ext4: remove a BUG_ON in ext4_mb_release_group_pa()

commit 463808f237cf73e98a1a45ff7460c2406a150a0b upstream.

If a malicious fuzzer overwrites the ext4 superblock while it is
mounted such that the s_first_data_block is set to a very large
number, the calculation of the block group can underflow, and trigger
a BUG_ON check.  Change this to be an ext4_warning so that we don't
crash the kernel.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230430154311.579720-3-tytso@mit.edu
Reported-by: syzbot+e2efa3efc15a1c9e95c3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=69b28112e098b070f639efb356393af3ffec4220
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
index a93bd342e0ae6880809d0c4045b2c40e19e7c150..d9f2fde2e3e92629080f304caa520f485d126b8b 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
@@ -3921,7 +3921,11 @@ ext4_mb_release_group_pa(struct ext4_buddy *e4b,
        trace_ext4_mb_release_group_pa(sb, pa);
        BUG_ON(pa->pa_deleted == 0);
        ext4_get_group_no_and_offset(sb, pa->pa_pstart, &group, &bit);
-       BUG_ON(group != e4b->bd_group && pa->pa_len != 0);
+       if (unlikely(group != e4b->bd_group && pa->pa_len != 0)) {
+               ext4_warning(sb, "bad group: expected %u, group %u, pa_start %llu",
+                            e4b->bd_group, group, pa->pa_pstart);
+               return 0;
+       }
        mb_free_blocks(pa->pa_inode, e4b, bit, pa->pa_len);
        atomic_add(pa->pa_len, &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mb_discarded);
        trace_ext4_mballoc_discard(sb, NULL, group, bit, pa->pa_len);