netfilter: xt_osf: Add missing permission checks

commit 916a27901de01446bcf57ecca4783f6cff493309 upstream.

The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, xt_osf_fingers is shared by all net namespaces on the
system.  An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:

    vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os

    vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os -d

These non-root operations successfully modify the systemwide OS
fingerprint list.  Add new capable() checks so that they can't.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
index 2455b69b58104366e4670967f7a169994af3ea97..b589a62e68a29a56e842e8b1bb01df885f6154a4 100644 (file)
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/if.h>
 #include <linux/inetdevice.h>
 #include <linux/ip.h>
@@ -69,6 +70,9 @@ static int xt_osf_add_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
        struct xt_osf_finger *kf = NULL, *sf;
        int err = 0;
 
+       if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;
+
        if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
                return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -113,6 +117,9 @@ static int xt_osf_remove_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
        struct xt_osf_finger *sf;
        int err = -ENOENT;
 
+       if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;
+
        if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
                return -EINVAL;