riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage

commit d14fa1fcf69db9d070e75f1c4425211fa619dfc8 upstream.

childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.

[From the email thread]

The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.

childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:

1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
   register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
   sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
   zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.

   This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only
   way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.

2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
   before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
   happen at user/kernel boundaries.

3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for
   user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the
   registers it returns.

4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel
   addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses
   are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under
   LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.

5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have
   not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user
   registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.

Fixes: 7db91e57a0ac ("RISC-V: Task implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan O'Rear <sorear@fastmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327061258.2370291-1-sorear@fastmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
index 6abeecbfc51d0245fdce5aca5746eb070c86347b..e4bc61c4e58af9c6c3914692c240021d053d72d8 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@
 #include <asm/vector.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 
-register unsigned long gp_in_global __asm__("gp");
-
 #if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR) && !defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK)
 #include <linux/stackprotector.h>
 unsigned long __stack_chk_guard __read_mostly;
@@ -207,7 +205,6 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
        if (unlikely(args->fn)) {
                /* Kernel thread */
                memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
-               childregs->gp = gp_in_global;
                /* Supervisor/Machine, irqs on: */
                childregs->status = SR_PP | SR_PIE;