Commit 3a70dd2d0503 ("spi: mediatek: fix fifo rx mode") claims that
fifo RX mode was never handled, and adds the presumably missing code
to the FIFO transfer function. However, the claim that receive data
was not handled is incorrect. It was handled as part of interrupt
handling after the transfer was complete. The code added with the above
mentioned commit reads data from the receive FIFO before the transfer
is started, which is wrong. This results in an actual transfer error
on a Hayato Chromebook.
Remove the code trying to handle receive data before the transfer is
started to fix the problem.
Fixes: 3a70dd2d0503 ("spi: mediatek: fix fifo rx mode") Cc: Peter Hess <peter.hess@ph-home.de> Cc: Frank Wunderlich <frank-w@public-files.de> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@google.com> Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@google.com> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Tested-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@google.com> Tested-by: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210802030023.1748777-1-linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[Why]
Regression found in some embedded panels traces back to the earliest
upstreamed ASSR patch. The changed code flow are causing problems
with some panels.
[How]
- Change ASSR enabling code while preserving original code flow
as much as possible
- Simplify the code on guarding with internal display flag
Bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=213779
Bug: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/1620 Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Stylon Wang <stylon.wang@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Catch an illegal case to queue async from an unrelated task that got
the ring fd passed to it. This should not be possible to hit, but
better be proactive and catch it explicitly. io-wq is extended to
check for early IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL being set on a work item as well,
so it can run the request through the normal cancelation path.
1) Ring is exiting, and we're canceling requests anyway. Any request
should be canceled anyway. In theory, this could iterate for a
number of times if someone else is also driving the target block
queue into request starvation, however the likelihood of this
happening is miniscule.
2) If the original task decided to pass the ring to another task, then
we don't want to be reissuing from this context as it may be an
unrelated task or context. No assumptions should be made about
the context in which ->release() is run. This can only happen for pure
read/write, and we'll get -EFAULT on them anyway.
[Why]
Vertical and horizontal borders in timings are treated as increasing the
active area - vblank and hblank actually shrink.
Our input into DML does not include these borders so it incorrectly
assumes it has more time than available for vstartup and tmdl
calculations for some modes with borders.
An example of such a timing would be 640x480@72Hz:
The metadata address is set after the trace event, so the trace is not
capturing anything useful. Rather than logging the memory address, it's
useful to know if the command carries a metadata payload, so change the
trace event to log that true/false state instead.
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
localhost kernel: efi: Failed to lookup EFI memory descriptor for 0x000000003dcf8000
which comes from x86's version of efi_arch_mem_reserve() trying to
reserve a memory region. Usually, that function expects
EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA memory descriptors but the above case is for the
MOKvar table which is allocated in the EFI shim as runtime services.
That lead to a fix changing the allocation of that table to boot services.
However, that fix broke booting SEV guests with that shim leading to
this kernel fix
8d651ee9c71b ("x86/ioremap: Map EFI-reserved memory as encrypted for SEV")
which extended the ioremap hint to map reserved EFI boot services as
decrypted too.
However, all that wasn't needed, IMO, because that error message in
efi_arch_mem_reserve() was innocuous in this case - if the MOKvar table
is not in boot services, then it doesn't need to be reserved in the
first place because it is, well, in runtime services which *should* be
reserved anyway.
So do that reservation for the MOKvar table only if it is allocated
in boot services data. I couldn't find any requirement about where
that table should be allocated in, unlike the ESRT which allocation is
mandated to be done in boot services data by the UEFI spec.
In some cases skb head could be locked and entire header
data is pulled from skb. When skb_zerocopy() called in such cases,
following BUG is triggered. This patch fixes it by copying entire
skb in such cases.
This could be optimized incase this is performance bottleneck.
Code that triggered BUG:
int
skb_zerocopy(struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *from, int len, int hlen)
{
int i, j = 0;
int plen = 0; /* length of skb->head fragment */
int ret;
struct page *page;
unsigned int offset;
BUG_ON(!from->head_frag && !hlen);
Signed-off-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@ovn.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
While using the DMIC recording, the garbled data will be captured by the
DMIC. It is caused by the critical power of PLL closed in the jack detect
function.
Liajian reported a bug_on hit on a ThunderX2 arm64 server with FastLinQ
QL41000 ethernet controller:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/0:4/531/0x00000200
[qed_probe:488()]hw prepare failed
kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:2355!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 531 Comm: kworker/0:4 Tainted: G W 5.4.0-77-generic #86-Ubuntu
pstate: 00400009 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO)
Call trace:
vunmap+0x4c/0x50
iounmap+0x48/0x58
qed_free_pci+0x60/0x80 [qed]
qed_probe+0x35c/0x688 [qed]
__qede_probe+0x88/0x5c8 [qede]
qede_probe+0x60/0xe0 [qede]
local_pci_probe+0x48/0xa0
work_for_cpu_fn+0x24/0x38
process_one_work+0x1d0/0x468
worker_thread+0x238/0x4e0
kthread+0xf0/0x118
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
In this case, qed_hw_prepare() returns error due to hw/fw error, but in
theory work queue should be in process context instead of interrupt.
The root cause might be the unpaired spin_{un}lock_bh() in
_qed_mcp_cmd_and_union(), which causes botton half is disabled incorrectly.
Reported-by: Lijian Zhang <Lijian.Zhang@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
r8152 driver sets up the MAC address at reset-resume, while
rtl8152_set_mac_address() has the temporary autopm get/put. This may
lead to a deadlock as the PM lock has been already taken for the
execution of the runtime PM callback.
This patch adds the workaround to avoid the superfluous autpm when
called from rtl8152_reset_resume().
Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1186194 Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
rtl8152_close() takes the refcount via usb_autopm_get_interface() but
it doesn't release when RTL8152_UNPLUG test hits. This may lead to
the imbalance of PM refcount. This patch addresses it.
Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1186194 Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In case of Full-Duplex mode, DXP flag is set when RXP and TXP flags are
set. But to avoid 2 different handlings, just add TXP and RXP flag in
the mask instead of DXP, and then keep the initial handling of TXP and
RXP events.
Also rephrase comment about EOTIE which is one of the interrupt enable
bits. It is not triggered by any event.
For linear regulators, the n_voltages should be (max - min) / step + 1.
Buck voltage from 1v to 3V, per step 100mV, and vout mask is 0x1f.
If value is from 20 to 31, the voltage will all be fixed to 3V.
And LDO also, just vout range is different from 1.2v to 3v, step is the
same. If value is from 18 to 31, the voltage will also be fixed to 3v.
Signed-off-by: ChiYuan Huang <cy_huang@richtek.com> In-reply-to: <CAFRkauB=0KwrJW19nJTTagdHhBR=V2R8YFWG3R3oVXt=rBRsqw@mail.gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Axel Lin <axel.lin@ingics.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1624723112-26653-1-git-send-email-u0084500@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
On TGL platform with max98373 codec the trigger start sequence is
fe first, then codec component and sdw link is the last. Recently
a delay was introduced in max98373 codec driver and this resulted
to the start of sdw stream transmission was delayed and the data
transmitted by fw can't be consumed by sdw controller, so xrun happened.
Adding delay in trigger function is a bad idea. This patch enable spk
pin in prepare function and disable it in hw_free to avoid xrun issue
caused by delay in trigger.
Fixes: 3a27875e91fb ("ASoC: max98373: Added 30ms turn on/off time delay") BugLink: https://github.com/thesofproject/sof/issues/4066 Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <bard.liao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Péter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rander Wang <rander.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210625205042.65181-2-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In May 2019 when commit 640f763f98c2 ("net: dsa: sja1105: Add support
for Spanning Tree Protocol") was introduced, the comment that "STP does
not get called for the CPU port" was true. This changed after commit 0394a63acfe2 ("net: dsa: enable and disable all ports") in August 2019
and went largely unnoticed, because the sja1105_bridge_stp_state_set()
method did nothing different compared to the static setup done by
sja1105_init_mac_settings().
With the ability to turn address learning off introduced by the blamed
commit, there is a new priv->learn_ena port mask in the driver. When
sja1105_bridge_stp_state_set() gets called and we are in
BR_STATE_LEARNING or later, address learning is enabled or not depending
on priv->learn_ena & BIT(port).
So what happens is that priv->learn_ena is not being set from anywhere
for the CPU port, and the static configuration done by
sja1105_init_mac_settings() is being overwritten.
To solve this, acknowledge that the static configuration of STP state is
no longer necessary because the STP state is being set by the DSA core
now, but what is necessary is to set priv->learn_ena for the CPU port.
Fixes: 4d9423549501 ("net: dsa: sja1105: offload bridge port flags to device") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The sja1105 driver will gain support for the next-gen SJA1110 switch,
which is very similar except for the fact it has more than 5 ports.
So we need to replace the hardcoded SJA1105_NUM_PORTS in this driver
with ds->num_ports. This patch is as mechanical as possible (save for
the fact that ds->num_ports is not an integer constant expression).
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Use the nice helpers to initialize and the uid/gid/cred_uid when passed as mount arguments.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Its possible if a socket is closed and the receive thread is under memory
pressure it may have cached a skb. We need to ensure these skbs are
free'd along with the normal ingress_skb queue.
Before 799aa7f98d53 ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") tear
down and backlog processing both had sock_lock for the common case of
socket close or unhash. So it was not possible to have both running in
parrallel so all we would need is the kfree in those kernels.
But, latest kernels include the commit 799aa7f98d5e and this requires a
bit more work. Without the ingress_lock guarding reading/writing the
state->skb case its possible the tear down could run before the state
update causing it to leak memory or worse when the backlog reads the state
it could potentially run interleaved with the tear down and we might end up
free'ing the state->skb from tear down side but already have the reference
from backlog side. To resolve such races we wrap accesses in ingress_lock
on both sides serializing tear down and backlog case. In both cases this
only happens after an EAGAIN error case so having an extra lock in place
is likely fine. The normal path will skip the locks.
Note, we check state->skb before grabbing lock. This works because
we can only enqueue with the mutex we hold already. Avoiding a race
on adding state->skb after the check. And if tear down path is running
that is also fine if the tear down path then removes state->skb we
will simply set skb=NULL and the subsequent goto is skipped. This
slight complication avoids locking in normal case.
With this fix we no longer see this warning splat from tcp side on
socket close when we hit the above case with redirect to ingress self.
sk_psock_skb_redirect() only takes skb as a parameter, we
will need to know where this skb is from, so just pass
the source psock to this function as a new parameter.
This patch prepares for the next one.
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210615021342.7416-8-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
It is hard to observe packet drops without increasing relevant
drop counters, here we should increase sk->sk_drops which is
a protocol-independent counter. Fortunately psock is always
associated with a struct sock, we can just use psock->sk.
Suggested-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210615021342.7416-9-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The code was calling ab8500_bm_of_probe() in four different
spots effectively overwriting the same configuration three
times. This was done because probe order was uncertain.
Since we now used componentized probe, call it only once
while probing the main charging component.
This reverts commit 9e31c1fe45d555a948ff66f1f0e3fe1f83ca63f7. Ever
since that commit, we've been having issues where a hang in one client
can propagate to another. In particular, a hang in an app can propagate
to the X server which causes the whole desktop to lock up.
Error propagation along fences sound like a good idea, but as your bug
shows, surprising consequences, since propagating errors across security
boundaries is not a good thing.
What we do have is track the hangs on the ctx, and report information to
userspace using RESET_STATS. That's how arb_robustness works. Also, if my
understanding is still correct, the EIO from execbuf is when your context
is banned (because not recoverable or too many hangs). And in all these
cases it's up to userspace to figure out what is all impacted and should
be reported to the application, that's not on the kernel to guess and
automatically propagate.
What's more, we're also building more features on top of ctx error
reporting with RESET_STATS ioctl: Encrypted buffers use the same, and the
userspace fence wait also relies on that mechanism. So it is the path
going forward for reporting gpu hangs and resets to userspace.
So all together that's why I think we should just bury this idea again as
not quite the direction we want to go to, hence why I think the revert is
the right option here.
For backporters: Please note that you _must_ have a backport of
https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/20210602164149.391653-2-jason@jlekstrand.net/
for otherwise backporting just this patch opens up a security bug.
v2: Augment commit message. Also restore Jason's sob that I
accidentally lost.
v3: Add a note for backporters
Signed-off-by: Jason Ekstrand <jason@jlekstrand.net> Reported-by: Marcin Slusarz <marcin.slusarz@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+ Cc: Jason Ekstrand <jason.ekstrand@intel.com> Cc: Marcin Slusarz <marcin.slusarz@intel.com> Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/3080 Fixes: 9e31c1fe45d5 ("drm/i915: Propagate errors on awaiting already signaled fences") Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Reviewed-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210714193419.1459723-3-jason@jlekstrand.net
(cherry picked from commit 93a2711cddd5760e2f0f901817d71c93183c3b87) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This reverts 686c7c35abc2 ("drm/i915/gem: Asynchronous cmdparser"). The
justification for this commit in the git history was a vague comment
about getting it out from under the struct_mutex. While this may
improve perf for some workloads on Gen7 platforms where we rely on the
command parser for features such as indirect rendering, no numbers were
provided to prove such an improvement. It claims to closed two
gitlab/bugzilla issues but with no explanation whatsoever as to why or
what bug it's fixing.
Meanwhile, by moving command parsing off to an async callback, it leaves
us with a problem of what to do on error. When things were synchronous,
EXECBUFFER2 would fail with an error code if parsing failed. When
moving it to async, we needed another way to handle that error and the
solution employed was to set an error on the dma_fence and then trust
that said error gets propagated to the client eventually. Moving back
to synchronous will help us untangle the fence error propagation mess.
This also reverts most of 0edbb9ba1bfe ("drm/i915: Move cmd parser
pinning to execbuffer") which is a refactor of some of our allocation
paths for asynchronous parsing. Now that everything is synchronous, we
don't need it.
v2 (Daniel Vetter):
- Add stabel Cc and Fixes tag
Signed-off-by: Jason Ekstrand <jason@jlekstrand.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+ Fixes: 9e31c1fe45d5 ("drm/i915: Propagate errors on awaiting already signaled fences") Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210714193419.1459723-2-jason@jlekstrand.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Remove devm_kfree of memory where VLAN entry to RVU PF mapping
info is saved. This will be freed anyway at driver exit.
Having this could result in warning from devm_kfree() if
the memory is not allocated due to errors in rvu_nix_block_init()
before nix_setup_txvlan().
Fixes: 9a946def264d ("octeontx2-af: Modify nix_vtag_cfg mailbox to support TX VTAG entries") Signed-off-by: Sunil Goutham <sgoutham@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit c47a5599eda324ba ("perf tools: Fix pattern matching for same
substring in different PMU type"), may have fixed some alias matching,
but has broken some others.
Firstly it cannot handle the simple scenario of PMU name in form
pmu_name{digits} - it can only handle pmu_name_{digits}.
Secondly it cannot handle more complex matching in the case where we
have multiple tokens. In this scenario, the code failed to realise that
we may examine multiple substrings in the PMU name.
Fix in two ways:
- Change perf_pmu__valid_suffix() to accept a PMU name without '_' in the
suffix
- Only pay attention to perf_pmu__valid_suffix() for the final token
Also add const qualifiers as necessary to avoid casting.
Fixes: c47a5599eda324ba ("perf tools: Fix pattern matching for same substring in different PMU type") Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com> Tested-by: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1626793819-79090-1-git-send-email-john.garry@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The j1939_session_deactivate() is decrementing the session ref-count and
potentially can free() the session. This would cause use-after-free
situation.
However, the code calling j1939_session_deactivate() does always hold
another reference to the session, so that it would not be free()ed in
this code path.
This patch adds a comment to make this clear and a WARN_ON, to ensure
that future changes will not violate this requirement. Further this
patch avoids dereferencing the session pointer as a precaution to avoid
use-after-free if the session is actually free()ed.
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210714111602.24021-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Reported-by: Xiaochen Zou <xzou017@ucr.edu> Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
We use a bit to manage if we need to add the shared task_work, but
a list + lock for the pending work. Before aborting a current run
of the task_work we check if the list is empty, but we do so without
grabbing the lock that protects it. This can lead to races where
we think we have nothing left to run, where in practice we could be
racing with a task adding new work to the list. If we do hit that
race condition, we could be left with work items that need processing,
but the shared task_work is not active.
Ensure that we grab the lock before checking if the list is empty,
so we know if it's safe to exit the run or not.
This makes 'perf top' abort in some cases, and the right fix will
involve surgery that is too much to do at this stage, so revert for now
and fix it in the next merge window.
With commit c9f3401313a5 ("powerpc: Always enable queued spinlocks for
64s, disable for others") CONFIG_PPC_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS is always
enabled on ppc64le, external modules that use spinlock APIs are
failing.
ERROR: modpost: GPL-incompatible module XXX.ko uses GPL-only symbol 'shared_processor'
Before the above commit, modules were able to build without any
issues. Also this problem is not seen on other architectures. This
problem can be workaround if CONFIG_UNINLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK is enabled in
the config. However CONFIG_UNINLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK is not enabled by
default and only enabled in certain conditions like
CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCKS is set in the kernel config.
Given that spin locks are one of the basic facilities for module code,
this effectively makes it impossible to build/load almost any non GPL
modules on ppc64le.
This was first reported at https://github.com/openzfs/zfs/issues/11172
Currently shared_processor is exported as GPL only symbol.
Fix this for parity with other architectures by exposing
shared_processor to non-GPL modules too.
The Go runtime uses r30 for some special value called 'g'. It assumes
that value will remain unchanged even when calling VDSO functions.
Although r30 is non-volatile across function calls, the callee is free
to use it, as long as the callee saves the value and restores it before
returning.
It used to be true by accident that the VDSO didn't use r30, because the
VDSO was hand-written asm. When we switched to building the VDSO from C
the compiler started using r30, at least in some builds, leading to
crashes in Go. eg:
~/go/src$ ./all.bash
Building Go cmd/dist using /usr/lib/go-1.16. (go1.16.2 linux/ppc64le)
Building Go toolchain1 using /usr/lib/go-1.16.
go build os/exec: /usr/lib/go-1.16/pkg/tool/linux_ppc64le/compile: signal: segmentation fault
go build reflect: /usr/lib/go-1.16/pkg/tool/linux_ppc64le/compile: signal: segmentation fault
go tool dist: FAILED: /usr/lib/go-1.16/bin/go install -gcflags=-l -tags=math_big_pure_go compiler_bootstrap bootstrap/cmd/...: exit status 1
There are patches in flight to fix Go[1], but until they are released
and widely deployed we can workaround it in the VDSO by avoiding use of
r30.
Note this only works with GCC, clang does not support -ffixed-rN.
As pointed out by Matthew Wilcox, this needs to use
page_file_offset() to calculate the offset instead.
Pages coming from the swap cache have page->index set
to their index within the swapcache, not within the backing
file. For a sufficiently large swapcache, we could have
overlapping values of page->index within the same backing file.
Suggested by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.7+ Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask") we
narrowed the offset mask for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to
mitigate a corner case where in the speculative domain it is possible to
advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-
bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space.
The verifier's state pruning for scalars leaves one corner case open
where in the first verification path R_x holds an unknown scalar with an
aux->alu_limit of e.g. 7, and in a second verification path that same
register R_x, here denoted as R_x', holds an unknown scalar which has
tighter bounds and would thus satisfy range_within(R_x, R_x') as well as
tnum_in(R_x, R_x') for state pruning, yielding an aux->alu_limit of 3:
Given the second path fits the register constraints for pruning, the final
generated mask from aux->alu_limit will remain at 7. While technically
not wrong for the non-speculative domain, it would however be possible
to craft similar cases where the mask would be too wide as in 7fedb63a8307.
One way to fix it is to detect the presence of unknown scalar map pointer
arithmetic and force a deeper search on unknown scalars to ensure that
we do not run into a masking mismatch.
func_states_equal makes a very short lived allocation for idmap,
probably because it's too large to fit on the stack. However the
function is called quite often, leading to a lot of alloc / free
churn. Replace the temporary allocation with dedicated scratch
space in struct bpf_verifier_env.
Follow-up to fe9a5ca7e370 ("bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative
path verification"). The sanitize_insn_aux_data() helper does not serve a
particular purpose in today's code. The original intention for the helper
was that if function-by-function verification fails, a given program would
be cleared from temporary insn_aux_data[], and then its verification would
be re-attempted in the context of the main program a second time.
However, a failure in do_check_subprogs() will skip do_check_main() and
propagate the error to the user instead, thus such situation can never occur.
Given its interaction is not compatible to the Spectre v1 mitigation (due to
comparing aux->seen with env->pass_cnt), just remove sanitize_insn_aux_data()
to avoid future bugs in this area.
Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of
techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and
stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5:
A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many
microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are
known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on
any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does
not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data
cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is
detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed.
af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate
this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast"
(low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store
of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then
speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero
value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at
that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then
redirected to the "zero page".
The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is
done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with
relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking
on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus,
there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10
and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e3088 /assumed/ a low latency
operation.
However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient
since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store
and is thus bypassed as well:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below
32: (bf) r9 = r10
// JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg:
// r9 -> r15 (callee saved)
// r10 -> rbp
// train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9
// and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table.
33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576)
34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580)
36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584)
38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588)
40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
[...]
543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp
// to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain
// in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is
// disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context:
//
// ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54 push r12
// ffffffff8117ee22: 55 push rbp
// ffffffff8117ee23: 53 push rbx
// ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff test rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc
// ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00 jne ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken
// [...]
// ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff mov r12,0xffffffffffffffea
// ffffffff8117eee7: 5b pop rbx
// ffffffff8117eee8: 5d pop rbp
// ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0 mov rax,r12
// ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c pop r12
// ffffffff8117eeee: c3 ret
545: (18) r1 = map[id:4]
547: (bf) r2 = r7
548: (b7) r3 = 0
549: (b7) r4 = 4
550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288
// instruction 551 inserted by verifier \
551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
// storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16 | since value of r10 is "slow".
552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 /
// following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency
// misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes.
553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16)
// in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative
// domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below.
554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the
verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of
the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency
instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast
to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware
registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally,
fp-16 can still be r2.
Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads
from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/
the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register
such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this
option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under
speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on
r10 would look as follows:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
[...]
// longer store forward prediction training sequence than before.
2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588)
2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0
2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592)
2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0
2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store
// forward prediction training.
2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0
2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0
2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0
2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0
2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0
2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0
2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0
2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0
2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0
2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0
2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0
2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0
2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0
2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0
2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0
2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0
2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0
2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0
2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0
2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0
2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0
2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the
// sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier.
2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 | since store unit is still busy.
// load from stack intended to bypass stores.
2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
[...]
Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such
as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution
units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the
sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior
stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack
may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share
execution resources.
This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e3088 ("bpf:
Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection
of stack reuse from af86ca4e3088 where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been
written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does
not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for
several reasons outlined as follows:
1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is
therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store
bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the
oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which
does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast"
read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and
therefore also must be subject to mitigation.
2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr)
condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could
also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative
store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to
a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near
these pointer types.
While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also
stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]:
[...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory
of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently
and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We
explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more
pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used
by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to
type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for
stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of
the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of
completeness. [...]
From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather
limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills
to the BPF stack:
[...]
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
[...]
2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value
// of 943576462 before store ...
2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462
2112: (af) r11 ^= r7
2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11
2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462
2116: (af) r2 ^= r11
// ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg.
2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage
infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective
and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have
to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a
tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers
would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the
fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the
latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations
options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes:
[...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might
complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...]
The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution
and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but
it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally
visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which
is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to
rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says:
[...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is
allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and
physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store
buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the
store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding
subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel
CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...]
One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e3088
where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming
from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX
or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data
value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills.
The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be
leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST |
BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a
speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged
programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon
register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not
used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot
occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate
the latter cost.
In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction
/either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to
/no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected
by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already.
This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation
as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled,
it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional
instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow
as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4
since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and
ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs.
The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does
annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers.
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The hi3110_cmd() is supposed to return zero on success and negative
error codes on failure, but it was accidentally declared as a u8 when
it needs to be an int type.
Fixes: 57e83fb9b746 ("can: hi311x: Add Holt HI-311x CAN driver") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729141246.GA1267@kili Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(),
pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be
called in release automatically.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(),
pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be
called in release automatically.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
blkdev_get_no_open acquires a reference to the block_device through
the block device inode and then tries to acquire a device model
reference to the gendisk. But at this point the disk migh already
be freed (although the race is free). Fix this by only freeing the
gendisk from the whole device bdevs ->free_inode callback as well.
Fixes: 22ae8ce8b892 ("block: simplify bdev/disk lookup in blkdev_get") Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722075402.983367-2-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The result of __dev_get_by_index() is not checked for NULL and then gets
dereferenced immediately.
Also, __dev_get_by_index() must be called while holding either RTNL lock
or @dev_base_lock, which isn't satisfied by mlx5e_hairpin_get_mdev() or
its callers. This makes the underlying hlist_for_each_entry() loop not
safe, and can have adverse effects in itself.
Fix by using dev_get_by_index() and handling nullptr return value when
ifindex device is not found. Update mlx5e_hairpin_get_mdev() callers to
check for possible PTR_ERR() result.
When fw_fatal reporter reports an error, the firmware in not responding.
Unload the device to ensure that the driver closes all its resources,
even if recovery is not due (user disabled auto-recovery or reporter is
in grace period). On successful recovery the device is loaded back up.
Fixes: b3bd076f7501 ("net/mlx5: Report devlink health on FW fatal issues") Signed-off-by: Aya Levin <ayal@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
If a feature flag is only present in features, but not in hw_features,
the user can't reset it. Although hw_features may contain NETIF_F_HW_TC
by the point where the driver checks whether HTB offload is supported,
this flag is controlled by another condition that may not hold. Set it
explicitly to make sure the user can disable it.
When HW aggregates packets for an LRO session, it writes the payload
of two consecutive packets of a flow contiguously, so that they usually
share a cacheline.
The first byte of a packet's payload is written immediately after
the last byte of the preceding packet.
In this flow, there are two consecutive write requests to the shared
cacheline:
1. Regular write for the earlier packet.
2. Read-modify-write for the following packet.
In case of relaxed-ordering on, these two writes might be re-ordered.
Using the end padding optimization (to avoid partial write for the last
cacheline of a packet) becomes problematic if the two writes occur
out-of-order, as the padding would overwrite payload that belongs to
the following packet, causing data corruption.
Avoid this by disabling the end padding optimization when both
LRO and relaxed-ordering are enabled.
This is the same check as LAG mode checks if to enable lag.
This will fix adding peer miss rules if lag is not supported
and even an incorrect rules in socket direct mode.
Also fix the incorrect comment on mlx5_get_next_phys_dev() as flow #1
doesn't exists.
Fixes: ac004b832128 ("net/mlx5e: E-Switch, Add peer miss rules") Signed-off-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Maor Dickman <maord@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Destination vport vhca id is valid flag is set only merged eswitch isn't supported.
Change destination vport vhca id value to be set also only when merged eswitch
is supported.
Fixes: e4ad91f23f10 ("net/mlx5e: Split offloaded eswitch TC rules for port mirroring") Signed-off-by: Maor Dickman <maord@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Fix a bug when flow table is created in priority that already
has other flow tables as shown in the below diagram.
If the new flow table (FT-B) has the lowest level in the priority,
we need to connect the flow tables from the previous priority (p0)
to this new table. In addition when this flow table is destroyed
(FT-B), we need to connect the flow tables from the previous
priority (p0) to the next level flow table (FT-C) in the same
priority of the destroyed table (if exists).
We don't want strparser to run and pass skbs into skmsg handlers when
the psock is null. We just sk_drop them in this case. When removing
a live socket from map it means extra drops that we do not need to
incur. Move the zap below strparser close to avoid this condition.
This way we stop the stream parser first stopping it from processing
packets and then delete the psock.
Fixes: a136678c0bdbb ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210727160500.1713554-2-john.fastabend@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
There is a missing break statement which causes a fallthrough to the
next statement where optarg will be null and a segmentation fault will
be generated.
Fixes: 9e965bb75aae ("KVM: selftests: Add backing src parameter to dirty_log_perf_test") Reviewed-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210713220957.3493520-6-dmatlack@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Some bootloaders set the widebus enable bit in the INTF_CONFIG register,
but configuration of widebus isn't yet supported ensure that the
register has a known value, with widebus disabled.
Fixes: c943b4948b58 ("drm/msm/dp: add displayPort driver support") Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722024434.3313167-1-bjorn.andersson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
DP cable should always connect to DPU during the entire PHY compliance
testing run. Since DP PHY compliance test is executed at irq_hpd event
context, dp_ctrl_off_link_stream() should be used instead of dp_ctrl_off().
dp_ctrl_off() is used for unplug event which is triggered when DP cable is
dis connected.
Changes in V2:
-- add fixes statement
Fixes: f21c8a276c2d ("drm/msm/dp: handle irq_hpd with sink_count = 0 correctly") Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <khsieh@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1626191647-13901-2-git-send-email-khsieh@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Syzbot reported skb_over_panic() in llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). The
problem was in wrong LCC header manipulations.
Syzbot's reproducer tries to send XID packet. llc_ui_sendmsg() is
doing following steps:
1. skb allocation with size = len + header size
len is passed from userpace and header size
is 3 since addr->sllc_xid is set.
2. skb_reserve() for header_len = 3
3. filling all other space with memcpy_from_msg()
Ok, at this moment we have fully loaded skb, only headers needs to be
filled.
Then code comes to llc_sap_action_send_xid_c(). This function pushes 3
bytes for LLC PDU header and initializes it. Then comes
llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). It initalizes next 3 bytes *AFTER* LLC PDU
header and call skb_push(skb, 3). This looks wrong for 2 reasons:
1. Bytes rigth after LLC header are user data, so this function
was overwriting payload.
2. skb_push(skb, 3) call can cause skb_over_panic() since
all free space was filled in llc_ui_sendmsg(). (This can
happen is user passed 686 len: 686 + 14 (eth header) + 3 (LLC
header) = 703. SKB_DATA_ALIGN(703) = 704)
So, in this patch I added 2 new private constansts: LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID
and LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID. LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID is used to correctly reserve
header size to handle LLC + XID case. LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID is used by
llc_pdu_header_init() function to push 6 bytes instead of 3. And finally
I removed skb_push() call from llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd().
This changes should not affect other parts of LLC, since after
all steps we just transmit buffer.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5e5a981ad7cc54c4b2b4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK MSR is part of interrupt based asynchronous page fault
interface and not the original (deprecated) KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF. This is
stated in Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst.
Fixes: 66570e966dd9 ("kvm: x86: only provide PV features if enabled in guest's CPUID") Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210722123018.260035-1-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
I noticed this while Christoph was reporting a bug found on headless
GVT configuration which bisect blamed commit 3ae04c0c7e63 ("drm/i915/bios:
limit default outputs to ports A through F")
v2: Avoid unnecessary line continuations as pointed by CI and Christoph
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Fixes: 3ae04c0c7e63 ("drm/i915/bios: limit default outputs to ports A through F") Cc: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Reviewed-by: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com> Tested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210723095225.562913-1-rodrigo.vivi@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 9b52aa720168859526bf90d77fa210fc0336f170) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Restore PHY_ID_BCM54811 accidently removed by commit 5d4358ede8eb.
Fixes: 5d4358ede8eb ("net: phy: broadcom: Allow BCM54210E to configure APD") Signed-off-by: Kevin Lo <kevlo@kevlo.org> Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Avoid configure backpressure for LBK links as they
don't support it and enable lmacs before configuration
pause frames.
Fixes: 75f36270990c ("octeontx2-pf: Support to enable/disable pause frames via ethtool") Signed-off-by: Geetha sowjanya <gakula@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Kelam <hkelam@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In the existing code while changing the number of TX/RX
queues using ethtool the PF/VF interface resources are
freed and reallocated (otx2_stop and otx2_open is called)
if the device is in running state. If any resource allocation
fails in otx2_open, driver free already allocated resources
and return. But again, when the number of queues changes
as the device state still running oxt2_stop is called.
In which we try to free already freed resources leading
to driver crash.
This patch fixes the issue by setting the INTF_DOWN flag on
error and free the resources in otx2_stop only if the flag is
not set.
Fixes: 50fe6c02e5ad ("octeontx2-pf: Register and handle link notifications") Signed-off-by: Geetha sowjanya <gakula@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Sunil Kovvuri Goutham <Sunil.Goutham@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
One skb's skb_shinfo frags are not writable, and they can be shared with
other skbs' like by pskb_copy(). To write the frags may cause other skb's
data crash.
So before doing en/decryption, skb_cow_data() should always be called for
a cloned or nonlinear skb if req dst is using the same sg as req src.
While at it, the likely branch can be removed, as it will be covered
by skb_cow_data().
Note that esp_input() has the same issue, and I will fix it in another
patch. tipc_aead_encrypt() doesn't have this issue, as it only processes
linear data in the unlikely branch.
Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication") Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In case an error occurred in the IRQ handler, the chip status is
dumped via devcoredump and all IRQs are disabled, but the chip stays
powered for further analysis.
The chip is in an undefined state and will not receive any CAN frames,
so shut down the timestamping worker, which reads the TBC register
regularly, too. This avoids any CRC read error messages if there is a
communication problem with the chip.
Be sure to count the csum_none cases when csum offload is
enabled.
Fixes: 0f3154e6bcb3 ("ionic: Add Tx and Rx handling") Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
We need to count the correct Tx and/or Rx packets for dynamic
interrupt moderation, depending on which we're processing on
the queue interrupt.
Fixes: 04a834592bf5 ("ionic: dynamic interrupt moderation") Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Move the interrupt coalesce value update out of the napi
thread and into the dim_work thread and set it only when it
has actually changed.
Fixes: 04a834592bf5 ("ionic: dynamic interrupt moderation") Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
If PTP configuration is attempted on ports that don't support
it, such as VF ports, the driver will return an error status
-95, or EOPNOSUPP and print an error message
enp98s0: hwstamp set failed: -95
Because some daemons can retry every few seconds, this can end
up filling the dmesg log and pushing out other more useful
messages.
We can catch this issue earlier in our handling and return
the error without a log message.
Fixes: 829600ce5e4e ("ionic: add ts_config replay") Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Move the bulk of the code from ionic_set_rx_mode(), which
can be called from atomic context, into ionic_lif_rx_mode()
which is a safe context.
A call from the stack will get pushed off into a work thread,
but it is also possible to simultaneously have a call driven
by a queue reconfig request from an ethtool command or fw
recovery event. We add a mutex around the rx_mode work to be
sure they don't collide.
Fixes: 81dbc24147f9 ("ionic: change set_rx_mode from_ndo to can_sleep") Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Syzbot reported memory leak in qrtr. The problem was in unputted
struct sock. qrtr_local_enqueue() function calls qrtr_port_lookup()
which takes sock reference if port was found. Then there is the following
check:
Since we should drop the reference before returning from this function and
ipc can be non-NULL inside this if, we should add qrtr_port_put() inside
this if.
The similar corner case is in qrtr_endpoint_post() as Manivannan
reported. In case of sock_queue_rcv_skb() failure we need to put
port reference to avoid leaking struct sock pointer.
Fixes: e04df98adf7d ("net: qrtr: Remove receive worker") Fixes: bdabad3e363d ("net: Add Qualcomm IPC router") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+35a511c72ea7356cdcf3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Commit 6cc8e7430801fa23 ("loop: scale loop device by introducing per
device lock") re-opened a race window for NULL pointer dereference at
loop_validate_file() where commit 310ca162d779efee ("block/loop: Use
global lock for ioctl() operation.") has closed.
Although we need to guarantee that other loop devices will not change
during traversal, we can't take remote "struct loop_device"->lo_mutex
inside loop_validate_file() in order to avoid AB-BA deadlock. Therefore,
introduce a global lock dedicated for loop_validate_file() which is
conditionally taken before local "struct loop_device"->lo_mutex is taken.
In cases where the header straight after the tunnel header was
another ethernet header (TEB), instead of the network header,
the ECN decapsulation code would treat the ethernet header as if
it was an IP header, resulting in mishandling and possible
wrong drops or corruption of the IP header.
In this case, ECT(1) is sent, so IP_ECN_decapsulate tries to copy it to the
inner IPv4 header, and correct its checksum.
The offset of the ECT bits in an IPv4 header corresponds to the
lower 2 bits of the second octet of the destination MAC address
in the ethernet header.
The IPv4 checksum corresponds to end of the source address.
In order to reproduce:
$ ip netns add A
$ ip netns add B
$ ip -n A link add _v0 type veth peer name _v1 netns B
$ ip -n A link set _v0 up
$ ip -n A addr add dev _v0 10.254.3.1/24
$ ip -n A route add default dev _v0 scope global
$ ip -n B link set _v1 up
$ ip -n B addr add dev _v1 10.254.1.6/24
$ ip -n B route add default dev _v1 scope global
$ ip -n B link add gre1 type gretap local 10.254.1.6 remote 10.254.3.1 key 0x49000000
$ ip -n B link set gre1 up
# Now send an IPv4/GRE/Eth/IPv4 frame where the outer header has ECT(1),
# and the inner header has no ECT bits set:
$ cat send_pkt.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from scapy.all import *
send(pkt)
$ sudo ip netns exec B tcpdump -neqlllvi gre1 icmp & ; sleep 1
$ sudo ip netns exec A python3 send_pkt.py
In the original packet, the source/destinatio MAC addresses are
dst=18:be:92:a0:ee:26 src=18:b0:92:a0:6c:26
In the received packet, they are
dst=18:bd:92:a0:ee:26 src=18:b0:92:a0:6c:27
Thanks to Lahav Schlesinger <lschlesinger@drivenets.com> and Isaac Garzon <isaac@speed.io>
for helping me pinpoint the origin.
Fixes: b723748750ec ("tunnel: Propagate ECT(1) when decapsulating as recommended by RFC6040") Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Gilad Naaman <gnaaman@drivenets.com> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The release_sock() is blocking function, it would change the state
after sleeping. In order to evaluate the stated condition outside
the socket lock context, switch to use wait_woken() instead.
Fixes: 6398e23cdb1d8 ("tipc: standardize accept routine") Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hoang Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
For implicit-connect, when it's either SYN- or SYN+, an ACK should
be sent back to the client immediately. It's not appropriate for
the client to enter established state only after receiving data
from the server.
On client side, after the SYN is sent out, tipc_wait_for_connect()
should be called to wait for the ACK if timeout is set.
This patch also restricts __tipc_sendstream() to call __sendmsg()
only when it's in TIPC_OPEN state, so that the client can program
in a single loop doing both connecting and data sending like:
for (...)
sendmsg(dest, buf);
This makes the implicit-connect more implicit.
Fixes: b97bf3fd8f6a ("[TIPC] Initial merge") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In SW DCB mode the packets sent receive incorrect UP tags. They are
constructed correctly and put into tx_ring, but UP is later remapped by
HW on the basis of TCTUPR register contents according to Tx queue
selected, and BW used is consistent with the new UP values. This is
caused by Tx queue selection in kernel not taking into account DCB
configuration. This patch fixes the issue by implementing the
ndo_select_queue NDO callback.
Previously the trace:
"Starting FW LLDP agent failed: error: I40E_ERR_ADMIN_QUEUE_ERROR, I40E_AQ_RC_EAGAIN"
was produced when user tried to start Firmware LLDP agent,
just after it was stopped with sequence:
ethtool --set-priv-flags <dev> disable-fw-lldp on
ethtool --set-priv-flags <dev> disable-fw-lldp off
(without any delay between the commands)
At that point the firmware is still processing stop command, the behavior
is expected.
Fixes: c1041d070437 ("i40e: Missing response checks in driver when starting/stopping FW LLDP") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com> Tested-by: Imam Hassan Reza Biswas <imam.hassan.reza.biswas@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Correct the message flow between driver and firmware when disabling
queues.
Previously in case of PF reset (due to required reinit after reconfig),
the error like: "VSI seid 397 Tx ring 60 disable timeout" could show up
occasionally. The error was not a real issue of hardware or firmware,
it was caused by wrong sequence of messages invoked by the driver.
Fixes: 41c445ff0f48 ("i40e: main driver core") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com> Tested-by: Tony Brelinski <tonyx.brelinski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Notify the driver about the 4-address mode change and also send a nulldata
packet to the AP to notify it about the change
Fixes: 1ff4e8f2dec8 ("mac80211: notify the driver when a sta uses 4-address mode") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210702050111.47546-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
projects / linux-stable / log