usb: rndis_host: Secure rndis_query check against int overflow

[ Upstream commit c7dd13805f8b8fc1ce3b6d40f6aff47e66b72ad2 ]

Variables off and len typed as uint32 in rndis_query function
are controlled by incoming RNDIS response message thus their
value may be manipulated. Setting off to a unexpectetly large
value will cause the sum with len and 8 to overflow and pass
the implemented validation step. Consequently the response
pointer will be referring to a location past the expected
buffer boundaries allowing information leakage e.g. via
RNDIS_OID_802_3_PERMANENT_ADDRESS OID.

Fixes: ddda08624013 ("USB: rndis_host, various cleanups")
Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c b/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c
index ab41a63aa4aaa667b6099a48b4a690fa5d9ae708..497d6bcdc2762866c3614cc035a4aa34297eb951 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c
@@ -267,7 +267,8 @@ static int rndis_query(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf,
 
        off = le32_to_cpu(u.get_c->offset);
        len = le32_to_cpu(u.get_c->len);
-       if (unlikely((8 + off + len) > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE))
+       if (unlikely((off > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE - 8) ||
+                    (len > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE - 8 - off)))
                goto response_error;
 
        if (*reply_len != -1 && len != *reply_len)