sctp: Free cookie before we memdup a new one

[ Upstream commit ce950f1050cece5e406a5cde723c69bba60e1b26 ]

Based on comments from Xin, even after fixes for our recent syzbot
report of cookie memory leaks, its possible to get a resend of an INIT
chunk which would lead to us leaking cookie memory.

To ensure that we don't leak cookie memory, free any previously
allocated cookie first.

Change notes
v1->v2
update subsystem tag in subject (davem)
repeat kfree check for peer_random and peer_hmacs (xin)

v2->v3
net->sctp
also free peer_chunks

v3->v4
fix subject tags

v4->v5
remove cut line

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+f7e9153b037eac9b1df8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
CC: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 4edb4f5596b81114ea7a1076cf5c56cbee9fdb0d..f67df16bd3409b6a4427b2d102ec4f25e0c2cae7 100644 (file)
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -2586,6 +2586,8 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
        case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
                asoc->peer.cookie_len =
                        ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
+               if (asoc->peer.cookie)
+                       kfree(asoc->peer.cookie);
                asoc->peer.cookie = kmemdup(param.cookie->body, asoc->peer.cookie_len, gfp);
                if (!asoc->peer.cookie)
                        retval = 0;
@@ -2650,6 +2652,8 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
                        goto fall_through;
 
                /* Save peer's random parameter */
+               if (asoc->peer.peer_random)
+                       kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random);
                asoc->peer.peer_random = kmemdup(param.p,
                                            ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
                if (!asoc->peer.peer_random) {
@@ -2663,6 +2667,8 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
                        goto fall_through;
 
                /* Save peer's HMAC list */
+               if (asoc->peer.peer_hmacs)
+                       kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs);
                asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = kmemdup(param.p,
                                            ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
                if (!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) {
@@ -2678,6 +2684,8 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
                if (!ep->auth_enable)
                        goto fall_through;
 
+               if (asoc->peer.peer_chunks)
+                       kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
                asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p,
                                            ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
                if (!asoc->peer.peer_chunks)