With Clang version 16+, -fsanitize=thread will turn
memcpy/memset/memmove calls in instrumented functions into
__tsan_memcpy/__tsan_memset/__tsan_memmove calls respectively.
Add these functions to the core KCSAN runtime, so that we (a) catch data
races with mem* functions, and (b) won't run into linker errors with
such newer compilers.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 030d794bf498 ("SUNRPC: Use gssproxy upcall for server RPCGSS authentication.") Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In check_acpi_tpm2(), we get the TPM2 table just to make
sure the table is there, not used after the init, so the
acpi_put_table() should be added to release the ACPI memory.
Fixes: 4cb586a188d4 ("tpm_tis: Consolidate the platform and acpi probe flow") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In crb_acpi_add(), we get the TPM2 table to retrieve information
like start method, and then assign them to the priv data, so the
TPM2 table is not used after the init, should be freed, call
acpi_put_table() to fix the memory leak.
The start and length of the event log area are obtained from
TPM2 or TCPA table, so we call acpi_get_table() to get the
ACPI information, but the acpi_get_table() should be coupled with
acpi_put_table() to release the ACPI memory, add the acpi_put_table()
properly to fix the memory leak.
While we are at it, remove the redundant empty line at the
end of the tpm_read_log_acpi().
Fixes: 0bfb23746052 ("tpm: Move eventlog files to a subdirectory") Fixes: 85467f63a05c ("tpm: Add support for event log pointer found in TPM2 ACPI table") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Since commit 10c70d95c0f2 ("block: remove the bd_openers checks in
blk_drop_partitions") we allow rereading of partition table although
there are users of the block device. This has an undesirable consequence
that e.g. if sda and sdb are assembled to a RAID1 device md0 with
partitions, BLKRRPART ioctl on sda will rescan partition table and
create sda1 device. This partition device under a raid device confuses
some programs (such as libstorage-ng used for initial partitioning for
distribution installation) leading to failures.
Fix the problem refusing to rescan partitions if there is another user
that has the block device exclusively open.
Depending on the memory configuration, isolate_freepages_block() may scan
pages out of the target range and causes panic.
Panic can occur on systems with multiple zones in a single pageblock.
The reason it is rare is that it only happens in special
configurations. Depending on how many similar systems there are, it
may be a good idea to fix this problem for older kernels as well.
The problem is that pfn as argument of fast_isolate_around() could be out
of the target range. Therefore we should consider the case where pfn <
start_pfn, and also the case where end_pfn < pfn.
This problem should have been addressd by the commit 6e2b7044c199 ("mm,
compaction: make fast_isolate_freepages() stay within zone") but there was
an oversight.
Case1: pfn < start_pfn
<at memory compaction for node Y>
| node X's zone | node Y's zone
+-----------------+------------------------------...
pageblock ^ ^ ^
+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+...
^ ^ ^
^ ^ end_pfn
^ start_pfn = cc->zone->zone_start_pfn
pfn
<---------> scanned range by "Scan After"
Case2: end_pfn < pfn
<at memory compaction for node X>
| node X's zone | node Y's zone
+-----------------+------------------------------...
pageblock ^ ^ ^
+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+...
^ ^ ^
^ ^ pfn
^ end_pfn
start_pfn
<---------> scanned range by "Scan Before"
It seems that there is no good reason to skip nr_isolated pages just after
given pfn. So let perform simple scan from start to end instead of
dividing the scan into "Before" and "After".
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221026112438.236336-1-a.naribayashi@fujitsu.com Fixes: 6e2b7044c199 ("mm, compaction: make fast_isolate_freepages() stay within zone"). Signed-off-by: NARIBAYASHI Akira <a.naribayashi@fujitsu.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There's a crash in mempool_free when running the lvm test
shell/lvchange-rebuild-raid.sh.
The reason for the crash is this:
* super_written calls atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes) and
wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait). Then it calls rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev)
and bio_put(bio).
* so, the process that waited on sb_wait and that is woken up is racing
with bio_put(bio).
* if the process wins the race, it calls bioset_exit before bio_put(bio)
is executed.
* bio_put(bio) attempts to free a bio into a destroyed bio set - causing
a crash in mempool_free.
We fix this bug by moving bio_put before atomic_dec_and_test.
We also move rdev_dec_pending before atomic_dec_and_test as suggested by
Neil Brown.
The function md_end_flush has a similar bug - we must call bio_put before
we decrement the number of in-progress bios.
Fix the potential risk of OOB read if bank index is over the maximum.
Refer to the discussion list for the experiment result on mt6370.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220914013345.GA5802@cyhuang-hp-elitebook-840-g3.rt/
If not to check the bound, there is the same issue on mt6360.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3b0850440a06c (mfd: mt6360: Merge different sub-devices I2C read/write) Signed-off-by: ChiYuan Huang <cy_huang@richtek.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1664416817-31590-1-git-send-email-u0084500@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The propagate_mnt() function handles mount propagation when creating
mounts and propagates the source mount tree @source_mnt to all
applicable nodes of the destination propagation mount tree headed by
@dest_mnt.
Unfortunately it contains a bug where it fails to terminate at peers of
@source_mnt when looking up copies of the source mount that become
masters for copies of the source mount tree mounted on top of slaves in
the destination propagation tree causing a NULL dereference.
Once the mechanics of the bug are understood it's easy to trigger.
Because of unprivileged user namespaces it is available to unprivileged
users.
While fixing this bug we've gotten confused multiple times due to
unclear terminology or missing concepts. So let's start this with some
clarifications:
* The terms "master" or "peer" denote a shared mount. A shared mount
belongs to a peer group.
* A peer group is a set of shared mounts that propagate to each other.
They are identified by a peer group id. The peer group id is available
in @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.
Shared mounts within the same peer group have the same peer group id.
The peers in a peer group can be reached via @shared_mnt->mnt_share.
* The terms "slave mount" or "dependent mount" denote a mount that
receives propagation from a peer in a peer group. IOW, shared mounts
may have slave mounts and slave mounts have shared mounts as their
master. Slave mounts of a given peer in a peer group are listed on
that peers slave list available at @shared_mnt->mnt_slave_list.
* The term "master mount" denotes a mount in a peer group. IOW, it
denotes a shared mount or a peer mount in a peer group. The term
"master mount" - or "master" for short - is mostly used when talking
in the context of slave mounts that receive propagation from a master
mount. A master mount of a slave identifies the closest peer group a
slave mount receives propagation from. The master mount of a slave can
be identified via @slave_mount->mnt_master. Different slaves may point
to different masters in the same peer group.
* Multiple peers in a peer group can have non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists.
Non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists of peers don't intersect. Consequently, to
ensure all slave mounts of a peer group are visited the
->mnt_slave_lists of all peers in a peer group have to be walked.
* Slave mounts point to a peer in the closest peer group they receive
propagation from via @slave_mnt->mnt_master (see above). Together with
these peers they form a propagation group (see below). The closest
peer group can thus be identified through the peer group id
@slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id of the peer/master that a slave
mount receives propagation from.
* A shared-slave mount is a slave mount to a peer group pg1 while also
a peer in another peer group pg2. IOW, a peer group may receive
propagation from another peer group.
If a peer group pg1 is a slave to another peer group pg2 then all
peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via
->mnt_master. IOW, all peers in peer group pg1 appear on the same
->mnt_slave_list. IOW, they cannot be slaves to different peer groups.
* A pure slave mount is a slave mount that is a slave to a peer group
but is not a peer in another peer group.
* A propagation group denotes the set of mounts consisting of a single
peer group pg1 and all slave mounts and shared-slave mounts that point
to a peer in that peer group via ->mnt_master. IOW, all slave mounts
such that @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id is equal to
@shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.
The concept of a propagation group makes it easier to talk about a
single propagation level in a propagation tree.
For example, in propagate_mnt() the immediate peers of @dest_mnt and
all slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group form a propagation group propg1.
So a shared-slave mount that is a slave in propg1 and that is a peer
in another peer group pg2 forms another propagation group propg2
together with all slaves that point to that shared-slave mount in
their ->mnt_master.
* A propagation tree refers to all mounts that receive propagation
starting from a specific shared mount.
For example, for propagate_mnt() @dest_mnt is the start of a
propagation tree. The propagation tree ecompasses all mounts that
receive propagation from @dest_mnt's peer group down to the leafs.
With that out of the way let's get to the actual algorithm.
We know that @dest_mnt is guaranteed to be a pure shared mount or a
shared-slave mount. This is guaranteed by a check in
attach_recursive_mnt(). So propagate_mnt() will first propagate the
source mount tree to all peers in @dest_mnt's peer group:
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
Notice, that the peer propagation loop of propagate_mnt() doesn't
propagate @dest_mnt itself. @dest_mnt is mounted directly in
attach_recursive_mnt() after we propagated to the destination
propagation tree.
The mount that will be mounted on top of @dest_mnt is @source_mnt. This
copy was created earlier even before we entered attach_recursive_mnt()
and doesn't concern us a lot here.
It's just important to notice that when propagate_mnt() is called
@source_mnt will not yet have been mounted on top of @dest_mnt. Thus,
@source_mnt->mnt_parent will either still point to @source_mnt or - in
the case @source_mnt is moved and thus already attached - still to its
former parent.
For each peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_one() will create a
new copy of the source mount tree and mount that copy @child on @m such
that @child->mnt_parent points to @m after propagate_one() returns.
propagate_one() will stash the last destination propagation node @m in
@last_dest and the last copy it created for the source mount tree in
@last_source.
Hence, if we call into propagate_one() again for the next destination
propagation node @m, @last_dest will point to the previous destination
propagation node and @last_source will point to the previous copy of the
source mount tree and mounted on @last_dest.
Each new copy of the source mount tree is created from the previous copy
of the source mount tree. This will become important later.
The peer loop in propagate_mnt() is straightforward. We iterate through
the peers copying and updating @last_source and @last_dest as we go
through them and mount each copy of the source mount tree @child on a
peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group.
After propagate_mnt() handled the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group
propagate_mnt() will propagate the source mount tree down the
propagation tree that @dest_mnt's peer group propagates to:
for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
/* everything in that slave group */
n = m;
do {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
n = next_peer(n);
} while (n != m);
}
The next_group() helper will recursively walk the destination
propagation tree, descending into each propagation group of the
propagation tree.
The important part is that it takes care to propagate the source mount
tree to all peers in the peer group of a propagation group before it
propagates to the slaves to those peers in the propagation group. IOW,
it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become
masters before it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree
that become slaves to these masters.
It is important to remember that propagating the source mount tree to
each mount @m in the destination propagation tree simply means that we
create and mount new copies @child of the source mount tree on @m such
that @child->mnt_parent points to @m.
Since we know that each node @m in the destination propagation tree
headed by @dest_mnt's peer group will be overmounted with a copy of the
source mount tree and since we know that the propagation properties of
each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at @m will mostly
mirror the propagation properties of @m. We can use that information to
create and mount the copies of the source mount tree that become masters
before their slaves.
The easy case is always when @m and @last_dest are peers in a peer group
of a given propagation group. In that case we know that we can simply
copy @last_source without having to figure out what the master for the
new copy @child of the source mount tree needs to be as we've done that
in a previous call to propagate_one().
The hard case is when we're dealing with a slave mount or a shared-slave
mount @m in a destination propagation group that we need to create and
mount a copy of the source mount tree on.
For each propagation group in the destination propagation tree we
propagate the source mount tree to we want to make sure that the copies
@child of the source mount tree we create and mount on slaves @m pick an
ealier copy of the source mount tree that we mounted on a master @m of
the destination propagation group as their master. This is a mouthful
but as far as we can tell that's the core of it all.
But, if we keep track of the masters in the destination propagation tree
@m we can use the information to find the correct master for each copy
of the source mount tree we create and mount at the slaves in the
destination propagation tree @m.
Let's walk through the base case as that's still fairly easy to grasp.
If we're dealing with the first slave in the propagation group that
@dest_mnt is in then we don't yet have marked any masters in the
destination propagation tree.
We know the master for the first slave to @dest_mnt's peer group is
simple @dest_mnt. So we expect this algorithm to yield a copy of the
source mount tree that was mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group
as the master for the copy of the source mount tree we want to mount at
the first slave @m:
for (n = m; ; n = p) {
p = n->mnt_master;
if (p == dest_master || IS_MNT_MARKED(p))
break;
}
For the first slave we walk the destination propagation tree all the way
up to a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. IOW, the propagation hierarchy
can be walked by walking up the @mnt->mnt_master hierarchy of the
destination propagation tree @m. We will ultimately find a peer in
@dest_mnt's peer group and thus ultimately @dest_mnt->mnt_master.
Btw, here the assumption we listed at the beginning becomes important.
Namely, that peers in a peer group pg1 that are slaves in another peer
group pg2 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, all slaves who are
peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via
their ->mnt_master. Otherwise the termination condition in the code
above would be wrong and next_group() would be broken too.
So the first iteration sets:
n = m;
p = n->mnt_master;
such that @p now points to a peer or @dest_mnt itself. We walk up one
more level since we don't have any marked mounts. So we end up with:
n = dest_mnt;
p = dest_mnt->mnt_master;
If @dest_mnt's peer group is not slave to another peer group then @p is
now NULL. If @dest_mnt's peer group is a slave to another peer group
then @p now points to @dest_mnt->mnt_master points which is a master
outside the propagation tree we're dealing with.
Now we need to figure out the master for the copy of the source mount
tree we're about to create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's
peer group:
do {
struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
if (last_source == first_source)
break;
done = parent->mnt_master == p;
if (done && peers(n, parent))
break;
last_source = last_source->mnt_master;
} while (!done);
We know that @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest and
@last_dest is the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we propagated to
in the peer loop in propagate_mnt().
Consequently, @last_source is the last copy we created and mount on that
last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So @last_source is the master we
want to pick.
We know that @last_source->mnt_parent->mnt_master points to
@last_dest->mnt_master. We also know that @last_dest->mnt_master is
either NULL or points to a master outside of the destination propagation
tree and so does @p. Hence:
done = parent->mnt_master == p;
is trivially true in the base condition.
We also know that for the first slave mount of @dest_mnt's peer group
that @last_dest either points @dest_mnt itself because it was
initialized to:
last_dest = dest_mnt;
at the beginning of propagate_mnt() or it will point to a peer of
@dest_mnt in its peer group. In both cases it is guaranteed that on the
first iteration @n and @parent are peers (Please note the check for
peers here as that's important.):
if (done && peers(n, parent))
break;
So, as we expected, we select @last_source, which referes to the last
copy of the source mount tree we mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's
peer group, as the master of the first slave in @dest_mnt's peer group.
The rest is taken care of by clone_mnt(last_source, ...). We'll skip
over that part otherwise this becomes a blogpost.
At the end of propagate_mnt() we now mark @m->mnt_master as the first
master in the destination propagation tree that is distinct from
@dest_mnt->mnt_master. IOW, we mark @dest_mnt itself as a master.
By marking @dest_mnt or one of it's peers we are able to easily find it
again when we later lookup masters for other copies of the source mount
tree we mount copies of the source mount tree on slaves @m to
@dest_mnt's peer group. This, in turn allows us to find the master we
selected for the copies of the source mount tree we mounted on master in
the destination propagation tree again.
The important part is to realize that the code makes use of the fact
that the last copy of the source mount tree stashed in @last_source was
mounted on top of the previous destination propagation node @last_dest.
What this means is that @last_source allows us to walk the destination
propagation hierarchy the same way each destination propagation node @m
does.
If we take @last_source, which is the copy of @source_mnt we have
mounted on @last_dest in the previous iteration of propagate_one(), then
we know @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest but we also know
that as we walk through the destination propagation tree that
@last_source->mnt_master will point to an earlier copy of the source
mount tree we mounted one an earlier destination propagation node @m.
IOW, @last_source->mnt_parent will be our hook into the destination
propagation tree and each consecutive @last_source->mnt_master will lead
us to an earlier propagation node @m via
@last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent.
Hence, by walking up @last_source->mnt_master, each of which is mounted
on a node that is a master @m in the destination propagation tree we can
also walk up the destination propagation hierarchy.
So, for each new destination propagation node @m we use the previous
copy of @last_source and the fact it's mounted on the previous
propagation node @last_dest via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent to
determine what the master of the new copy of @last_source needs to be.
The goal is to find the _closest_ master that the new copy of the source
mount tree we are about to create and mount on a slave @m in the
destination propagation tree needs to pick. IOW, we want to find a
suitable master in the propagation group.
As the propagation structure of the source mount propagation tree we
create mirrors the propagation structure of the destination propagation
tree we can find @m's closest master - i.e., a marked master - which is
a peer in the closest peer group that @m receives propagation from. We
store that closest master of @m in @p as before and record the slave to
that master in @n
We then search for this master @p via @last_source by walking up the
master hierarchy starting from the last copy of the source mount tree
stored in @last_source that we created and mounted on the previous
destination propagation node @m.
We will try to find the master by walking @last_source->mnt_master and
by comparing @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master to @p. If
we find @p then we can figure out what earlier copy of the source mount
tree needs to be the master for the new copy of the source mount tree
we're about to create and mount at the current destination propagation
node @m.
If @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent and @n are peers then we know
that the closest master they receive propagation from is
@last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master. If not then the
closest immediate peer group that they receive propagation from must be
one level higher up.
This builds on the earlier clarification at the beginning that all peers
in a peer group which are slaves of other peer groups all point to the
same ->mnt_master, i.e., appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list, of the
closest peer group that they receive propagation from.
However, terminating the walk has corner cases.
If the closest marked master for a given destination node @m cannot be
found by walking up the master hierarchy via @last_source->mnt_master
then we need to terminate the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.
This isn't an arbitrary termination. It simply means that the new copy
of the source mount tree we're about to create has a copy of the source
mount tree we created and mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as
its master. IOW, @source_mnt is the peer in the closest peer group that
the new copy of the source mount tree receives propagation from.
We absolutely have to stop @source_mnt because @last_source->mnt_master
either points outside the propagation hierarchy we're dealing with or it
is NULL because @source_mnt isn't a shared-slave.
So continuing the walk past @source_mnt would cause a NULL dereference
via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. And so we have to stop the
walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.
One scenario where this can happen is when we first handled a series of
slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group and then encounter peers in a new peer
group that is a slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. We handle them and then
we encounter another slave mount to @dest_mnt that is a pure slave to
@dest_mnt's peer group. That pure slave will have a peer in @dest_mnt's
peer group as its master. Consequently, the new copy of the source mount
tree will need to have @source_mnt as it's master. So we walk the
propagation hierarchy all the way up to @source_mnt based on
@last_source->mnt_master.
So terminate on @source_mnt, easy peasy. Except, that the check misses
something that the rest of the algorithm already handles.
If @dest_mnt has peers in it's peer group the peer loop in
propagate_mnt():
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
will consecutively update @last_source with each previous copy of the
source mount tree we created and mounted at the previous peer in
@dest_mnt's peer group. So after that loop terminates @last_source will
point to whatever copy of the source mount tree was created and mounted
on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group.
Furthermore, if there is even a single additional peer in @dest_mnt's
peer group then @last_source will __not__ point to @source_mnt anymore.
Because, as we mentioned above, @dest_mnt isn't even handled in this
loop but directly in attach_recursive_mnt(). So it can't even accidently
come last in that peer loop.
So the first time we handle a slave mount @m of @dest_mnt's peer group
the copy of the source mount tree we create will make the __last copy of
the source mount tree we created and mounted on the last peer in
@dest_mnt's peer group the master of the new copy of the source mount
tree we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group__.
But this means that the termination condition that checks for
@source_mnt is wrong. The @source_mnt cannot be found anymore by
propagate_one(). Instead it will find the last copy of the source mount
tree we created and mounted for the last peer of @dest_mnt's peer group
again. And that is a peer of @source_mnt not @source_mnt itself.
IOW, we fail to terminate the loop correctly and ultimately dereference
@last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. When @source_mnt's peer group
isn't slave to another peer group then @last_source->mnt_master is NULL
causing the splat below.
For example, assume @dest_mnt is a pure shared mount and has three peers
in its peer group:
After this sequence has been processed @last_source will point to (P3),
the copy generated for the third peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we
handled. So the copy of the source mount tree (P4) we create and mount
on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group:
will pick the last copy of the source mount tree (P3) as master, not (S0).
When walking the propagation hierarchy via @last_source's master
hierarchy we encounter (P3) but not (S0), i.e., @source_mnt.
We can fix this in multiple ways:
(1) By setting @last_source to @source_mnt after we processed the peers
in @dest_mnt's peer group right after the peer loop in
propagate_mnt().
(2) By changing the termination condition that relies on finding exactly
@source_mnt to finding a peer of @source_mnt.
(3) By only moving @last_source when we actually venture into a new peer
group or some clever variant thereof.
The first two options are minimally invasive and what we want as a fix.
The third option is more intrusive but something we'd like to explore in
the near future.
This passes all LTP tests and specifically the mount propagation
testsuite part of it. It also holds up against all known reproducers of
this issues.
Final words.
First, this is a clever but __worringly__ underdocumented algorithm.
There isn't a single detailed comment to be found in next_group(),
propagate_one() or anywhere else in that file for that matter. This has
been a giant pain to understand and work through and a bug like this is
insanely difficult to fix without a detailed understanding of what's
happening. Let's not talk about the amount of time that was sunk into
fixing this.
Second, all the cool kids with access to
unshare --mount --user --map-root --propagation=unchanged
are going to have a lot of fun. IOW, triggerable by unprivileged users
while namespace_lock() lock is held.
The recent code refactoring for HD-audio HDMI codec driver caused a
regression on AMD/ATI HDMI codecs; namely, PulseAudioand pipewire
don't recognize HDMI outputs any longer while the direct output via
ALSA raw access still works.
The problem turned out that, after the code refactoring, the driver
assumes only the dynamic PCM assignment, and when a PCM stream that
still isn't assigned to any pin gets opened, the driver tries to
assign any free converter to the PCM stream. This behavior is OK for
Intel and other codecs, as they have arbitrary connections between
pins and converters. OTOH, on AMD chips that have a 1:1 mapping
between pins and converters, this may end up with blocking the open of
the next PCM stream for the pin that is tied with the formerly taken
converter.
Also, with the code refactoring, more PCM streams are exposed than
necessary as we assume all converters can be used, while this isn't
true for AMD case. This may change the PCM stream assignment and
confuse users as well.
This patch fixes those problems by:
- Introducing a flag spec->static_pcm_mapping, and if it's set, the
driver applies the static mapping between pins and converters at the
probe time
- Limiting the number of PCM streams per pins, too; this avoids the
superfluous PCM streams
Correctly calculate available space including the size of the chunk
buffer. This fixes a buffer overflow when multiple MIDI sysex
messages are sent to a PODxt device.
A PODxt device sends 0xb2, 0xc2 or 0xf2 as a status byte for MIDI
messages over USB that should otherwise have a 0xb0, 0xc0 or 0xf0
status byte. This is usually corrected by the driver on other OSes.
ovl_change_flags() is an open-coded variant of fs/fcntl.c:setfl() and it
got missed by commit 164f4064ca81 ("keep iocb_flags() result cached in
struct file"); the same change applies there.
Reported-by: Pierre Labastie <pierre.labastie@neuf.fr> Fixes: 164f4064ca81 ("keep iocb_flags() result cached in struct file") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.0 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216738 Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There is a wrong case of link() on overlay:
$ mkdir /lower /fuse /merge
$ mount -t fuse /fuse
$ mkdir /fuse/upper /fuse/work
$ mount -t overlay /merge -o lowerdir=/lower,upperdir=/fuse/upper,\
workdir=work
$ touch /merge/file
$ chown bin.bin /merge/file // the file's caller becomes "bin"
$ ln /merge/file /merge/lnkfile
Then we will get an error(EACCES) because fuse daemon checks the link()'s
caller is "bin", it denied this request.
In the changing history of ovl_link(), there are two key commits:
The first is commit bb0d2b8ad296 ("ovl: fix sgid on directory") which
overrides the cred's fsuid/fsgid using the new inode. The new inode's
owner is initialized by inode_init_owner(), and inode->fsuid is
assigned to the current user. So the override fsuid becomes the
current user. We know link() is actually modifying the directory, so
the caller must have the MAY_WRITE permission on the directory. The
current caller may should have this permission. This is acceptable
to use the caller's fsuid.
The second is commit 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link")
which removed the inode creation in ovl_link(). This commit move
inode_init_owner() into ovl_create_object(), so the ovl_link() just
give the old inode to ovl_create_or_link(). Then the override fsuid
becomes the old inode's fsuid, neither the caller nor the overlay's
mounter! So this is incorrect.
Fix this bug by using ovl mounter's fsuid/fsgid to do underlying
fs's link().
After we introduced a module parameter and quirk infrastructure for
picking the Microsoft GUID over the SOC vendor GUID we discovered
that lots and lots of systems are getting this wrong.
The table continues to grow, and is becoming unwieldy.
We don't really have any benefit to forcing vendors to populate the
AMD GUID. This is just extra work, and more and more vendors seem
to mess it up. As the Microsoft GUID is used by Windows as well,
it's very likely that it won't be messed up like this.
So drop all the quirks forcing it and the Rembrandt behavior. This
means that Cezanne or later effectively only run the Microsoft GUID
codepath with the exception of HP Elitebook 8*5 G9.
Fixes: fd894f05cf30 ("ACPI: x86: s2idle: If a new AMD _HID is missing assume Rembrandt") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1 Reported-by: Benjamin Cheng <ben@bcheng.me> Reported-by: bilkow@tutanota.com Reported-by: Paul <paul@zogpog.com> Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2292 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216768 Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel <philipp.zabel@gmail.com> Tested-by: Philipp Zabel <philipp.zabel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
HP Elitebook 865 supports both the AMD GUID w/ _REV 2 and Microsoft
GUID with _REV 0. Both have very similar code but the AMD GUID
has a special workaround that is specific to a problem with
spurious wakeups on systems with Qualcomm WLAN.
This is believed to be a bug in the Qualcomm WLAN F/W (it doesn't
affect any other WLAN H/W). If this WLAN firmware is fixed this
quirk can be dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1 Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If mem-type is specified in the device tree
it would end up overriding the record_size
field instead of populating mem_type.
As record_size is currently parsed after the
improper assignment with default size 0 it
continued to work as expected regardless of the
value found in the device tree.
Simply changing the target field of the struct
is enough to get mem-type working as expected.
mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:316:9: error: implicit declaration of function 'vmap' is invalid in C99 [-Werror,-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
vbuf = vmap(pages, npages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL);
^
mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:316:29: error: use of undeclared identifier 'VM_MAP'
vbuf = vmap(pages, npages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL);
^
mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:322:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'vunmap' is invalid in C99 [-Werror,-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
vunmap(vbuf);
^
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215163046.4079767-1-arnd@kernel.org Fixes: 8ed691b02ade ("kmsan: add tests for KMSAN") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When encountering any vma in the range with policy other than MPOL_BIND or
MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY, an error is returned without issuing a mpol_put on
the policy just allocated with mpol_dup().
This allows arbitrary users to leak kernel memory.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215194621.202816-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Fixes: c6018b4b2549 ("mm/mempolicy: add set_mempolicy_home_node syscall") Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.17+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Since 6.1 we have noticed random rpm install failures that were tracked to
mremap() returning -ENOMEM and to commit ca3d76b0aa80 ("mm: add merging
after mremap resize").
The problem occurs when mremap() expands a VMA in place, but using an
starting address that's not vma->vm_start, but somewhere in the middle.
The extension_pgoff calculation introduced by the commit is wrong in that
case, so vma_merge() fails due to pgoffs not being compatible. Fix the
calculation.
By the way it seems that the situations, where rpm now expands a vma from
the middle, were made possible also due to that commit, thanks to the
improved vma merging. Yet it should work just fine, except for the buggy
calculation.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221216163227.24648-1-vbabka@suse.cz Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1206359 Fixes: ca3d76b0aa80 ("mm: add merging after mremap resize") Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Jakub Matěna <matenajakub@gmail.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jan Kara reported the following bug triggering on 6.0.5-rt14 running dbench
on XFS on arm64.
kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:625!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP
CPU: 11 PID: 6611 Comm: dbench Tainted: G E 6.0.0-rt14-rt+ #1
pc : clear_inode+0xa0/0xc0
lr : clear_inode+0x38/0xc0
Call trace:
clear_inode+0xa0/0xc0
evict+0x160/0x180
iput+0x154/0x240
do_unlinkat+0x184/0x300
__arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x48/0xc0
el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0xe4/0x2c0
do_el0_svc+0xac/0x100
el0_svc+0x78/0x200
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x9c/0xc0
el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0
It also affects 6.1-rc7-rt5 and affects a preempt-rt fork of 5.14 so this
is likely a bug that existed forever and only became visible when ARM
support was added to preempt-rt. The same problem does not occur on x86-64
and he also reported that converting sb->s_inode_wblist_lock to
raw_spinlock_t makes the problem disappear indicating that the RT spinlock
variant is the problem.
Which in turn means that RT mutexes on ARM64 and any other weakly ordered
architecture are affected by this independent of RT.
Will Deacon observed:
"I'd be more inclined to be suspicious of the slowpath tbh, as we need to
make sure that we have acquire semantics on all paths where the lock can
be taken. Looking at the rtmutex code, this really isn't obvious to me
-- for example, try_to_take_rt_mutex() appears to be able to return via
the 'takeit' label without acquire semantics and it looks like we might
be relying on the caller's subsequent _unlock_ of the wait_lock for
ordering, but that will give us release semantics which aren't correct."
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior prototyped a fix that does work based on that
comment but it was a little bit overkill and added some fences that should
not be necessary.
The lock owner is updated with an IRQ-safe raw spinlock held, but the
spin_unlock does not provide acquire semantics which are needed when
acquiring a mutex.
Adds the necessary acquire semantics for lock owner updates in the slow path
acquisition and the waiter bit logic.
It successfully completed 10 iterations of the dbench workload while the
vanilla kernel fails on the first iteration.
[ bigeasy@linutronix.de: Initial prototype fix ]
Fixes: 700318d1d7b38 ("locking/rtmutex: Use acquire/release semantics") Fixes: 23f78d4a03c5 ("[PATCH] pi-futex: rt mutex core") Reported-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221202100223.6mevpbl7i6x5udfd@techsingularity.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In a scenario where kcalloc() fails to allocate memory, the futex_waitv
system call immediately returns -ENOMEM without invoking
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(). When CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS=y, this
results in leaking a timer debug object.
I no longer work for Plantronics (aka Poly, aka HP) and do not have
access to the headsets in order to test. However, as noted by Maxim,
the other 32xx models that share the same base code set as the 3220
would need the same quirk. This patch adds the PIDs for the rest of
the Blackwire 32XX product family that require the quirk.
Plantronics Blackwire 3210 Series (047f:c055)
Plantronics Blackwire 3215 Series (047f:c057)
Plantronics Blackwire 3225 Series (047f:c058)
Quote from previous patch by Maxim Mikityanskiy
Plantronics Blackwire 3220 Series (047f:c056) sends HID reports twice
for each volume key press. This patch adds a quirk to hid-plantronics
for this product ID, which will ignore the second volume key press if
it happens within 5 ms from the last one that was handled.
The patch was tested on the mentioned model only, it shouldn't affect
other models, however, this quirk might be needed for them too.
Auto-repeat (when a key is held pressed) is not affected, because the
rate is about 3 times per second, which is far less frequent than once
in 5 ms.
End quote
Default value of maxactive is set as num_possible_cpus() for nonpreemptable
systems. For a 2-core system, only 2 kretprobe instances would be allocated
in default, then these 2 instances for execve kretprobe are very likely to
be used up with a pipelined command.
Here's the testcase: a shell script was added to crontab, and the content
of the script is:
cron will trigger a series of program executions (4 times every hour). Then
events loss would be noticed normally after 3-4 hours of testings.
The issue is caused by a burst of series of execve requests. The best number
of kretprobe instances could be different case by case, and should be user's
duty to determine, but num_possible_cpus() as the default value is inadequate
especially for systems with small number of cpus.
This patch enables the logic for preemption as default, thus increases the
minimum of maxactive to 10 for nonpreemptable systems.
Problem caused by source's vfsmount being unmounted but remains
on the delayed unmount list. This happens when nfs42_ssc_open()
return errors.
Fixed by removing nfsd4_interssc_connect(), leave the vfsmount
for the laundromat to unmount when idle time expires.
We don't need to call nfs_do_sb_deactive when nfs42_ssc_open
return errors since the file was not opened so nfs_server->active
was not incremented. Same as in nfsd4_copy, if we fail to
launch nfsd4_do_async_copy thread then there's no need to
call nfs_do_sb_deactive
Reported-by: Xingyuan Mo <hdthky0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com> Tested-by: Xingyuan Mo <hdthky0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG),
indirect call targets are validated against the expected function
pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate
ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time,
which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed.
msc313_rtc_probe() was passing clk_disable_unprepare() directly, which
did not have matching prototypes for devm_add_action_or_reset()'s
callback argument. Refactor to use devm_clk_get_enabled() instead.
This was found as a result of Clang's new -Wcast-function-type-strict
flag, which is more sensitive than the simpler -Wcast-function-type,
which only checks for type width mismatches.
rtas_os_term() is called during panic. Its behavior depends on a couple
of conditions in the /rtas node of the device tree, the traversal of
which entails locking and local IRQ state changes. If the kernel panics
while devtree_lock is held, rtas_os_term() as currently written could
hang.
Instead of discovering the relevant characteristics at panic time,
cache them in file-static variables at boot. Note the lookup for
"ibm,extended-os-term" is converted to of_property_read_bool() since it
is a boolean property, not an RTAS function token.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Incorporate suggested change from Nick] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118150751.469393-4-nathanl@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
When PAGE_SIZE is 64K, if read_log_page is called by log_read_rst for
the first time, the size of *buffer would be equal to
DefaultLogPageSize(4K).But for *buffer operations like memcpy,
if the memory area size(n) which being assigned to buffer is larger
than 4K (log->page_size(64K) or bytes(64K-page_off)), it will cause
an out of boundary error.
Call trace:
[...]
kasan_report+0x44/0x130
check_memory_region+0xf8/0x1a0
memcpy+0xc8/0x100
ntfs_read_run_nb+0x20c/0x460
read_log_page+0xd0/0x1f4
log_read_rst+0x110/0x75c
log_replay+0x1e8/0x4aa0
ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x290/0x2d0
ntfs_fill_super+0x508/0xec0
get_tree_bdev+0x1fc/0x34c
[...]
Fix this by setting variable r_page to NULL in log_read_rst.
syzbot is reporting too large allocation at ntfs_fill_super() [1], for a
crafted filesystem can contain bogus inode->i_size. Add __GFP_NOWARN in
order to avoid too large allocation warning, than exhausting memory by
using kvmalloc().
syzbot is reporting too large allocation at wnd_init() [1], for a crafted
filesystem can become wnd->nwnd close to UINT_MAX. Add __GFP_NOWARN in
order to avoid too large allocation warning, than exhausting memory by
using kvcalloc().
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The USB PHY used in the Allwinner H616 SoC inherits some traits from its
various predecessors: it has four full PHYs like the H3, needs some
extra bits to be set like the H6, and puts SIDDQ on a different bit like
the A100. Plus it needs this weird PHY2 quirk.
Name all those properties in a new config struct and assign a new
compatible name to it.
At least the Allwinner H616 SoC requires a weird quirk to make most
USB PHYs work: Only port2 works out of the box, but all other ports
need some help from this port2 to work correctly: The CLK_BUS_PHY2 and
RST_USB_PHY2 clock and reset need to be enabled, and the SIDDQ bit in
the PMU PHY control register needs to be cleared. For this register to
be accessible, CLK_BUS_ECHI2 needs to be ungated. Don't ask ....
Instead of disguising this as some generic feature, treat it more like
a quirk (what it really is):
If the quirk bit is set, and we initialise a PHY other than PHY2, ungate
this one special clock, and clear the SIDDQ bit. We also pick the clock
and reset from PHY2 and enable them as well.
Syzkaller reports slab-out-of-bounds bug as follows:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in run_unpack+0x8b7/0x970 fs/ntfs3/run.c:944
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801bbdff02 by task syz-executor131/3611
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea00006ef600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1bbd8
head:ffffea00006ef600 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88801bbdfe00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88801bbdfe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88801bbdff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^ ffff88801bbdff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88801bbe0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Kernel will tries to read record and parse MFT from disk in
ntfs_read_mft().
Yet the problem is that during enumerating attributes in record,
kernel doesn't check whether run_off field loading from the disk
is a valid value.
To be more specific, if attr->nres.run_off is larger than attr->size,
kernel will passes an invalid argument run_buf_size in
run_unpack_ex(), which having an integer overflow. Then this invalid
argument will triggers the slab-out-of-bounds Read bug as above.
This patch solves it by adding the sanity check between
the offset to packed runs and attribute size.
Though we already have some sanity checks while enumerating attributes,
resident attribute names aren't included. This patch checks the resident
attribute names are in the valid ranges.
[ 259.209031] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850
[ 259.210770] Write of size 426 at addr ffff88800632f2b2 by task exp/255
[ 259.211551]
[ 259.212035] CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: exp Not tainted 6.0.0-rc6 #37
[ 259.212955] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 259.214387] Call Trace:
[ 259.214640] <TASK>
[ 259.214895] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 259.215284] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689
[ 259.215565] ? kasan_poison+0x3c/0x50
[ 259.215778] ? kasan_unpoison+0x28/0x60
[ 259.215991] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850
[ 259.216270] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130
[ 259.216481] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850
[ 259.216719] kasan_check_range+0x15a/0x1d0
[ 259.216939] memcpy+0x3c/0x70
[ 259.217136] ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850
[ 259.217945] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280
[ 259.218384] ? ni_remove_attr+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 259.218712] ? kernel_text_address+0xcf/0xe0
[ 259.219064] ? __kernel_text_address+0x12/0x40
[ 259.219434] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0
[ 259.219668] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
[ 259.219904] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0
[ 259.220140] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20
[ 259.220561] ni_ins_attr_ext+0x52c/0x5c0
[ 259.220984] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x850/0x850
[ 259.221532] ? run_deallocate+0x120/0x120
[ 259.221972] ? vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300
[ 259.222688] ? setxattr+0x126/0x140
[ 259.222921] ? path_setxattr+0x164/0x180
[ 259.223431] ? __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80
[ 259.223828] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 259.224417] ? mi_find_attr+0x3c/0xf0
[ 259.224772] ni_insert_attr+0x1ba/0x420
[ 259.225216] ? ni_ins_attr_ext+0x5c0/0x5c0
[ 259.225504] ? ntfs_read_ea+0x119/0x450
[ 259.225775] ni_insert_resident+0xc0/0x1c0
[ 259.226316] ? ni_insert_nonresident+0x400/0x400
[ 259.227001] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 259.227468] ? __kmalloc+0x192/0x320
[ 259.227773] ntfs_set_ea+0x6bf/0xb30
[ 259.228216] ? ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x2a/0xb0
[ 259.228494] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 259.228838] ? ntfs_read_ea+0x450/0x450
[ 259.229098] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x24/0x40
[ 259.229418] ? kernel_text_address+0xcf/0xe0
[ 259.229681] ? __kernel_text_address+0x12/0x40
[ 259.229948] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3a/0x60
[ 259.230271] ? write_profile+0x270/0x270
[ 259.230537] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0
[ 259.230836] ntfs_setxattr+0x114/0x5c0
[ 259.231099] ? ntfs_set_acl_ex+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 259.231529] ? evm_protected_xattr_common+0x6d/0x100
[ 259.231817] ? posix_xattr_acl+0x13/0x80
[ 259.232073] ? evm_protect_xattr+0x1f7/0x440
[ 259.232351] __vfs_setxattr+0xda/0x120
[ 259.232635] ? xattr_resolve_name+0x180/0x180
[ 259.232912] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x93/0x300
[ 259.233219] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x141/0x160
[ 259.233492] ? kasan_poison+0x3c/0x50
[ 259.233744] vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300
[ 259.234002] ? __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x160/0x160
[ 259.234837] do_setxattr+0xb8/0x170
[ 259.235567] ? vmemdup_user+0x53/0x90
[ 259.236212] setxattr+0x126/0x140
[ 259.236491] ? do_setxattr+0x170/0x170
[ 259.236791] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
[ 259.237232] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x57/0x180
[ 259.237605] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 259.237870] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x11c/0x1b0
[ 259.238234] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 259.238500] ? preempt_count_sub+0x18/0xc0
[ 259.238775] ? __mnt_want_write+0xaa/0x100
[ 259.238990] ? mnt_want_write+0x8b/0x150
[ 259.239290] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180
[ 259.239605] ? setxattr+0x140/0x140
[ 259.239849] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
[ 259.240174] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x67/0x80
[ 259.240411] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80
[ 259.240715] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 259.240934] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 259.241697] RIP: 0033:0x7fc6b26e4469
[ 259.242647] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088
[ 259.244512] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3c7841f8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc
[ 259.245086] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc6b26e4469
[ 259.246025] RDX: 00007ffc3c784380 RSI: 00007ffc3c7842e0 RDI: 00007ffc3c784238
[ 259.246961] RBP: 00007ffc3c788410 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffc3c7884f8
[ 259.247775] R10: 000000000000007f R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 00000000004004e0
[ 259.248534] R13: 00007ffc3c7884f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 259.249368] </TASK>
[ 259.249644]
[ 259.249888] Allocated by task 255:
[ 259.250283] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
[ 259.250957] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 259.251826] __kmalloc+0x192/0x320
[ 259.252745] ni_create_attr_list+0x11e/0x850
[ 259.253298] ni_ins_attr_ext+0x52c/0x5c0
[ 259.253685] ni_insert_attr+0x1ba/0x420
[ 259.253974] ni_insert_resident+0xc0/0x1c0
[ 259.254311] ntfs_set_ea+0x6bf/0xb30
[ 259.254629] ntfs_setxattr+0x114/0x5c0
[ 259.254859] __vfs_setxattr+0xda/0x120
[ 259.255155] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x93/0x300
[ 259.255445] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x141/0x160
[ 259.255862] vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300
[ 259.256251] do_setxattr+0xb8/0x170
[ 259.256522] setxattr+0x126/0x140
[ 259.256911] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180
[ 259.257308] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80
[ 259.257637] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 259.257970] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 259.258550]
[ 259.258772] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800632f000
[ 259.258772] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
[ 259.260190] The buggy address is located 690 bytes inside of
[ 259.260190] 1024-byte region [ffff88800632f000, ffff88800632f400)
[ 259.261412]
[ 259.261743] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 259.262354] page:0000000081e8cac9 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x632c
[ 259.263722] head:0000000081e8cac9 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 259.264284] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 259.265312] raw: 000fffffc0010200ffffea0000060d00dead000000000004ffff888001041dc0
[ 259.265772] raw: 0000000000000000000000008008000800000001ffffffff0000000000000000
[ 259.266305] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 259.266588]
[ 259.266728] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 259.267225] ffff88800632f300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 259.267841] ffff88800632f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 259.269111] >ffff88800632f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 259.269626] ^
[ 259.270162] ffff88800632f480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 259.270810] ffff88800632f500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
indx_read is called when we have some NTFS directory operations that
need more information from the index buffers. This adds a sanity check
to make sure the returned index buffer length is legit, or we may have
some out-of-bound memory accesses.
[ 560.897595] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 560.898321] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888009497238 by task exp/245
[ 560.898760]
[ 560.899129] CPU: 0 PID: 245 Comm: exp Not tainted 6.0.0-rc6 #37
[ 560.899505] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 560.900170] Call Trace:
[ 560.900407] <TASK>
[ 560.900732] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 560.901108] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689
[ 560.901395] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 560.901716] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130
[ 560.901950] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 560.902208] __asan_load2+0x68/0x90
[ 560.902427] hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 560.902846] ? cmp_uints+0xe0/0xe0
[ 560.903363] ? cmp_sdh+0x90/0x90
[ 560.903883] ? ntfs_bread_run+0x190/0x190
[ 560.904196] ? rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x750/0x750
[ 560.904969] ? ntfs_fix_post_read+0xe0/0x130
[ 560.905259] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 560.905599] ? up_read+0x1a/0x90
[ 560.905853] ? indx_read+0x22c/0x380
[ 560.906096] indx_find+0x2ef/0x470
[ 560.906352] ? indx_find_buffer+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 560.906692] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 560.906977] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0
[ 560.907220] ? ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x450/0x450
[ 560.907464] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 560.907747] ? mutex_lock+0x8f/0xe0
[ 560.907970] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x20/0x20
[ 560.908214] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x143/0x4b0
[ 560.908459] ntfs_lookup+0xe0/0x100
[ 560.908788] __lookup_slow+0x116/0x220
[ 560.909050] ? lookup_fast+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 560.909309] ? lookup_fast+0x13f/0x1b0
[ 560.909601] walk_component+0x187/0x230
[ 560.909944] link_path_walk.part.0+0x3f0/0x660
[ 560.910285] ? handle_lookup_down+0x90/0x90
[ 560.910618] ? path_init+0x642/0x6e0
[ 560.911084] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x6e/0xf0
[ 560.912559] ? __alloc_file+0x114/0x170
[ 560.913008] path_openat+0x19c/0x1d10
[ 560.913419] ? getname_flags+0x73/0x2b0
[ 560.913815] ? kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x50
[ 560.914125] ? kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
[ 560.914542] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6d/0x90
[ 560.914924] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x143/0x4b0
[ 560.915339] ? getname_flags+0x73/0x2b0
[ 560.915647] ? getname+0x12/0x20
[ 560.916114] ? __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60
[ 560.916460] ? path_lookupat.isra.0+0x230/0x230
[ 560.916867] ? __isolate_free_page+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 560.917194] do_filp_open+0x15c/0x1f0
[ 560.917448] ? may_open_dev+0x60/0x60
[ 560.917696] ? expand_files+0xa4/0x3a0
[ 560.917923] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 560.918185] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x88/0xdb
[ 560.918409] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x100/0x100
[ 560.918783] ? _find_next_bit+0x4a/0x130
[ 560.919026] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x19/0x40
[ 560.919276] ? alloc_fd+0x14b/0x2d0
[ 560.919635] do_sys_openat2+0x32a/0x4b0
[ 560.920035] ? file_open_root+0x230/0x230
[ 560.920336] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280
[ 560.920813] do_sys_open+0x99/0xf0
[ 560.921208] ? filp_open+0x60/0x60
[ 560.921482] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x49/0x180
[ 560.921867] __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60
[ 560.922128] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 560.922369] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 560.923030] RIP: 0033:0x7f7dff2e4469
[ 560.923681] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088
[ 560.924451] RSP: 002b:00007ffd41a210b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
[ 560.925168] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7dff2e4469
[ 560.925655] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 00007ffd41a211f0
[ 560.926085] RBP: 00007ffd41a252a0 R08: 00007f7dff60fba0 R09: 00007ffd41a25388
[ 560.926405] R10: 0000000000400b80 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000004004e0
[ 560.926867] R13: 00007ffd41a25380 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 560.927241] </TASK>
[ 560.927491]
[ 560.927755] Allocated by task 245:
[ 560.928409] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
[ 560.929271] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 560.929778] __kmalloc+0x192/0x320
[ 560.930023] indx_read+0x249/0x380
[ 560.930224] indx_find+0x2a2/0x470
[ 560.930695] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0
[ 560.930892] ntfs_lookup+0xe0/0x100
[ 560.931115] __lookup_slow+0x116/0x220
[ 560.931323] walk_component+0x187/0x230
[ 560.931570] link_path_walk.part.0+0x3f0/0x660
[ 560.931791] path_openat+0x19c/0x1d10
[ 560.932008] do_filp_open+0x15c/0x1f0
[ 560.932226] do_sys_openat2+0x32a/0x4b0
[ 560.932413] do_sys_open+0x99/0xf0
[ 560.932709] __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60
[ 560.933417] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 560.933776] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 560.934235]
[ 560.934486] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009497000
[ 560.934486] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 560.935239] The buggy address is located 56 bytes to the right of
[ 560.935239] 512-byte region [ffff888009497000, ffff888009497200)
[ 560.936153]
[ 560.937326] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 560.938228] page:0000000062a3dfae refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9496
[ 560.939616] head:0000000062a3dfae order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 560.940219] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 560.942702] raw: 000fffffc0010200ffffea0000164f80dead000000000005ffff888001041c80
[ 560.943932] raw: 0000000000000000000000008008000800000001ffffffff0000000000000000
[ 560.944568] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 560.945735]
[ 560.946112] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 560.946870] ffff888009497100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 560.947242] ffff888009497180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 560.947611] >ffff888009497200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 560.947915] ^
[ 560.948249] ffff888009497280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 560.948687] ffff888009497300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Although the attribute name length is checked before comparing it to
some common names (e.g., $I30), the offset isn't. This adds a sanity
check for the attribute name offset, guarantee the validity and prevent
possible out-of-bound memory accesses.
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This adds a sanity check for the i_op pointer of the inode which is
returned after reading Root directory MFT record. We should check the
i_op is valid before trying to create the root dentry, otherwise we may
encounter a NPD while mounting a image with a funny Root directory MFT
record.
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Some metadata files are handled before MFT. This adds a null pointer
check for some corner cases that could lead to NPD while reading these
metadata files for a malformed NTFS image.
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This adds sanity checks for data run offset. We should make sure data
run offset is legit before trying to unpack them, otherwise we may
encounter use-after-free or some unexpected memory access behaviors.
Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The offset addition could overflow and pass the used size check given an
attribute with very large size (e.g., 0xffffff7f) while parsing MFT
attributes. This could lead to out-of-bound memory R/W if we try to
access the next attribute derived by Add2Ptr(attr, asize)
Signed-off-by: edward lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
When the NTFS BOOT record_size field < 0, it represents a
shift value. However, there is no sanity check on the shift result
and the sbi->record_bits calculation through blksize_bits() assumes
the size always > 256, which could lead to NPD while mounting a
malformed NTFS image.
Signed-off-by: edward lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Mask out the "Command Supported" and "Logical Block Content Change" bits
and only defer execution of commands that have non-trivial effects to
the workqueue for synchronous execution. This allows to execute admin
commands asynchronously on controllers that provide a Command Supported
and Effects log page, and will keep allowing to execute Write commands
asynchronously once command effects on I/O commands are taken into
account.
Fixes: c1fef73f793b ("nvmet: add passthru code to process commands") Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Since kernel 5.3.4 my laptop (ICH8M controller) does not see Kingston
SV300S37A60G SSD disk connected into a SATA connector on wake from
suspend. The problem was introduced in c312ef176399 ("libata/ahci: Drop
PCS quirk for Denverton and beyond"): the quirk is not applied on wake
from suspend as it originally was.
It is worth to mention the commit contained another bug: the quirk is
not applied at all to controllers which require it. The fix commit 09d6ac8dc51a ("libata/ahci: Fix PCS quirk application") landed in 5.3.8.
So testing my patch anywhere between commits c312ef176399 and 09d6ac8dc51a is pointless.
Not all disks trigger the problem. For example nothing bad happens with
Western Digital WD5000LPCX HDD.
Test hardware:
- Acer 5920G with ICH8M SATA controller
- sda: some SATA HDD connnected into the DVD drive IDE port with a
SATA-IDE caddy. It is a boot disk
- sdb: Kingston SV300S37A60G SSD connected into the only SATA port
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Starting disk
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Starting disk
ata4: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata1.00: ACPI cmd ef/03:0c:00:00:00:a0 (SET FEATURES) filtered out
ata1.00: ACPI cmd ef/03:42:00:00:00:a0 (SET FEATURES) filtered out
ata1: FORCE: cable set to 80c
ata5: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3.00: disabled
sd 2:0:0:0: rejecting I/O to offline device
ata3.00: detaching (SCSI 2:0:0:0)
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Start/Stop Unit failed: Result: hostbyte=DID_NO_CONNECT
driverbyte=DRIVER_OK
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronizing SCSI cache
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronize Cache(10) failed: Result:
hostbyte=DID_BAD_TARGET driverbyte=DRIVER_OK
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Stopping disk
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Start/Stop Unit failed: Result: hostbyte=DID_BAD_TARGET
driverbyte=DRIVER_OK
Commit c312ef176399 dropped ahci_pci_reset_controller() which internally
calls ahci_reset_controller() and applies the PCS quirk if needed after
that. It was called each time a reset was required instead of just
ahci_reset_controller(). This patch puts the function back in place.
Fixes: c312ef176399 ("libata/ahci: Drop PCS quirk for Denverton and beyond") Signed-off-by: Adam Vodopjan <grozzly@protonmail.com> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Commit 64dc8c732f5c ("block, bfq: fix possible uaf for 'bfqq->bic'")
will access 'bic->bfqq' in bic_set_bfqq(), however, bfq_exit_icq_bfqq()
can free bfqq first, and then call bic_set_bfqq(), which will cause uaf.
Fix the problem by moving bfq_exit_bfqq() behind bic_set_bfqq().
Fixes: 64dc8c732f5c ("block, bfq: fix possible uaf for 'bfqq->bic'") Reported-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221226030605.1437081-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The apple-gmux driver only binds to old GMUX devices which have an
IORESOURCE_IO resource (using inb()/outb()) rather then memory-mapped
IO (IORESOURCE_MEM).
T2 MacBooks use the new style GMUX devices (with IORESOURCE_MEM access),
so these are not supported by the apple-gmux driver. This is not a problem
since they have working ACPI video backlight support.
But the apple_gmux_present() helper only checks if an ACPI device with
the "APP000B" HID is present, causing acpi_video_get_backlight_type()
to return acpi_backlight_apple_gmux disabling the acpi_video backlight
device.
Add a new apple_gmux_backlight_present() helper which checks that
the "APP000B" device actually is an old GMUX device with an IORESOURCE_IO
resource.
This fixes the acpi_video0 backlight no longer registering on T2 MacBooks.
Note people are working to add support for the new style GMUX to Linux:
https://github.com/kekrby/linux-t2/commits/wip/hybrid-graphics
Once this lands this patch should be reverted so that
acpi_video_get_backlight_type() also prefers the gmux on new style GMUX
MacBooks, but for now this is necessary to avoid regressing backlight
control on T2 Macs.
Fixes: 21245df307cb ("ACPI: video: Add Apple GMUX brightness control detection") Reported-and-tested-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The Asus ExpertBook B2502 has the same keyboard issue as Asus Vivobook
K3402ZA/K3502ZA. The kernel overrides IRQ 1 to Edge_High when it
should be Active_Low.
This patch adds the ExpertBook B2502 model to the existing
quirk list of Asus laptops with this issue.
Fixes: b5f9223a105d ("ACPI: resource: Skip IRQ override on Asus Vivobook S5602ZA") Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2142574 Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Commit bfcdf58380b1 ("ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on LENOVO IdeaPad")
added an override for Lenovo IdeaPad 5 16ALC7. The 14ALC7 variant also
suffers from a broken touchscreen and trackpad.
Fixes: 9946e39fe8d0 ("ACPI: resource: skip IRQ override on AMD Zen platforms") Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216804 Signed-off-by: Adrian Freund <adrian@freund.io> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The Schenker XMG CORE 15 (M22) is Ryzen-6 based and needs IRQ overriding
for the keyboard to work. Adding an entry for this laptop to the
override_table makes the internal keyboard functional again.
Signed-off-by: Erik Schumacher <ofenfisch@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Stable-dep-of: f3cb9b740869 ("ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on Lenovo 14ALC7") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Convert the max size to bytes to match the units of the divisor that
calculates the worst-case number of PRP entries.
The result is used to determine how many PRP Lists are required. The
code was previously rounding this to 1 list, but we can require 2 in the
worst case. In that scenario, the driver would corrupt memory beyond the
size provided by the mempool.
While unlikely to occur (you'd need a 4MB in exactly 127 phys segments
on a queue that doesn't support SGLs), this memory corruption has been
observed by kfence.
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Fixes: 943e942e6266f ("nvme-pci: limit max IO size and segments to avoid high order allocations") Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
When using shadow doorbells, the event index and the doorbell values are
written to host memory. Prior to this patch, the values written would
erroneously be written in host endianness. This causes trouble on
big-endian platforms. Fix this by adding missing endian conversions.
This issue was noticed by Guenter while testing various big-endian
platforms under QEMU[1]. A similar fix required for hw/nvme in QEMU is
up for review as well[2].
Pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE when signaling eventfd or doing poll related
wakups, so that we can check for a circular event dependency between
eventfd and epoll. If this flag is set when our wakeup handlers are
called, then we know we have a dependency that needs to terminate
multishot requests.
eventfd and epoll are the only such possible dependencies.
This is identical to eventfd_signal(), but it allows the caller to pass
in a mask to be used for the poll wakeup key. The use case is avoiding
repeated multishot triggers if we have a dependency between eventfd and
io_uring.
If we setup an eventfd context and register that as the io_uring eventfd,
and at the same time queue a multishot poll request for the eventfd
context, then any CQE posted will repeatedly trigger the multishot request
until it terminates when the CQ ring overflows.
In preparation for io_uring detecting this circular dependency, add the
mentioned helper so that io_uring can pass in EPOLL_URING as part of the
poll wakeup key.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.0
[axboe: fold in !CONFIG_EVENTFD fix from Zhang Qilong] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Stable-dep-of: 4464853277d0 ("io_uring: pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE for eventfd signaling and wakeups") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
We can have dependencies between epoll and io_uring. Consider an epoll
context, identified by the epfd file descriptor, and an io_uring file
descriptor identified by iofd. If we add iofd to the epfd context, and
arm a multishot poll request for epfd with iofd, then the multishot
poll request will repeatedly trigger and generate events until terminated
by CQ ring overflow. This isn't a desired behavior.
Add EPOLL_URING so that io_uring can pass it in as part of the poll wakeup
key, and io_uring can check for that to detect a potential recursive
invocation.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.0 Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Stable-dep-of: 4464853277d0 ("io_uring: pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE for eventfd signaling and wakeups") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The value of NSEC_PER_SEC << PWM_DUTY_WIDTH doesn't fix within a 32 bit
integer causing a build warning/error (and the value truncated):
drivers/pwm/pwm-tegra.c: In function ‘tegra_pwm_config’:
drivers/pwm/pwm-tegra.c:148:53: error: result of ‘1000000000 << 8’ requires 39 bits to represent, but ‘long int’ only has 32 bits [-Werror=shift-overflow=]
148 | required_clk_rate = DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(NSEC_PER_SEC << PWM_DUTY_WIDTH,
| ^~
Explicitly cast to a u64 to ensure the correct result.
We should set the return value to -ENOMEM explicitly when
create_singlethread_workqueue() fails in stmmac_dvr_probe(),
otherwise we'll lose the error value.
Fixes: a137f3f27f92 ("net: stmmac: fix possible memory leak in stmmac_dvr_probe()") Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221214080117.3514615-1-cuigaosheng1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Read cq_timeouts in io_flush_timeouts() only after taking the
timeout_lock, as it's protected by it. There are many places where we
also grab ->completion_lock, but for instance io_timeout_fn() doesn't
and still modifies cq_timeouts.
If we're not allocating the vectors because the count is below
UIO_FASTIOV, we still do need to properly clear ->free_iov to prevent
an erronous free of on-stack data.
We should not be messing with req->file outside of core paths. Clearing
it makes msg_ring non reentrant, i.e. luckily io_msg_send_fd() fails the
request on failed io_double_lock_ctx() but clearly was originally
intended to do retries instead.
It might be useful for applications to detect if a zero copy transfer with
SEND[MSG]_ZC was actually possible or not. The application can fallback to
plain SEND[MSG] in order to avoid the overhead of two cqes per request. Or
it can generate a log message that could indicate to an administrator that
no zero copy was possible and could explain degraded performance.
When a gendisk is successfully initialized but add_disk() fails such as when
a loop device has invalid number of minor device numbers specified,
blkcg_init_disk() is called during init and then blkcg_exit_disk() during
error handling. Unfortunately, iolatency gets initialized in the former but
doesn't get cleaned up in the latter.
This is because, in non-error cases, the cleanup is performed by
del_gendisk() calling rq_qos_exit(), the assumption being that rq_qos
policies, iolatency being one of them, can only be activated once the disk
is fully registered and visible. That assumption is true for wbt and iocost,
but not so for iolatency as it gets initialized before add_disk() is called.
It is desirable to lazy-init rq_qos policies because they are optional
features and add to hot path overhead once initialized - each IO has to walk
all the registered rq_qos policies. So, we want to switch iolatency to lazy
init too. However, that's a bigger change. As a fix for the immediate
problem, let's just add an extra call to rq_qos_exit() in blkcg_exit_disk().
This is safe because duplicate calls to rq_qos_exit() become noop's.
hugetlb does not support fake write-faults (write faults without write
permissions). However, we are currently able to trigger a
FAULT_FLAG_WRITE fault on a VMA without VM_WRITE.
If we'd ever want to support FOLL_FORCE|FOLL_WRITE, we'd have to teach
hugetlb to:
(1) Leave the page mapped R/O after the fake write-fault, like
maybe_mkwrite() does.
(2) Allow writing to an exclusive anon page that's mapped R/O when
FOLL_FORCE is set, like can_follow_write_pte(). E.g.,
__follow_hugetlb_must_fault() needs adjustment.
For now, it's not clear if that added complexity is really required.
History tolds us that FOLL_FORCE is dangerous and that we better limit its
use to a bare minimum.
if (pwrite(mem_fd, "0", 1, (uintptr_t) map) == 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "write() succeeded, which is unexpected\n");
return 1;
}
printf("write() failed as expected: %d\n", errno);
return 0;
}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fortunately, we have a sanity check in hugetlb_wp() in place ever since
commit 1d8d14641fd9 ("mm/hugetlb: support write-faults in shared
mappings"), that bails out instead of silently mapping a page writable in
a !PROT_WRITE VMA.
Consequently, above reproducer triggers a warning, similar to the one
reported by szsbot:
So let's silence that warning by teaching GUP code that FOLL_FORCE -- so
far -- does not apply to hugetlb.
Note that FOLL_FORCE for read-access seems to be working as expected. The
assumption is that this has been broken forever, only ever since above
commit, we actually detect the wrong handling and WARN_ON_ONCE().
I assume this has been broken at least since 2014, when mm/gup.c came to
life. I failed to come up with a suitable Fixes tag quickly.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221031152524.173644-1-david@redhat.com Fixes: 1d8d14641fd9 ("mm/hugetlb: support write-faults in shared mappings") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reported-by: <syzbot+f0b97304ef90f0d0b1dc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If we get -ENOMEM while dropping file extent items in a given range, at
btrfs_drop_extents(), due to failure to allocate memory when attempting to
increment the reference count for an extent or drop the reference count,
we handle it with a BUG_ON(). This is excessive, instead we can simply
abort the transaction and return the error to the caller. In fact most
callers of btrfs_drop_extents(), directly or indirectly, already abort
the transaction if btrfs_drop_extents() returns any error.
Also, we already have error paths at btrfs_drop_extents() that may return
-ENOMEM and in those cases we abort the transaction, like for example
anything that changes the b+tree may return -ENOMEM due to a failure to
allocate a new extent buffer when COWing an existing extent buffer, such
as a call to btrfs_duplicate_item() for example.
So replace the BUG_ON() calls with proper logic to abort the transaction
and return the error.
Reported-by: syzbot+0b1fb6b0108c27419f9f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000089773e05ee4b9cb4@google.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ovl_dentry_revalidate_common() can be called in rcu-walk mode. As document
said, "in rcu-walk mode, d_parent and d_inode should not be used without
care".
Check inode here to protect access under rcu-walk mode.
syzbot is reporting memory leak at fbcon_do_set_font() [1], for
commit a5a923038d70 ("fbdev: fbcon: Properly revert changes when
vc_resize() failed") missed that the buffer might be newly allocated
by fbcon_set_font().
Mike Rapoport contacted me off-list with a regression in running criu.
Periodic tests fail with an RCU stall during execution. Although rare, it
is possible to hit this with other uses so this patch should be backported
to fix the regression.
This patchset adds the fix and a test case to the maple tree test
suite.
This patch (of 2):
An insufficient node was causing an out-of-bounds access on the node in
mas_leaf_max_gap(). The cause was the faulty detection of the new node
being a root node when overwriting many entries at the end of the tree.
Fix the detection of a new root and ensure there is sufficient data prior
to entering the spanning rebalance loop.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221219161922.2708732-1-Liam.Howlett@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221219161922.2708732-2-Liam.Howlett@oracle.com Fixes: 54a611b60590 ("Maple Tree: add new data structure") Signed-off-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Reported-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If the floppy_alloc_disk() failed, disks of current drive will not be set,
thus the lastest allocated set->tag cannot be freed in the error handling
path. A simple call graph shown as below:
->out_put_disk:
for (drive = 0; drive < N_DRIVE; drive++)
if (!disks[drive][0]) # the last disks is not set and loop break
break;
blk_mq_free_tag_set() # the latest allocated set->tag leaked
Fix this problem by free the set->tag of current drive before jump to
error handling path.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 302cfee15029 ("floppy: use a separate gendisk for each media format") Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan@huawei.com>
[efremov: added stable list, changed title] Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit c9bfcb315104 ("spi_mpc83xx: much improved driver") made
modifications to the driver to not perform speed changes while
chipselect is active. But those changes where lost with the
convertion to tranfer_one.
Previous implementation was allowing speed changes during
message transfer when cs_change flag was set.
At the time being, core SPI does not provide any feature to change
speed while chipselect is off, so do not allow any speed change during
message transfer, and perform the transfer setup in prepare_message
in order to set correct speed while chipselect is still off.
When updating the operating mode as part of regulator enable, the caller
has already locked the regulator tree and drms_uA_update() must not try
to do the same in order not to trigger a deadlock.
The lock inversion is reported by lockdep as:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.1.0-next-20221215 #142 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
udevd/154 is trying to acquire lock: ffffc11f123d7e50 (regulator_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regulator_lock_dependent+0x54/0x280
but task is already holding lock: ffff80000e4c36e8 (regulator_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: regulator_enable+0x34/0x80
The constant AD74413R_ADC_RESULT_MAX is defined via GENMASK, so its
type is "unsigned long".
Hence in the expression voltage_offset * AD74413R_ADC_RESULT_MAX,
voltage_offset is first promoted to unsigned long, and since it may be
negative, that results in a garbage value. For example, when range is
AD74413R_ADC_RANGE_5V_BI_DIR, voltage_offset is -2500 and
voltage_range is 5000, so the RHS of this assignment is, depending on
sizeof(long), either 826225UL or 3689348814709142UL, which after
truncation to int then results in either 826225 or 1972216214 being
the output from in_currentX_offset.
Casting to int avoids that promotion and results in the correct -32767
output.
projects / linux-stable / log