ext4: clear i_data in ext4_inode_info when removing inline data

commit 6e8ab72a812396996035a37e5ca4b3b99b5d214b upstream.

When converting from an inode from storing the data in-line to a data
block, ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock() was only clearing the on-disk
copy of the i_blocks[] array.  It was not clearing copy of the
i_blocks[] in ext4_inode_info, in i_data[], which is the copy actually
used by ext4_map_blocks().

This didn't matter much if we are using extents, since the extents
header would be invalid and thus the extents could would re-initialize
the extents tree.  But if we are using indirect blocks, the previous
contents of the i_blocks array will be treated as block numbers, with
potentially catastrophic results to the file system integrity and/or
user data.

This gets worse if the file system is using a 1k block size and
s_first_data is zero, but even without this, the file system can get
quite badly corrupted.

This addresses CVE-2018-10881.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200015

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c
index 3006b81c107fd4ca83975e5d057884fc36ed516f..e72f53a897647ed7fdd618b8e965a165b5df7566 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/ext4/inline.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ static int ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock(handle_t *handle,
 
        memset((void *)ext4_raw_inode(&is.iloc)->i_block,
                0, EXT4_MIN_INLINE_DATA_SIZE);
+       memset(ei->i_data, 0, EXT4_MIN_INLINE_DATA_SIZE);
 
        if (ext4_has_feature_extents(inode->i_sb)) {
                if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) ||