by vcpu-id to have KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID+1
elements.
Note that this is currently no real problem, as KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID is
an odd number, resulting in always enough padding being available at
the end of those arrays.
Nevertheless this should be fixed in order to avoid rare problems in
case someone is using an even number for KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID.
The current assumption that methods to read PCH FIVR attributes will
return integer, is not correct. There is no good way to return integer
as negative numbers are also valid.
These read methods return a package of integers. The first integer returns
status, which is 0 on success and any other value for failure. When the
returned status is zero, then the second integer returns the actual value.
This change fixes this issue by replacing acpi_evaluate_integer() with
acpi_evaluate_object() and use acpi_extract_package() to extract results.
The commit 0ec4e55e9f57 ("ACPI: resources: Add checks for ACPI IRQ
override") introduces regression on some platforms, at least it makes
the UART can't get correct irq setting on two different platforms,
and it makes the kernel can't bootup on these two platforms.
In compression write endio sequence, the range which the compressed_bio
writes is marked as uptodate if the last bio of the compressed (sub)bios
is completed successfully. There could be previous bio which may
have failed which is recorded in cb->errors.
Set the writeback range as uptodate only if cb->errors is zero, as opposed
to checking only the last bio's status.
Backporting notes: in all versions up to 4.4 the last argument is always
replaced by "!cb->errors".
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
As a note, prior to commit cf89af146b7e ("btrfs: dev-replace: fail
mount if we don't have replace item with target device"), rw_devices
was decremented on removing a writable device in
__btrfs_free_extra_devids only if the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT bit
was not set for the device. However, this check does not need to be
reinstated as it is now redundant and incorrect.
In __btrfs_free_extra_devids, we skip removing the device if it is the
target for replacement. This is done by checking whether device->devid
== BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID. Since BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT is set
only on the device with devid BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID, no devices
should have the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT bit set after the check,
and so it's redundant to test for that bit.
Additionally, following commit 82372bc816d7 ("Btrfs: make
the logic of source device removing more clear"), rw_devices is
incremented whenever a writeable device is added to the alloc
list (including the target device in btrfs_dev_replace_finishing), so
all removals of writable devices from the alloc list should also be
accompanied by a decrement to rw_devices.
Reported-by: syzbot+a70e2ad0879f160b9217@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: cf89af146b7e ("btrfs: dev-replace: fail mount if we don't have replace item with target device") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Tested-by: syzbot+a70e2ad0879f160b9217@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Since commit 1b6b26ae7053 ("pipe: fix and clarify pipe write wakeup
logic") we have sanitized the pipe write logic, and would only try to
wake up readers if they needed it.
In particular, if the pipe already had data in it before the write,
there was no point in trying to wake up a reader, since any existing
readers must have been aware of the pre-existing data already. Doing
extraneous wakeups will only cause potential thundering herd problems.
However, it turns out that some Android libraries have misused the EPOLL
interface, and expected "edge triggered" be to "any new write will
trigger it". Even if there was no edge in sight.
Quoting Sandeep Patil:
"The commit 1b6b26ae7053 ('pipe: fix and clarify pipe write wakeup
logic') changed pipe write logic to wakeup readers only if the pipe
was empty at the time of write. However, there are libraries that
relied upon the older behavior for notification scheme similar to
what's described in [1]
One such library 'realm-core'[2] is used by numerous Android
applications. The library uses a similar notification mechanism as GNU
Make but it never drains the pipe until it is full. When Android moved
to v5.10 kernel, all applications using this library stopped working.
The library has since been fixed[3] but it will be a while before all
applications incorporate the updated library"
Our regression rule for the kernel is that if applications break from
new behavior, it's a regression, even if it was because the application
did something patently wrong. Also note the original report [4] by
Michal Kerrisk about a test for this epoll behavior - but at that point
we didn't know of any actual broken use case.
So add the extraneous wakeup, to approximate the old behavior.
[ I say "approximate", because the exact old behavior was to do a wakeup
not for each write(), but for each pipe buffer chunk that was filled
in. The behavior introduced by this change is not that - this is just
"every write will cause a wakeup, whether necessary or not", which
seems to be sufficient for the broken library use. ]
It's worth noting that this adds the extraneous wakeup only for the
write side, while the read side still considers the "edge" to be purely
about reading enough from the pipe to allow further writes.
See commit f467a6a66419 ("pipe: fix and clarify pipe read wakeup logic")
for the pipe read case, which remains that "only wake up if the pipe was
full, and we read something from it".
../arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h:14:30: warning: ‘struct task_struct’ declared \
inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2);
^~~~~~~~~~~
.../arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h:40:34: warning: ‘struct task_struct’ declared \
inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option,
^~~~~~~~~~~
if linux/sched.h hasn't be included previously. This fixes a build error
when this header is used outside of the kernel tree.
If io_allocate_scq_urings() fails in io_uring_create(), 'ctx->sq_data'
is not set yet, when calling io_sq_offload_start() in io_disable_sqo_submit()
in error path, it will lead a null-ptr-deref.
The io_disable_sqo_submit() has been removed in mainline by commit 70aacfe66136 ("io_uring: kill sqo_dead and sqo submission halting"),
so the bug has been eliminated in mainline, it's a fix only for stable-5.10.
selftest: fix build error in tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c
When backporting 0db282ba2c12 ("selftest: use mmap instead of
posix_memalign to allocate memory") to this stable branch, I forgot a {
breaking the build.
The length variable is rather pointless given that it can be trivially
deduced from offset and size. Also the initial calculation can lead
to KASAN warnings.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reported-by: Leizhen (ThunderTown) <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The length variable is rather pointless given that it can be trivially
deduced from offset and size. Also the initial calculation can lead
to KASAN warnings.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reported-by: Leizhen (ThunderTown) <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
SCMI message headers carry a sequence number and such field is sized to
allow for MSG_TOKEN_MAX distinct numbers; moreover zero is not really an
acceptable maximum number of pending in-flight messages.
Fix accordingly the checks performed on the value exported by transports
in scmi_desc.max_msg
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712141833.6628-3-cristian.marussi@arm.com Reported-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com>
[sudeep.holla: updated the patch title and error message] Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The scmi_linux_errmap buffer access index is supposed to depend on the
array size to prevent element out of bounds access. It uses SCMI_ERR_MAX
to check bounds but that can mismatch with the array size. It also
changes the success into -EIO though scmi_linux_errmap is never used in
case of success, it is expected to work for success case too.
It is slightly confusing code as the negative of the error code
is used as index to the buffer. Fix it by negating it at the start and
make it more readable.
This happens due to missing lock nesting information. From the logs, we
see that a call to hfs_fill_super is made to mount the hfs filesystem.
While searching for the root inode, the lock on the catalog btree is
grabbed. Then, when the parent of the root isn't found, a call to
__hfs_bnode_create is made to create the parent of the root. This
eventually leads to a call to hfs_ext_read_extent which grabs a lock on
the extents btree.
Since the order of locking is catalog btree -> extents btree, this lock
hierarchy does not lead to a deadlock.
To tell lockdep that this locking is safe, we add nesting notation to
distinguish between catalog btrees, extents btrees, and attributes
btrees (for HFS+). This has already been done in hfsplus.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f007ef1d7a31a469e3be7aeb0fde0769b18585db Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-4-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+b718ec84a87b7e73ade4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+b718ec84a87b7e73ade4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Pages that we read in hfs_bnode_read need to be kmapped into kernel
address space. However, currently only the 0th page is kmapped. If the
given offset + length exceeds this 0th page, then we have an invalid
memory access.
To fix this, we kmap relevant pages one by one and copy their relevant
portions of data.
An example of invalid memory access occurring without this fix can be seen
in the following crash report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888125fdcffe by task syz-executor5/4634
This series ultimately aims to address a lockdep warning in
hfs_find_init reported by Syzbot [1].
The work done for this led to the discovery of another bug, and the
Syzkaller repro test also reveals an invalid memory access error after
clearing the lockdep warning. Hence, this series is broken up into
three patches:
1. Add a missing call to hfs_find_exit for an error path in
hfs_fill_super
2. Fix memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read by fixing calls to kmap
3. Add lock nesting notation to tell lockdep that the observed locking
hierarchy is safe
This patch (of 3):
Before exiting hfs_fill_super, the struct hfs_find_data used in
hfs_find_init should be passed to hfs_find_exit to be cleaned up, and to
release the lock held on the btree.
The call to hfs_find_exit is missing from an error path. We add it back
in by consolidating calls to hfs_find_exit for error paths.
When TEE target mirrors traffic to another interface, sk_buff may
not have enough headroom to be processed correctly.
ip_finish_output2() detect this situation for ipv4 and allocates
new skb with enogh headroom. However ipv6 lacks this logic in
ip_finish_output2 and it leads to skb_under_panic:
Invoking trc_del_holdout() from within trc_wait_for_one_reader() is
only a performance optimization because the RCU Tasks Trace grace-period
kthread will eventually do this within check_all_holdout_tasks_trace().
But it is not a particularly important performance optimization because
it only applies to the grace-period kthread, of which there is but one.
This commit therefore removes this invocation of trc_del_holdout() in
favor of the one in check_all_holdout_tasks_trace() in the grace-period
kthread.
Reported-by: "Xu, Yanfei" <yanfei.xu@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
As Yanfei pointed out, although invoking trc_del_holdout() is safe
from the viewpoint of the integrity of the holdout list itself,
the put_task_struct() invoked by trc_del_holdout() can result in
use-after-free errors due to later accesses to this task_struct structure
by the RCU Tasks Trace grace-period kthread.
This commit therefore removes this call to trc_del_holdout() from
trc_inspect_reader() in favor of the grace-period thread's existing call
to trc_del_holdout(), thus eliminating that particular class of
use-after-free errors.
Reported-by: "Xu, Yanfei" <yanfei.xu@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The doc draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00 that restricts 198 addresses
was never published. These addresses as private addresses should be
allowed to use in SCTP.
As Michael Tuexen suggested, this patch is to move 198 addresses from
unusable to private scope.
Reported-by: Sérgio <surkamp@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
sk_ll_usec is read locklessly from sk_can_busy_loop()
while another thread can change its value in sock_setsockopt()
This is correct but needs annotations.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_datagram / sock_setsockopt
write to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14011 on cpu 0:
sock_setsockopt+0x1287/0x2090 net/core/sock.c:1175
__sys_setsockopt+0x14f/0x200 net/socket.c:2100
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2115 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2112 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2112
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14001 on cpu 1:
sk_can_busy_loop include/net/busy_poll.h:41 [inline]
__skb_try_recv_datagram+0x14f/0x320 net/core/datagram.c:273
unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x14c/0x870 net/unix/af_unix.c:2101
unix_seqpacket_recvmsg+0x5a/0x70 net/unix/af_unix.c:2067
____sys_recvmsg+0x15d/0x310 include/linux/uio.h:244
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2598 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x35c/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2692
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2794 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2787 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xcf/0x150 net/socket.c:2787
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000101
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 14001 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Calling garp_request_leave() after garp_request_join(), the attr->state
is set to GARP_APPLICANT_VO, garp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last
transmit event in garp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be
leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before
rerturning from garp_uninit_applicant().
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Calling mrp_request_leave() after mrp_request_join(), the attr->state
is set to MRP_APPLICANT_VO, mrp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last
TX event in mrp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be leaked.
To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before rerturning
from mrp_uninit_applicant().
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
There were other less common instances of some kind of a general scribble
but the common theme was mount and cgroup and a dubious dentry triggering
the NULL dereference. I was only able to reproduce it under qemu by
replicating Richard's setup as closely as possible - I never did get it
to happen on bare metal, even while keeping everything else the same.
In commit 71d883c37e8d ("cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions")
we see this as a part of the overall change:
In changing from the local "*dentry" variable to using fc->root, we now
export/leave that dentry pointer in the file context after doing the dput()
in the unlikely "is_dying" case. With LTP doing a crazy amount of back to
back mount/unmount [testcases/bin/cgroup_regression_5_1.sh] the unlikely
becomes slightly likely and then bad things happen.
A fix would be to not leave the stale reference in fc->root as follows:
If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails in alloc_workqueue(), it will call put_pwq()
which invoke a work queue to call pwq_unbound_release_workfn() and use the 'wq'.
The 'wq' allocated in alloc_workqueue() will be freed in error path when
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails. So it will lead a UAF.
If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails, the new pwq are not linked, it doesn't
hold any reference to the 'wq', 'wq' is invalid to access in the worker,
so add check pwq if linked to fix this.
Fixes: 2d5f0764b526 ("workqueue: split apply_workqueue_attrs() into 3 stages") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Tested-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
unix_gc() assumes that candidate sockets can never gain an external
reference (i.e. be installed into an fd) while the unix_gc_lock is
held. Except for MSG_PEEK this is guaranteed by modifying inflight
count under the unix_gc_lock.
MSG_PEEK does not touch any variable protected by unix_gc_lock (file
count is not), yet it needs to be serialized with garbage collection.
Do this by locking/unlocking unix_gc_lock:
1) increment file count
2) lock/unlock barrier to make sure incremented file count is visible
to garbage collection
3) install file into fd
This is a lock barrier (unlike smp_mb()) that ensures that garbage
collection is run completely before or completely after the barrier.
A page fault can be queued while vCPU is in real paged mode on AMD, and
AMD manual asks the user to always intercept it
(otherwise result is undefined).
The resulting VM exit, does have an error code.
io_link_timeout_fn() should put only one reference of the linked timeout
request, however in case of racing with the master request's completion
first io_req_complete() puts one and then io_put_req_deferred() is
called.
selftests/bpf/Makefile includes tools/scripts/Makefile.include.
With the following command
make -j60 LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 <=== compile kernel
make -j60 -C tools/testing/selftests/bpf LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 V=1
some files are still compiled with gcc. This patch
fixed the case if CC/AR/LD/CXX/STRIP is allowed to be
overridden, it will be written to clang/llvm-ar/..., instead of
gcc binaries. The definition of CC_NO_CLANG is also relocated
to the place after the above CC is defined.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210413153419.3028165-1-yhs@fb.com Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
We will fail to build with CONFIG_SKB_EXTENSIONS disabled after 8550ff8d8c75 ("skbuff: Release nfct refcount on napi stolen or re-used
skbs") since there is an unconditionally use of skb_ext_find() without
an appropriate stub. Simply build the code conditionally and properly
guard against both COFNIG_SKB_EXTENSIONS as well as
CONFIG_NET_TC_SKB_EXT being disabled.
Fixes: Fixes: 8550ff8d8c75 ("skbuff: Release nfct refcount on napi stolen or re-used skbs") Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 99ba0ea616aa ("sfc: adjust efx->xdp_tx_queue_count with the real
number of initialized queues") intended to fix a problem caused by a
round up when calculating the number of XDP channels and queues.
However, this was not the real problem. The real problem was that the
number of XDP TX queues had been reduced to half in
commit e26ca4b53582 ("sfc: reduce the number of requested xdp ev queues"),
but the variable xdp_tx_queue_count had remained the same.
Once the correct number of XDP TX queues is created again in the
previous patch of this series, this also can be reverted since the error
doesn't actually exist.
Only in the case that there is a bug in the code we can have different
values in xdp_queue_number and efx->xdp_tx_queue_count. Because of this,
and per Edward Cree's suggestion, I add instead a WARN_ON to catch if it
happens again in the future.
Note that the number of allocated queues can be higher than the number
of used ones due to the round up, as explained in the existing comment
in the code. That's why we also have to stop increasing xdp_queue_number
beyond efx->xdp_tx_queue_count.
Signed-off-by: Íñigo Huguet <ihuguet@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
d3_entered flag is used to mark for vgpu_reset a previous power
transition from D3->D0, typically for VM resume from S3, so that gvt
could skip PPGTT invalidation in current vgpu_reset during resuming.
In case S0ix exit, although there is D3->D0, guest driver continue to
use vgpu as normal, with d3_entered set, until next shutdown/reboot or
power transition.
If a reboot follows a S0ix exit, device power state transite as:
D0->D3->D0->D0(reboot), while system power state transites as:
S0->S0 (reboot). There is no vgpu_reset until D0(reboot), thus
d3_entered won't be cleared, the vgpu_reset will skip PPGTT invalidation
however those PPGTT entries are no longer valid. Err appears like:
gvt: vgpu 2: vfio_pin_pages failed for gfn 0xxxxx, ret -22
gvt: vgpu 2: fail: spt xxxx guest entry 0xxxxx type 2
gvt: vgpu 2: fail: shadow page xxxx guest entry 0xxxxx type 2.
Give gvt a chance to clear d3_entered on elsp cmd submission so that the
states before & after S0ix enter/exit are consistent.
Fixes: ba25d977571e ("drm/i915/gvt: Do not destroy ppgtt_mm during vGPU D3->D0.") Reviewed-by: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Colin Xu <colin.xu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210707004531.4873-1-colin.xu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When MSI is used by the ehci-hcd driver, it can cause lost interrupts which
results in EHCI only continuing to work due to a polling fallback. But the
reliance of polling drastically reduces performance of any I/O through EHCI.
Interrupts are lost as the EHCI interrupt handler does not safely handle
edge-triggered interrupts. It fails to ensure all interrupt status bits are
cleared, which works with level-triggered interrupts but not the
edge-triggered interrupts typical from using MSI.
To fix this problem, check if the driver may have raced with the hardware
setting additional interrupt status bits and clear status until it is in a
stable state.
Fixes: 306c54d0edb6 ("usb: hcd: Try MSI interrupts on PCI devices") Tested-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210715213744.GA44506@redhat Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
projects / linux-stable / log